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Federal grants are one of the government’s most important policy tools. 
While high-profile debates about constitutional coercion, entitlement reform, 
and budget cuts receive most of the public attention given to federal grants, a 
more prosaic but equally important reality describes the operation of these 
grants on the ground: the web of detailed rules and massive enforcement 
structure devoted to the administrative side of federal grants, which this Article 
refers to as “the grants-management regime.” Unacknowledged in the legal 
literature, the grants-management regime drives the implementation of federal 
grants and tells a very different story than the standard concern about feckless 
agency enforcement action of federal grants. That is, the powerful grants-
management regime creates strong incentives that unintentionally undermine 
grantees’ ability to accomplish the underlying policy purposes of their grants. 
By mapping out the rules and the institutional realities in relationships among 
congressional committees, the Office of Management and Budget, agencies, 
grantees, and auditors, the Article identifies unintended consequences that 
result from the grants-management regime and unwarranted assumptions on 
which the regime relies. The Article then develops reform options to improve 
the functioning of the system in light of the critical role federal grants play in 
contemporary American governance. 
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Introduction 
Grants are an important policy instrument for the federal government, 
serving as “the lifeblood of government services across the country.”1 In fiscal 
 
1. Subash Kari, 5 Fixes for Grants Management, GCN (Mar. 24, 2017), 
https://gcn.com/Articles/2017/03/24/Fixes-for-grants-management.aspx [https://perma.cc/E2GY-
WFTS]; see also Eloise Pasachoff, Agency Enforcement of Spending Clause Statutes: A Defense of the 
Funding Cut-Off, 124 YALE L.J. 248, 255-58 (2014) (“Consider these facts: The cabinet agency that 
gives the least money in grants each year, the Treasury Department, in 2012 nonetheless provided more 
in grant money than did the MacArthur Foundation, a giant in American private philanthropy. The 
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year 2019, the most recent year for which complete figures are available, 
federal grants to state and local governments clocked in at more than seven 
hundred billion dollars, constituting over sixteen percent of the entire federal 
budget, and representing almost a quarter of all state and local expenditures.2 
Federal grants play a significant role for nonprofit organizations as well.3 
Federal grants support policies as diverse as education and health, 
transportation and food security, emergency management and community 
development.4 
Given the importance of federal grants to contemporary American 
governance, a key question is whether they are working well to accomplish 
their underlying policy purposes. It is often suggested that they are not.  One 
reason frequently offered for this failure is that agencies have insufficient tools 
to enforce the terms of the grants against noncompliant grantees.5 Individual 
bad actors may be prosecuted for fraud,6 to be sure, but agency enforcement of 
federal grantees’ overall implementation of their funding programs is 
 
Environmental Protection Agency, better known for its work in direct regulation than in grants, provided 
$1.5 billion more in grant money in 2012 than did the Gates Foundation, the largest private grant-
making institution in the world. And the cabinet agency that gives the most money in grants each year, 
the Department of Health and Human Services, provided more grant money in 2012 than any individual 
state spent on its entire budget.”). 
2. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE UNITED 
STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2021: ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES at 202 tbl.14-1. In some policy 
areas, federal grants “account . . . for more than half of state government funding.” CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R40638, FEDERAL GRANTS TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 1 (2019) [hereinafter CRS, FEDERAL GRANTS]. 
3. See, e.g., Sarah L. Pettijohn et al., Nonprofit-Government Contracts and Grants: Findings 
from the 2013 National Survey, URB. INST. 9, 11, 13 (2013), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/24231/412962-Nonprofit-Government-Contracts-
and-Grants-Findings-from-the-National-Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/BZJ2-BVVS] (discussing the 
significance of government grants in general and federal grants in particular for nonprofit 
organizations). 
4. See CRS, FEDERAL GRANTS, supra note 2, at 1. In times of crisis, the federal government’s 
reliance on grants as a policy tool is even more apparent, as Congress’s response to the coronavirus 
emergency, unfolding as this Article goes to press in the spring of 2020, makes plain. Congress passed 
multiple statutes in short order giving federal agencies one-time infusions of hundreds of billions of 
additional dollars to provide in grant funding across a wide array of policy areas and all over the 
country. See, e.g., Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, H.R. 748, 116th 
Cong. (2020) (enacted); Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, div. A, tits. I, 
IV, V, VI, 134 Stat. 178, 179-80, 181-83 (2020); Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental 
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 116-123, tit. III, 134 Stat. 146, 147-151 (2020); CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R46298, THE CORONAVIRUS RELIEF FUND (CARES ACT, TITLE V): BACKGROUND AND STATE 
AND LOCAL ALLOCATIONS 1-2 (2020). Debates about still additional hundreds of billions of dollars in 
federal aid to state and local governments are underway. See, e.g., Seung Min Kim, Tensions Emerge 
Between Republicans Over Coronavirus Spending and How to Rescue the Economy, WASH. POST (Apr. 
25, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/republicans-trump-coronavirus-spending-deficit-
economy/2020/04/25/9013c5ee-8671-11ea-a3eb-e9fc93160703_story.html [https://perma.cc/5ZSS-
3GKZ] (describing proposals ranging from $500 billion to $700 billion in additional one-time aid to 
state and local governments). 
5. See, e.g., Pasachoff, supra note 1, at 251-53 (describing such claims). 
6. See, e.g., Matt Zapotosky, Justice Dept. Anticipates Coronavirus Stimulus Will Be a Major 
Target for Fraud, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/coronavirus-
stimulus-fraud/2020/04/22/f17d952a-833e-11ea-878a-86477a724bdb_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/38AU-H5AA] (describing individual prosecutions for fraudulent spending of previous 
disaster-relief funding). 
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understood to be rare. Withholding grant funds—the perceived main 
enforcement tool—is seen as a “nuclear option” that would hurt needy 
beneficiaries and interfere with federalism values, the story goes; agencies have 
little motivation or capacity and insufficient political capital to take such a 
drastic step.7 
In fact, this story is only partially accurate. While it is true that agencies 
almost never withhold federal funds when grantees are out of compliance with 
the substantive requirements of their grant statutes, agencies claw back money 
all the time for violations of procedural grants-management rules. In the last 
few years, for example, the financially troubled cities of Camden, Detroit, 
Flint, and Stockton had to pay back millions of dollars in housing, 
transportation, justice, and health grants for poor record-keeping in outdated 
accounting systems.8 Another local jurisdiction was subject to a loss of more 
than $6 million dollars in federal emergency-management money for soliciting 
bids for disaster-related work only from contractors with which it was 
familiar.9 Rhode Island had to pay back almost $2 million dollars of welfare 
funding for failure to keep an adequate eligibility and verification system in 
place.10 Pennsylvania had to pay back $3 million dollars in Medicaid funding 
for recording certain program costs as administrative instead of training-
related, and then for trying to change that documentation too late.11 The list 
goes on. In all these cases, state and local governments repaid millions of 
dollars to the federal government, not for failure to meet the grant program’s 
performance goals or to support the grant program’s activities, and not for 
fraud, but rather for failure to comply with detailed administrative requirements 
set forth in grants-management rules. 
This Article shines a light on these grants-management rules and the 
enforcement system in which they are embedded—collectively, the grants-
management regime. This regime, as yet unexplored in the legal literature, is 
the operational reality for financial-management officials in the White House’s 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB), the twenty-six federal grant-
making agencies, and several hundred thousand state, local, and nonprofit 
grantees around the country. 
As these players know well, the federal grants-management rules (some 
statutory, some promulgated by OMB, all enforced by street-level auditors 
 
7. See Pasachoff, supra note 1, at 253-55 (describing this story in the context of advocating for 
more enforcement of the substantive terms of Spending Clause statutes). 
8. Liz Farmer, How Cities Lose Millions in Federal Funds, GOVERNING (Apr. 16, 2015, 5:00 
PM), https://www.governing.com/topics/finance/gov-distressed-cities-often-lose-millions-federal-
funds.html [https://perma.cc/T5XM-DZAN]. 
9. DHS OIG Offers Tips for Better Funding Oversight, FED. GRANTS MGMT. HANDBOOK, 
Dec. 2017, at 11. 
10. Appeals Board Upholds Rhode Island TANF Penalty, FED. GRANTS MGMT. HANDBOOK, 
June 2014, at 7. 
11. Pa. Agency’s Medicaid Training Costs Disallowed, FED. GRANTS MGMT. HANDBOOK, 
Aug. 2015, at 10. 
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around the country) have a big effect on grant implementation, and thus on the 
achievement of the policy goals of the statute and of the appropriations creating 
a grant in the first place. While the grants-management rules are designed to 
promote accountability for federal funds and to prevent against fraud, waste, 
and abuse,12 they have unintended consequences. For example, because of a 
regularized enforcement structure through annual individualized audits 
conducted by nonfederal auditors, surveys routinely find that grantees spend 
more time on compliance activities under the grants-management rules (such as 
paperwork) than on improving performance.13 Sometimes, in order to simplify 
compliance activities and avoid the potential of losing federal funding for 
noncompliance, grantees end up designing their programs in a way that runs 
counter to the overall purpose of the grant, making it more difficult to 
accomplish the program’s goals.14 In turn, policymakers may decide to stop 
funding a program or to redesign its substantive requirements without 
recognizing that it is grants-management rules, not substantive requirements or 
grantee competence, that are at issue.15 
Understanding this regime is important. Yet aside from a small set of 
players in the financial-management community, these rules do not typically 
receive attention from policymakers or the public.16 Instead, federal grants tend 
to be seen through the lens of high-profile debates about coercion,17 entitlement 
reform,18 and budget cuts.19 These are important topics, to be sure. And as 
 
12. See, e.g., Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements 
for Federal Awards, 78 Fed. Reg. 78590, 78590 (Dec. 26, 2013) (explaining that these grants-
management rules will “improve the integrity of the financial management and operation of Federal 
programs and strengthen accountability for Federal dollars by improving policies that protect against 
waste, fraud, and abuse”). 
13. Study: Funding Uncertainty Remains Key Grants Management Concern, FED. GRANTS 
MGMT. HANDBOOK, Apr. 2019, at 1, 5; Charles S. Clark, Obama Grantmaking Reforms Are Thriving 
Under Trump, Officials Say, GOV’T EXEC. (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://www.govexec.com/management/2018/01/obama-grantmaking-reforms-are-thriving-under-trump-
officials-say/145451 [https://perma.cc/S2A6-PQFH]. 
14. See infra notes 261-264 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra note 288 and accompanying text. 
16. Shelley H. Metzenbaum, Rethinking Federal Grants Management: From Oversight to 
Insight, GOV’T EXEC. (Feb. 3, 2016), https://www.govexec.com/management/2016/02/rethinking-
federal-grants-management-oversight-insight/125637 [https://perma.cc/6TYA-8E5A] (“Grants are 
among the most important tools the federal government uses to accomplish its objectives. Sadly, the 
way federal grants are managed gets woefully little attention.”). 
17. See, e.g., ALEC, Draft Act to Identify Coercive Federal Funds in the Budget of [Insert 
State] (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.alec.org/model-policy/draft-act-to-identify-coercive-federal-funds-
in-the-budget-of-insert-state [https://perma.cc/8DUW-L5UR] (seeking to “‘operationalize’ Justice 
O’Connor’s dissent in South Dakota v. Dole (1987) and the Medicaid portion of the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in NFIB v. Sebelius (2012)”). 
18. See, e.g., Ronald Brownstein, There’s No Way Congress Is Going to Fix Entitlements, 
ATLANTIC (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/01/gop-tax-bill-
entitlement-reform/549623 [https://perma.cc/LZ9E-XQYJ]; Tom Rogan, On Entitlement Reform, Trump 
Has Morality on His Side, WASH. EXAMINER (Mar. 11, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/on-entitlement-reform-trump-has-morality-on-his-side 
[https://perma.cc/D2D8-ETVP]. 
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against these attention-grabbing things, the grants-management rules seem 
technical, perhaps even boring. As with many other kinds of procedural and 
administrative rules, it is easy to tune out and miss their importance.20 But, as 
with those other kinds of procedural and administrative rules, doing so is a 
mistake. 
Paying attention to the grants-management regime indicates that, far from 
the standard concern about feckless agency enforcement of federal grants, there 
is instead a huge infrastructure dedicated to grant enforcement—but this 
infrastructure is focused on administrative compliance rather than on 
substantive grant goals. If grantees end up focusing more on paperwork than on 
achieving grant program goals as a result of this enforcement prioritization, 
there is reason to question whether the system governing seven hundred billion 
dollars of federal money each year is working as it should. 
In focusing on the grants-management regime, this Article situates itself 
within two strands of contemporary scholarship—the project of “internal 
administrative law” on the one hand and the project of “intergovernmental 
management” on the other—in a way that seeks to connect the disparate fields 
of administrative law and public administration.21 
Internal administrative law emphasizes the importance of seeing 
administrative law as more than simply external constraints on agency action, 
focusing instead on the centrality of internal measures “such as management 
structures, guidance, planning and coordination, civil service, professionalism, 
and the like.”22 One goal of this Article is to provide an intergovernmental case 
study where internal administrative law reigns supreme.23 The story told in the 
pages that follow is not one where external constraints on intergovernmental 
agency relations figure prominently. By detailing the way the grants-
management regime works, this Article illustrates “both internal 
administration’s lawlike character and its importance for ensuring the rule of 
law in today’s world of administrative governance”24 at this prime site of 
 
19. See, e.g., Kate Rabinowitz & Kevin Uhrmacher, What Trump Proposed in His 2020 
Budget, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/politics/trump-
budget-2020 [https://perma.cc/BJ7V-BTN3] (describing “substantial cuts” to domestic grant programs). 
20. Cf. J. Maria Glover, The Supreme Court’s “Non-Trans-substantive” Class Action, 165 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1625, 1662 (2017) (“[B]y emphasizing the ‘procedural’ features of those cases, the opinions 
tend to repel public interest and media scrutiny.”); Peter M. Shane, The Quiet GOP Campaign Against 
Government Regulation, ATLANTIC (Jan. 26, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/gop-complicates-regulation/514436 
[https://perma.cc/JR47-HTU7] (explaining that efforts to roll back important public-interest regulations 
“are largely shielded from public scrutiny because of the obscurity of the subject matter”). 
21. Cf. Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law, Public Administration, and the Administrative 
Conference of the United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1517, 1534 (2015) (arguing for the need to 
“bridge the current divide between administrative law and public administration”). 
22. Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law, 115 MICH. L. REV. 
1239, 1246 (2017). 
23. The internal administrative-law literature as it has recently developed has largely remained 
focused within the federal executive branch itself. See, e.g., id. at 1243 n.16 (collecting recent 
scholarship on internal administrative law, all focused solely on federal administration). 
24. Id. at 1290. 
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interaction between federal agency grantors and state- and local-agency 
grantees. 
For its part, intergovernmental management focuses on “pathways for 
improving governance in our intergovernmental system,” especially in its 
“fiscal, programmatic, and administrative capacity.”25 Like its cousin 
administrative federalism (a more familiar topic in the legal literature), 
intergovernmental management (a subfield of the public-administration 
literature) focuses on processes governing interactions between federal 
agencies and state and local governments. But where administrative federalism 
asks “whether federal agencies, and administrative law more generally, may be 
trusted to safeguard state autonomy,”26 and “seeks to advance federalism 
values through the administrative process and administrative law,”27 
intergovernmental management is more concerned with day-to-day operations 
after the dust settles on policy debates and a sprawling program actually has to 
be implemented.28 
This Article seeks to contribute to the intergovernmental-management 
literature in two ways. First, in its illustration and analysis of the grants-
management regime, it fills a gap in what is known about the flow of federal 
funds.29 Second, more generally, it shows what can be learned about 
intergovernmental management when legal documents and institutional 
processes are brought to the fore. For if administrative law often focuses on 
courts at the expense of understanding internal administration, the 
intergovernmental-management literature, and the public-administration 
literature more generally, often focus on management and administration 
without analysis of the legal frameworks that shape and constrain management 
and administration. This Article reflects an effort to bring these worlds 
together. 
 
25. TIMOTHY J. CONLAN & PAUL L. POSNER, INTERGOVERNMENTAL MANAGEMENT FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY 4-5 (2008). 
26. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV. 953, 
970 (2016). 
27. Miriam Seifter, States as Interest Groups in the Administrative Process, 100 VA. L. REV. 
953, 980 (2014). 
28. CARL W. STENBERG & DAVID K. HAMILTON, INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN 
TRANSITION: REFLECTIONS AND DIRECTIONS 6-7 (2018) (“The term ‘intergovernmental management’ 
has been used to underscore that effective implementation of programs requires skill in managing the 
various actors involved and navigating through complex intergovernmental and intersectoral 
relationships.”). 
29. As the late Paul Posner—former president of the American Society for Public 
Administration, board chair of the National Academy of Public Administration, and director of the 
Government Accountability Office’s work on the federal budget and intergovernmental fiscal 
management—wrote about intergovernmental grants toward the end of his career, “the cupboard is quite 
bare” when it comes to knowledge about “the real local environment and networks through which 
federal funds operate.” Paul L. Posner, The Daunting Challenge of Following the Federal Money, 
GOVERNING (Sept. 19, 2012, 11:00 AM), https://www.governing.com/columns/mgmt-insights/col-
recovery-act-transparency-challenge-following-federal-money.html [https://perma.cc/4BNV-7KWX] 
[hereinafter The Daunting Challenge]; see also The Passing of Paul Posner, AM. SOC’Y FOR PUB. 
ADMIN. (July 6, 2017), https://www.aspanet.org/aspa/About-ASPA/In-the-Community/Releases/Paul-
Posner.aspx [https://perma.cc/S7KW-RKSN]. 
09. PASACHOFF ARTICLE. FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2020  3:21 PM 
Yale Journal on Regulation  Vol. 37:573, 2020 
580 
 
Methodologically, this Article responds to the appeal in the literature on 
public choice and public law “for more contextual research on institutions,” for 
“rich case studies from a public choice perspective of how preferences, 
institutions, and procedures shape regulatory outcomes.”30 While not a formal 
work of public choice—the Article includes no modeling or empirical testing, 
for example—it nonetheless tells a story of institutional incentives and 
interactions in an iterative game. Drawing from a variety of industry 
publications and news stories about state, local, and federal interactions across 
the universe of federal grants, the Article treats agencies, grantees, auditors, 
and OMB as rational and self-interested.31 In so doing, it helps explain why the 
grants-management rules end up operating as they do. 
In part, the thrust of the Article is descriptive. Part I first explains the 
variety of grants-management rules and their legal sources, and then identifies 
the institutions and their subcomponents that create, implement, and enforce 
the rules. Part II next describes both unintended consequences that result from 
the rules and unwarranted assumptions on which the rules rely. That is, because 
of capacity limitations and the comparative ease of enforcing the grants-
management rules, agencies end up prioritizing administrative compliance over 
substantive compliance. In turn, grantees are incentivized to do the same, 
which leads to a series of negative consequences for program implementation 
and policy accomplishment. Prioritizing administrative compliance would be 
one thing if the integrity of the audit process could be relied on, as the regime 
implicitly assumes, but history and experience suggest concerns with such 
reliance. Moreover, while the grants-management rules are often presented 
entirely as neutral, good-government interventions, they can obscure an 
underlying political or substantive policy agenda, so a skeptical view of their 
operation is sometimes required. 
In addition to its descriptive focus, this Article has a normative 
component as well—for the problems of the grants-management regime may 
feed into the antiregulatory political environment that is currently gripping the 
nation. From the left, regulation is often portrayed as necessary to support 
human health, safety, and well-being.32 But to the extent that grants designed to 
advance those very values are bogged down in proverbial red tape that 
prioritizes box-checking compliance over substantive implementation, the 
grants-management rules can seem to undercut the value of government 
 
30. DANIEL A. FARBER & ANNE JOSEPH O’CONNELL, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC 
CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 13 (2010). 
31. Id. at 2. Conversations with grant practitioners in a range of roles, referenced in the 
acknowledgments footnote supra, further confirmed or refined intuitions gleaned from these written 
sources. 
32. See, e.g., Shane, supra note 20 (“Thanks to administrative regulation, Americans breathe 
cleaner air, drink cleaner water, eat healthier food, drive safer cars, work in safer environments, and 
have fairer and more secure access to education, housing, employment, telecommunications, and the 
ballot box.”); Rena Steinzor, The Truth About Regulation in America, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 323, 
324 (2011) (defending the “regulatory system we painstakingly constructed over four decades to protect 
health, safety, and the environment”). 
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involvement. It becomes harder to promote the proposition that regulation 
makes us safe when people experience this set of regulations as burdensome 
busywork at best33 or ridiculous restraints at worst.34 
Part III confronts this problem head on. It first considers potential 
reactions to the pathologies of the grants-management regime from the 
perspective of a government skeptic opposed to federal grants in the first place. 
Section III.A argues that the options that flow from this viewpoint are 
normatively undesirable, politically unfeasible, and administratively doomed. 
Section III.B then turns to reform options. While attending to the potential for 
political manipulation of grant reforms, that Section makes the case for 
modifying the incentive structure created by the grants-management regime—
changes that would improve the operation of this massive intergovernmental 
system and thereby help ensure that grant programs meet their intended, and 
important, goals. 
These reforms are only part of what is needed. As public-administration 
scholars Pamela Herd and Donald Moynihan have observed, the “failure to 
build a progressive politics around the goal of reducing administrative burdens 
puts liberals in a reactionary or technocratic mode when it comes to defending 
the capacity of the state to help its citizens.”35 This Article is not the place for 
building such a politics. But to be clear: in analyzing the role of burdens in the 
grants-management arena, the Article highlights the potential for increased 
capacity in the intergovernmental administrative state, rather than telling a 
story of government failure. 
 
33. See, e.g., NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G, & MED., OPTIMIZING THE NATION’S 
INVESTMENT IN ACADEMIC RESEARCH: A NEW REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 1 
(2016) (describing, as one of report’s central conclusions, the increasing regulation over grant funding 
for the “government-academic research partnership” that has “led over time to an environment wherein 
a significant percentage of an investigator’s time is spent complying with regulations,
 
taking valuable 
time away from research, education, and scholarship”). 
34. See, e.g., Bruce Eggler, FEMA Red Tape Strangling Local Governments, TIMES-
PICAYUNE, July 29, 2007 (describing critiques of FEMA grant rules as limiting recovery efforts from 
Hurricane Katrina); Kurt Erickson, New Report Finds Red Tape Is Limiting Help for Domestic Violence 
Victims in Missouri, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Sept. 17, 2018), 
https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/new-report-finds-red-tape-is-limiting-help-for-
domestic/article_84273156-336f-52c7-a524-5d4fb4770ea7.html [https://perma.cc/AG7M-55QP] 
(describing state auditor’s report concluding that grant rules keep domestic violence shelters from 
accessing available funding); Peter Salter, Red Tape, Grant Rules Will Keep Malone Center Teens from 
Taking Trip, LINCOLN J. STAR (Apr. 1, 2017), https://journalstar.com/news/local/red-tape-grant-rules-
will-keep-malone-center-teens-from/article_38e3f2e2-d3b7-59c4-952e-d65d73406c31.html 
[https://perma.cc/2HVQ-X33Y] (describing community outrage after grant rules prevented low-income 
youth from taking an out-of-state trip for which they had fundraised); Karen Lee Scrivo, Senator Seeks 
Flexibility for First Responders, GOV’T EXEC. (Apr. 28, 2003), 
https://www.govexec.com/defense/2003/04/senator-seeks-flexibility-for-first-responders/13936 
[https://perma.cc/R6C3-NQ8E] (describing local governments’ complaints that rules on using homeland 
security funds are “cumbersome” and “confusing”). 
35. PAMELA HERD & DONALD P. MOYNIHAN, ADMINISTRATIVE BURDEN: POLICYMAKING BY 
OTHER MEANS 244 (2018). 
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I. The Intergovernmental Grants-Management Regime 
This Part introduces the intergovernmental grants-management regime. It 
does so first by presenting a typology of the grants-management rules: those 
that exist in individual substantive grants statutes; trans-substantive rules 
developed by OMB; and state-level variations. It next highlights and 
disaggregates the key institutional players that bring the rules to life: 
congressional committees, grant-making agencies, OMB, grantees, and 
auditors. The goal of this Part is to make plain the scope of these rules and the 
vast institutional infrastructure that supports them. These rules are no 
afterthought, but are rather a core part of the way federal grants—and thus 
American policy—operate. 
A. Typology of Grants-Management Rules 
The key theme of the intergovernmental grants-management regime—
accountability for spending of federal dollars—dates back to the nation’s 
founding. Article I of the Constitution requires that “a regular statement and 
account of receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published 
from time to time,”36 and in the Treasury Act of 1789, the first Congress 
created the position of a national auditor to “to receive all public accounts, and 
after examination to certify the balance.”37 Concerns about financial 
accountability were also a core part of the post-Civil War Antideficiency Act, 
which limited agencies’ ability to spend unappropriated federal dollars,38 as 
well as the foundational 1921 Budget and Accounting Act,39 which created 
both OMB’s predecessor, the Bureau of the Budget (the BOB), and the General 
Accounting Office (the GAO, renamed the Government Accountability Office 
in 2004).40 
Such concerns were largely directed inward, to the functioning of the 
federal government itself, until the 1950 Accounting and Auditing Act, which 
for the first time made agencies broadly responsible for how their grantees 
spent federal dollars.41 In the 1960s, as the War on Poverty dramatically 
 
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
37. An Act to Establish the Treasury Department, §§ 1, 5, 1 Stat. 65, 65-67 (1789). 
38. Antideficiency Act, Pub. L. No. 41-252, 16 Stat. 251 (1870) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 31 U.S.C.). 
39. Pub. L. No. 67-13, § 304, 42 Stat. 20, 24 (1921). See generally LARRY BERMAN, THE 
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET AND THE PRESIDENCY 1921-1979 (1979). 
40. GAO Human Capital Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-271, 118 Stat. 811 (codified in 
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and other titles). 
41. Pub. L. No. 81-784, 64 Stat. 832, 836 (1950) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
5 U.S.C.); CRS, FEDERAL GRANTS, supra note 2, at 17-19 (describing piecemeal efforts to attach 
requirements for fiscal accountability and anti-corruption principles to federal grants); U.S. GEN. 
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FGMSD-79-37, GRANT AUDITING: A MAZE OF INCONSISTENCY, GAPS, AND 
DUPLICATION THAT NEEDS OVERHAULING 1 (1979) (describing this history) [hereinafter MAZE OF 
INCONSISTENCY]. 
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expanded the extent of federal grant spending,42 Congress and the White House 
both turned their attention to managing the increasingly unwieldy 
intergovernmental grants regime.43 
Out of this interbranch attention to grants administration, two kinds of 
grants-management rules developed: those that were specific to individual 
substantive grant statutes and those that were trans-substantive. The latter were 
typically set out in general financial-management statutes that delegated 
authority to OMB to promulgate more specific rules. This Section explains 
each of these two categories, as well as a third set that these categories 
variously demand or accommodate: state grants-management rules that either 
overlay or fill in gaps left by the federal rules. 
Overall, these rules represent an effort to address a number of different 
kinds of problems related to federal grants. One goal of the rules is to better 
target federal dollars toward a specific policy intervention, rather than letting 
the money be fungible. We might think of this as a response to what could be 
called the “swimming pool problem,” in light of a famous example in which a 
school district receiving the first influx of major federal education dollars in the 
1960s ended up building a new town swimming pool rather than using the 
money to improve schooling for poor children.44 Another goal is to prevent 
waste, fraud, and abuse with federal dollars. We might think of this as a 
response to what could be called the “yacht problem,” after a scandal in the 
1990s in which a university applied federal research dollars to entertainment on 
a fancy vessel.45 Still another goal is to improve the administrative operations 
of the grantees receiving the aid. This might be termed the “backwater 
problem,” in light of the goal of professionalizing state and local agencies and 
nonprofits, rather than sending money to poorly functioning institutions.46 A 
final goal is to do all of this while respecting some jurisdictional diversity 
where doing so is perceived to be possible or desirable. We could think of this 
as reflecting the “federalism fence,” where the federal government has one foot 
in federal control and one foot in devolution.47 
 
42. For two accounts of the development of these federal grant programs, see JOSHUA ZEITZ, 
BUILDING THE GREAT SOCIETY: INSIDE LYNDON JOHNSON’S WHITE HOUSE (2019); and MICHAEL L. 
GILLETTE, LAUNCHING THE WAR ON POVERTY: AN ORAL HISTORY (2010). 
43. See, e.g., Intergovernmental Cooperation Act, Pub. L. No. 90-577, 82 Stat. 1098 (1968) 
(codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6508 (2018)); 29 C.F.R. § 1902.5 (1968); Presidential 
Memorandum of November 8, 1968, 33 Fed. Reg. 16487 (Nov. 13, 1968). 
44. WASH. RESEARCH PROJECT & NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, TITLE I OF ESEA: IS 
IT HELPING POOR CHILDREN? 34 (1969). 
45. Lynn McGuire, Federal Research Grant Funding at Universities: Legislative Waves from 
Auditors Diving into Overhead Cost Pools, 23 J.C. & U.L. 563, 563 (1997). 
46. See, e.g., Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 
613(a)(6), 89 Stat. 773, 783 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2018)) (requiring states 
receiving funds to educate children with disabilities to set up an agency with the capacity to handle 
funds appropriately). 
47. James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 932, 987-88 (2004). 
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These goals, while quite sensible in themselves, have given rise to a legal 
regime that is considerably more expansive than the sum of its parts. This 
Section illustrates the pervasiveness, depth, and complexity of that regime—the 
grants-management framework. It lays the groundwork for the analysis in Part 
II of how these rules affect the day-to-day operation of federal grant programs. 
1. Statute-Specific Grants-Management Rules 
Grants statutes typically contain both substantive requirements and 
administrative requirements.48 Substantive requirements are typically set forth 
via goals that the program is supposed to achieve. For example, an education 
grant may have the goal of increasing students’ performance on standardized 
tests;49 an environmental grant may have the goal of protecting ground water in 
a community;50 and a transportation grant may have the goal of improving 
access to jobs.51 These requirements are often framed as outcomes that the 
grantee is expected to achieve. In contrast, administrative requirements are 
typically framed as inputs, directed to the grantee’s own efforts, in organizing 
its activities and its use of money. It is this latter set of requirements that 
constitute statute-specific grants-management rules. 
For intergovernmental programs in policy areas in which state and local 
involvement is heavy (such as education), one common type of grants-
management requirement prevents state and local governments from 
substituting federal money for their own.52 “Maintenance of effort” rules 
require state and local governments to satisfy a certain level of continued 
funding in this overall policy area as compared to some base year.53 
“Supplement, not supplant” rules require state and local governments to use 
federal funds on top of, instead of as a replacement for, funding for a particular 
activity in the general policy area.54 
The goal of these rules is to make sure that federal funding is truly extra, 
to deepen the focus on the policy area in question, rather than allowing state 
and local governments to pare back their own spending.55 But compliance with 
these rules is notoriously difficult to assess. For one thing, the rules vary by 
grant program even when the different grant programs are funding the same 
 
48. See Pasachoff, supra note 1, at 271 (describing different types of grant conditions). 
49. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301, 6311(c)(4) (2018). 
50. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300h-8 (2018). 
51. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 5307(a)(1)(C) (2018). 
52. ROBERT M. LLOYD & DARLA M. FERA, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO FEDERAL GRANTS 
MANAGEMENT—FROM SOLICITATION THROUGH AUDIT 100 (2015). 
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. See Nora Gordon & Eloise Pasachoff, Fiscal Compliance Rules for Federal Funding of 
Elementary and Secondary Education: Transparency, Reason-Giving, and Agency Accountability, in 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF US K-12 EDUCATION LAW 6 (Kristi Bowman ed., forthcoming 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3237880 [https://perma.cc/MVY4-V5P9]. 
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state or local agency.56 For another, the rules require case-specific judgment 
calls about how to calculate the base, when exceptions to the base are 
permitted, how to distinguish impermissible supplanting from permissible 
supplementing, and so on.57 The rules therefore require significant 
infrastructure, both from a compliance and enforcement perspective. 
Another common type of requirement, applicable to nonprofits as well as 
to intergovernmental grantees, mandates some kind of cost-sharing or matching 
of funds.58 The rationale for this requirement, “as old as philanthropy” itself, 
“is that the provider of funds is going to help an organization if the 
organization helps itself.”59 Conceptually related to maintenance-of-effort and 
supplement-not-supplant rules, cost-sharing and fund-matching are typically 
calculated differently, as a percentage of the overall project cost.60 This, too, 
can be quite difficult to assess. There are many methods for assessing these 
arrangements, and different statutes build in a wide variety of limitations.61 
A third common type of requirement is statutory earmarking. For 
example, a statute may require that grantees spend a certain percentage of their 
federal funding on an activity (such as, say, on certain kinds of program 
beneficiaries), or no more than a certain percentage of their federal funding on 
an activity (such as on program administration).62 Compliance with these rules 
is also difficult to evaluate. It may be contestable whether an activity falls into 
a particular category.63 Whether a particular requirement applies may depends 
on facts whose existence may be difficult to ascertain.64 
These administrative rules may play a large role in individual grant 
statutes; one assessment of the largest federal education grant to states and 




58. LLOYD & FERA, supra note 52, at 98-99. 
59. Id. at 98. 
60. Id. at 98, 100. 
61. Id. at 101-04 (describing the variety of approaches). 
62. Id. at 101. 
63. See, e.g., Chris Kardish, States Want Flexibility for Health Exchange Grants, 
GOVERNING.COM (Jul.y 2014), https://www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/gov-health-
exchange-grant-flexibility.html [https://perma.cc/NC4F-E8U5] (describing the debate over whether 
“meeting enrollment needs” is an “operating cost” under the Affordable Care Act or a “design, 
development, and implementation cost”). 
64. See, e.g., Ryan Holeywell, Small Transit Agencies Fight Costly Quirk in Law, 
GOVERNING: FEDWATCH (Dec. 5, 2011, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.governing.com/blogs/fedwatch/Small-Transit-Agencies-Fight-Costly-Quirk.html 
[https://perma.cc/4YXA-SHRW] (describing difficulties in assessing whether a jurisdiction is an 
“urbanized area” such that they can use federal transit grants only for capital, rather than operational, 
costs). 
65. See, e.g., Melissa Junge & Sheara Krvaric, Federal Compliance Works Against Education 
Policy Goals, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. 4 (2011), http://www.aei.org/publication/federal-compliance-
works-against-education-policy-goals [https://perma.cc/SEF5-AJZH]. 
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2. Delegation to OMB for Common Grants Rules 
A different set of grants-management rules comes from statutes that 
delegate authority to OMB to create interagency financial management 
systems. Where the statute-specific administrative rules are designed to shape 
the operation of individual programs, the grants-management rules under 
OMB’s purview are designed to promote sound fiscal management and 
administrative capacity more generally.66 The prevention of waste, fraud, and 
abuse is their overall goal.67 
For decades, OMB (and its predecessor office, the Bureau of the Budget, 
before President Nixon transformed and renamed it in 197068) issued these 
rules in a series of circulars that were from time to time revised, rescinded, 
consolidated, or expanded.69 These circulars created a complicated maze for 
funding recipients to follow, with some duplicative and overlapping but some 
quite distinct requirements for different kinds of institutions.70 Grantees 
sometimes violated the rules unintentionally because it was confusing which 
rules they were supposed to follow at different times.71 This reality, combined 
with the huge influx of federal dollars from the 2009 stimulus bill, heightened 
both congressional and presidential interest in improving federal oversight of 
state and local control of their federal grants.72 
In 2013, then, for the first time, OMB consolidated and superseded these 
individual circulars in one streamlined guidance document.73 Formally called 
the “Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit 
Requirements for Federal Awards”—a long and unwieldy title that captures the 
three different categories of circulars it joined together—this document is more 
colloquially known as the “Uniform Grant Guidance.”74 OMB required each 
federal grant-making agency to incorporate by reference this guidance into its 
own regulations.75 With some exceptions and variations, the agencies did so in 
 
66. See Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for 
Federal Awards, 78 Fed. Reg. 78590, 78590 (Dec. 26, 2013). 
67. Id. 
68. See BERMAN, supra note 39 at 112. 
69. See 78 Fed. Reg. at 78590. An OMB circular is used “to communicate various instructions 
and information to the executive departments and establishments . . . when the nature of the subject 
matter is of continuing effect.” BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR 
NO. A-1 (1952), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Circular-001.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/29V6-FNV2]. 
70. 78 Fed. Reg. at 78591. 
71. Id. 
72. See, e.g., id. at 78590-91 (describing this increased congressional interest). 
73. Id. at 78591 (describing consolidation and noting one aspect that remained as yet 
unconsolidated). 
74. See, e.g., Uniform Requirements for Managing Grants that Apply to All Federal Executive 
Agencies, EPA (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.epa.gov/grants/uniform-requirements-managing-grants-
apply-all-federal-executive-agencies [https://perma.cc/ZL9X-99AX]. 
75. Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for 
Federal Awards, 2 C.F.R. § 200.106 (2019). 
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2014.76 In early 2020, OMB proposed revisions to the Uniform Grant Guidance 
that would tweak the requirements around the edges but would not 
fundamentally transform the system.77 
Because of the importance of the Uniform Grant Guidance to 
intergovernmental grant administration, it is worth describing each of the three 
categories it governs—administrative requirements, cost principles, and audit 
requirements—in a little more detail. 
a. Administrative Requirements 
The administrative requirements obligate federal agencies, on the one 
hand, to take certain procedural steps before and after awarding grants, and 
grantees, on the other hand, to maintain certain kinds of control over the grant 
money that is ultimately awarded.78 
For example, as to the former, federal agencies must provide public notice 
of funding opportunities in specific ways,79 collect applications according to 
OMB-approved guidelines,80 and assess the riskiness of grant applicants 
according to certain criteria.81 Once grants have been made, federal agencies 
must monitor grant recipients,82 may impose certain specified additional 
conditions on grantees having difficulties complying with the terms of the 
grant,83 and may ultimately take steps to temporarily withhold funds or 
terminate the grant after providing grantees notice and an opportunity to 
respond.84 
As for obligations placed on grant recipients, grantees must agree to 
implement compliant financial-management systems,85 abide by applicable 
procurement standards,86 and maintain and provide access to required 
records.87 Grantees that are “pass-through entities”—such as state agencies that 
give subgrants to local government agencies—must formalize the subgrants 
 
76. Joint Interim Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 75872 (Dec. 19, 2014). 
77. Guidance for Grants and Agreements, 85 Fed. Reg. 3766 (proposed Jan. 22, 2020); 
Courtney Bublé, White House Seeks to Revise Federal Grants Process to Reflect New Priorities, GOV’T 
EXEC. (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.govexec.com/management/2020/01/white-house-seeks-revise-
federal-grants-process-reflect-new-priorities/162582 [https://perma.cc/WU87-LYB2]. I will discuss 
several proposed changes as relevant in Sections II.D and III.B below, but nothing explained in this 
section would change if OMB’s proposals are ultimately adopted, nor would the central dynamics 
described in Part II. 
78. 2 C.F.R. §§ 200.100-.345 (2019). 
79. Id. §§ 200.202-.203. 
80. Id. § 200.206. 
81. Id. §§ 200.205, 200.207. 
82. Id. §§ 200.327-.329. 
83. Id. § 200.207. 
84. Id. §§ 200.338-.342. 
85. Id. §§ 200.302-.303. 
86. Id. §§ 200.317-.328. 
87. Id. §§ 200.333-.337. 
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with required documentation and information and must monitor, support, and 
take enforcement action as needed against noncompliant subgrantees.88 
These administrative requirements structure the relationship between 
federal agencies and their grantees in meaningful ways, creating standardized 
requirements and sets of expectations that last the entire lifetime of each grant, 
as well as across all grants that the grantee may receive from different federal 
agencies. 
b. Cost Principles 
The cost principles govern what grantees may do with their federal 
dollars.89 Like the administrative requirements, the cost principles are issued 
under OMB’s general management authority.90 There are two basic kinds of 
cost principles: general principles for how to determine what grantees may 
spend their federal grant dollars on, and specific principles covering particular 
types of potential spending. 
The general principles set forth a series of factors that determine whether 
a cost is “allowable”—that is, whether that cost may be charged to a federal 
grant.91 To be allowable, a cost must be “necessary and reasonable for the 
performance of the Federal award,” where “[a] cost is reasonable if, in its 
nature and amount, it does not exceed that which would be incurred by a 
prudent person under the circumstances prevailing at the time the decision was 
made to incur the cost.”92 A cost must also be “allocable,” or able to be 
assigned to the grant in proportion to the extent to which that cost benefitted 
the work of the grant (as compared to other work of the grantee not related to 
the grant in question).93 Allowable costs must also be, among other things, 
“adequately documented.”94 
These general principles are at some level straightforward, but at the same 
time their vague words are very open-ended—more standard than rule. It 
therefore takes a judgment call to determine whether something the grantee 
spent money on can be charged to the grant. 
As for the specific cost principles, while some make certain costs 
categorically unallowable,95 and others make certain costs categorically 
allowable,96 a number of important cost principles make certain costs allowable 
 
88. Id. § 200.331. 
89. Id. §§ 200.400-.475. 
90. Id. § 200.103(a)-(b). 
91. Id. § 200.403. 
92. Id. §§ 200.403(a), 200.404. 
93. Id. §§ 200.403(a), 200.405. 
94. Id. § 200.403(g). 
95. Id. § 200.432 (governing alcoholic beverages). 
96. Id. § 200.472 (governing training and education for employee development). 
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only sometimes.97 This last category is particularly difficult to assess. For 
example, consider the cost principle governing “professional service costs,” 
such as a lawyer’s advice. The cost principles lay out eight relevant factors for 
whether such spending is a permissible use of grant funds while noting that “no 
single factor or any special combination of factors is necessarily 
determinative.”98 Or consider the cost principles governing the use of grant 
money to pay for “indirect” costs—the costs of a grantee’s ongoing “facilities 
and administration,” as opposed to the “direct” costs that are incurred 
specifically for the grant.99 The cost principles make clear that “[t]here is no 
universal rule for classifying certain costs as either direct or indirect.”100 
Moreover, an indirect cost rate is subject to bargaining between the grantee and 
its primary federal agency (which then must be accepted by all of the other 
federal agencies from which a grantee may receive funds).101 All of these 
nuances make assessing compliance particularly complicated. 
c. Audit Requirements 
The third category covered in the Uniform Grant Guidance are audit 
requirements.102 While the other parts of the Uniform Grant Guidance and its 
predecessor circulars are based on OMB’s general management authority, the 
audit requirements flesh out the details of a specific statute: the Single Audit 
Act, which instructs OMB to issue implementing guidance.103 The audit 
requirements build in a regular and pervasive accountability structure with 
potentially dramatic consequences for noncompliance. 
The audit requirements provide a regular accountability structure because 
the process unfolds annually. The statute generally requires each grantee 
spending more than a certain amount of federal funds per year to have an 
annual “single audit” of all of its federal programs.104 OMB sets the amount of 
federal funding that triggers this requirement, currently $750,000, which covers 
more than 30,000 nonfederal entities.105 Most state agencies fall within this 
limit, and many local governments106 and thousands of nonprofits107 are 
 
97. See, e.g., id. § 200.474 (governing travel costs for the grantees’ employees while on 
official business trips). 
98. Id. § 200.459(b). 
99. Id. §§ 200.56, 200.68 (defining direct versus indirect costs); id. §§ 200.412-200.415 
(describing procedures for calculating rates). 
100. Id. § 200.412. 
101. Id. § 200.414(c). 
102. Id. §§ 200.500-.521. 
103. Single Audit Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7506 (2018); 2 C.F.R. §§ 200.100(d), 
200.101(b)(3), 200.103(c) (2019). 
104. Some exceptions allow a biennial audit or program-specific instead. 2 C.F.R. § 200.504 
(2019). 
105. Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for 
Federal Awards, 78 Fed. Reg. 78590, 78606 (Dec. 26, 2013). 
106. See Gordon & Pasachoff, supra note 55, at 7-8. 
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covered as well. Local governments and nonprofits may be affected by the 
single-audit regime, even if they are not subjected to a single audit themselves, 
because the single audit of their supervising pass-through entities examines the 
quality of oversight of subgrantees.108 Unlike the infinitesimally small chance 
of an IRS audit,109 then, or the larger but somewhat random chance of an 
agency reviewing a grantee’s substantive compliance,110 the single audit 
appears like clockwork. 
The accountability structure provided by the audit requirements is also 
pervasive, going far beyond simply financial statements. Financial compliance 
is certainly a part of the audit; an auditor must confirm whether a grantee’s 
financial statements are “presented fairly in all material respects in conformity 
with generally accepted accounting principles,” and whether its federal 
expenditures are presented fairly in connection with overall financial 
statements.111 Much more broadly, however, the audit reviews the strength and 
breadth of the grantee’s “internal controls” to oversee compliance with each 
major federal program.112 The audit also reviews the extent of the grantee’s 
compliance with the administrative requirements embedded in individual 
statutes and regulations governing each grant program113 and in OMB’s 
administrative requirements and cost principles.114 
The expansive scope of the audit is well illustrated by reference to an 
additional document referenced throughout the audit requirements: the 
Compliance Supplement.115 Although officially an appendix to the Uniform 
Grant Guidance, this 1,600-page document is too big to be published alongside 
the rest of the Guidance, so its annual publication on the OMB website is 
simply noted in the Federal Register.116 The Compliance Supplement gathers in 
one place, agency by agency and then program by program, what it calls the 
“important compliance requirements that the Federal Government expects to be 
considered as part of an audit”117—in other words, all of the requirements 
 
107. Elizabeth K. Keating, Is It Time to Address Selective Disclosure by Nonprofit 
Organizations?, 61 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 151, 152 (2008). 
108. 2 C.F.R. § 200.331(d) (2019). Similarly, the possibility of a federal audit outside the 
annual single-audit process always exists, even for those entities who spend less than the threshold, as 
the audit requirements provide that grantees must make themselves available for an audit upon the 
request of any granting federal agency, Inspector General, or the General Accounting Office. Id. § 
200.501(d); see also infra notes 143-144 and 176-179 and accompanying text (explaining the role of 
these offices). 
109. Kevin McCormally, What Are the Odds the IRS Will Audit Your Tax Return?, NASDAQ 
(Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.nasdaq.com/article/what-are-the-odds-the-irs-will-audit-your-tax-return-
cm780898 [https://perma.cc/663U-MBHW]. 
110. See Pasachoff, supra note 1, at 278-79. 
111. 31 U.S.C. § 7502(e)(1)-(2) (2018); 2 C.F.R. § 200.513(b) (2019). 
112. 31 U.S.C. § 7502(e)(3); 2 C.F.R. § 200.514(c) (2019). 
113. See supra notes 52-64. 
114. 31 U.S.C. § 7502(e)(4); 2 C.F.R. § 200.514(d). 
115. 2 C.F.R. pt. 200 app. XI. 
116. See, e.g., Notice of Availability, 84 Fed. Reg. 35313 (July 1, 2019). 
117. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, COMPLIANCE SUPPLEMENT at 1-1 (June 2019). 
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referenced in the previous paragraph. To give a sense of the scope of these 
requirements, the Compliance Supplement chapters devoted to the largest 
grant-making agencies—the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS), the Department of Education, and the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development—are each between two hundred and three hundred 
pages.118 
Noncompliance with these requirements can have significant 
consequences, as the audit process results in a regularized enforcement 
decision that can require repayment of millions of dollars of funds or the 
imposition of burdensome “special conditions” after the auditing process has 
run its course. After conducting the audit, the auditor writes a report identifying 
problematic findings and questioned costs.119 The grantee must then write a 
response, which must propose a corrective action plan to remedy the 
problematic findings and explain how it has implemented any prior corrective 
action plan based on the previous year’s audit findings.120 Together, the 
auditor’s report and the grantee’s response are uploaded to the Federal Audit 
Clearinghouse, a public, centralized repository.121 Responsibility then shifts to 
the federal granting agency (or the pass-through entity, if the audit is of a 
subgrantee), which then issues a “management decision” sustaining or rejecting 
the auditor’s findings.122 
“Disallowed costs” are a major aspect of these decisions. If the 
management decision sustains the auditor’s findings on disallowed costs, the 
grantee must repay these costs in some fashion: without complaint as part of a 
corrective action plan, through a cooperative resolution process,123 or after an 
appeal through the agency’s internal process.124 Unlike substantive funding 
cutoffs, which almost never happen,125 it is not uncommon for a grantee to 
have to repay of millions of dollars of disallowed costs after an audit.126 This 
reality functions as general deterrence; even grantees that have never had to 
repay any money are aware that the possibility is real, in light of grant industry 
publications that highlight major repayments to illustrate the importance of 
 
118. See id. §§ 4.14, 4.84, 4.93; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-539, 
FEDERAL GRANTS: AGENCIES PERFORMED INTERNAL CONTROL ASSESSMENTS CONSISTENT WITH 
GUIDANCE AND ARE ADDRESSING INTERNAL CONTROL DEFICIENCIES pmbl. (2019) (identifying these 
agencies as among the “five largest grant-making agencies by amount of grant obligations”). 
119. 2 C.F.R. §§ 200.515-.516 (2019). 
120. Id. § 200.511. 
121. Id. § 200.511(b)-(d). 
122. Id. § 200.521. 
123. Id. § 200.25. 
124. Id. § 200.341; see also infra notes 145-148 (describing this process). 
125. See Pasachoff, supra note 1, at 284. 
126. Ernest B. Abbott, Representing Local Governments in Catastrophic Events: DHS/FEMA 
Response and Recovery Issues, 37 URB. LAW. 467, 469-70 (2005) (explaining the grant compliance rules 
for FEMA and urging that lawyers work to “protect[] their client communities from the financial 
disaster that will surely follow a physical disaster if federal rules are not understood and followed”); 
Gordon & Pasachoff, supra note 55, at 11 (describing significant repayment requirements for state and 
local educational authorities). 
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compliance.127 Nonfinancial consequences from audit findings can be 
significant, too, as agencies may decide to impose “specific conditions” that 
add burdens to compliance and reporting.128 In these ways, then, the 
accountability structure provided by the single audit is important. 
3. State Grants-Management Rules 
In addition to these two sets of federal rules—those stemming from 
individual substantive grants statutes and those stemming from OMB’s 
authority to promulgate general management requirements—states may also 
overlay their own grants-management rules on top of the federal requirements. 
These state grants-management rules fall into several categories. 
One category are those activities specifically identified in the Uniform 
Grant Guidance as open to state rules. Rather than requiring all grantees to 
follow entirely the same set of uniform rules, the Uniform Grant Guidance 
provides that, in certain categories, such as procurement, states have the 
authority to use their own procedures to govern their own operation under 
federal grants, even though their subgrantees must follow the standard Uniform 
Grant Guidance rules.129 This distinction raises complexities for compliance. 
States must monitor their subgrantees for compliance with the federal 
procurement rules while ensuring their own compliance with the state 
procurement rules for purchases made under federal grants, but must ensure 
that their subgrantees are following the state procurement rules for purchases 
made under state-funded programs.130 
A second category of state grants-management rules are program-specific 
rules that arise from the state’s implementation choices under substantive 
federal grant statutes. Federal grant statutes often leave it to states to determine 
how they will implement a particular administrative requirement by making 
choices that they submit to the relevant federal agency in a state plan.131 Under 
these circumstances, subgrantees in one state cannot rely on information from 
subgrantees in other states about compliance or implementation, because the 
operable rules may be quite different.132 
 
127. The sources cited in notes 9-11 supra are illustrative. 
128. 2 C.F.R. §§ 200.338, 200.207. 
129. Id. § 200.317. 
130. Junge & Krvaric, supra note 65, at 2. 
131. See, e.g., Pasachoff, Spending Clause Statutes, supra note 1, at 276-77. For a discussion 
of how state educational agencies may use their oversight and implementation discretion in these rules 
under the largest federal education grant, see A Guide to State Educational Agency Oversight 
Responsibilities Under ESSA, COUNCIL OF CHIEF ST. SCHOOL OFFICERS, 
https://www.ccsso.org/sites/default/files/2017-10/CCSSO_State_Authority_Over_ESSA_Programs.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V9PW-SP9B]. 
132. Junge & Krvaric, supra note 65, at 2-3. 
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B. Institutional Landscape 
In order to understand how these rules operate on the ground—the subject 
of Part II—it is important to comprehend the institutional landscape in which 
they are embedded. This Section therefore introduces the key institutions that 
create, effectuate, and oversee the operation of the rules: Congress, agencies, 
OMB, grantees, and auditors. It also disaggregates each institution into 
component parts with different responsibilities. In so doing, it demonstrates 
both the extent of the infrastructure around the grants-management rules and 
the difficulties of coordination. It also makes plain that courts play only a small 
role in the grants-management system. 
1. Congress 
Three kinds of congressional committees play a role in the grants-
management system. 
First are the authorizing committees for substantive grant statutes—for 
example, the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee and 
the House Committee on Education and the Workforce, which reauthorize the 
key education and labor grant programs. While these committees have under 
their purview grants-management rules that appear in the statutes they oversee 
(such as maintenance of effort, cost sharing, and administrative set-asides in 
education grant programs), these committees tend to focus more on big-picture 
policy issues, and often pay little attention to the trans-substantive grant rules 
developed by OMB.133 
Second are the authorizing committees for government oversight: the 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs and the 
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. These committees 
develop trans-substantive grants laws and often delegate to OMB for 
government-wide execution.134 Because these committees lack expertise in the 
policy areas that these rules will govern and in the state- and local-government 
machinery that will realize them, they may be disconnected from 
implementation consequences.135 These committees may also overestimate 
OMB capacity.136 
 
133. See, e.g., id. at 1, 4 (explaining that these policymakers “typically debate the merits and 
drawbacks of broad federal education policies and various educational approaches, without examining 
the underlying federal compliance framework that directly impacts whether and how these policies can 
be carried out by states and school districts,” and explaining that the OMB “rules are little known to 
education policymakers and are rarely taken into account when discussing federal education policy”). 
134. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. 
135. See CRS, FEDERAL GRANTS, supra note 2, at 39 (describing the need for more input to 
Congress on intergovernmental grants). 
136. Eloise Pasachoff, The President’s Budget as a Source of Agency Policy Control, 125 
YALE L.J. 2182, 2195, 2237-43 (2016) (discussing OMB’s small staff and large delegations in the 
management arena); Posner, The Daunting Challenge, supra note 29 (noting overestimating capacity of 
reporting downstream). 
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Finally, while the appropriations committees for each substantive grant 
area do not play a formal role in the grants-management rules, their work has 
consequences for that system to the extent that appropriations for 
intergovernmental programs do not break out implementation costs from policy 
costs.137 When new administrative requirements are put in place for 
intergovernmental actors, there does not tend to be a discussion of this 
increased obligation in appropriations mark-ups.138 
2. Agencies 
Grant-giving federal agencies tend to divide their responsibility for grant 
oversight between program oversight and financial oversight, with these 
responsibilities lying in separate offices.139 Program officials tend to have 
substantive expertise in the subject matter of the grant program, while financial 
officials tend to have expertise in financial administration.140 Different agencies 
arrange these offices differently—for example, some agencies operate with 
program officials in regional offices rather than only in headquarters, and some 
agencies divide responsibility for audit oversight from other aspects of 
financial management141—but the basic divide between program and finance is 
generally consistent. Unlike in many regulatory programs, there is no federal 
office dedicated specifically to enforcement on either the program or finance 
side.142 
Agency Inspector General offices also play an important role in grants 
oversight as part of their role investigating the possibility of waste, fraud, and 
abuse in government programs.143 They serve two different functions: 
investigating the agency’s own oversight over its grantees, and investigating 
individual grantees’ operations.144 They do not have final authority over grant 
matters, but their investigations can trigger authoritative agency investigations 
into grantee mismanagement or change agency operations over grants—or they 
may not. Their attention to the grants-management rules under their agency’s 
substantive statutes may also prompt congressional or even OMB policy 
changes—but again, not always. 
 
137. The most recent budgets are typical in this respect. Where they specify implementation 
set-asides, they are for federal agencies rather than for state or local governments as program 
implementers. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 115-245, 132 Stat. 2981 (2018). 
138. See infra notes 468-470 and accompanying text. 
139. KENNETH J. ALLEN, FEDERAL GRANT PRACTICE: A GUIDE FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND 
GRANTEES § 4:25 (2016); THOMPSON GRANTS, FEDERAL GRANTS MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK § 410 
(2019), https://grants.complianceexpert.com/handbooks/federal-grants-management-handbook 
[https://perma.cc/M5GX-KD54]; LLOYD & FERA, supra note 52, at 3. 
140. ALLEN, supra note 139, § 4:25. 
141. THOMPSON FEDERAL GRANTS MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 139, § 410. 
142. See Pasachoff, Spending Clause Statutes, supra note 1, at 326-27. 
143. ALLEN, supra note 139, § 4:26. 
144. Id. at §§ 6:19-:22 (describing the variety of inspector-general investigations). 
10. PASACHOFF ARTICLE. PUBLICATION (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2020  3:21 PM 
Federal Grant Rules and Realities 
595 
 
Finally, agencies in which grantmaking is a substantial part of their work 
tend to have an office of adjudicators overseeing grant disputes between 
grantees and the agency.145 These offices vary in size and in the formality of 
their procedures depending on the extent of grantmaking in the agency.146 
Some agencies have one agency-wide office for all grant disputes, while others 
have different dispute offices for different programs.147 It is to these offices that 
grantees may appeal a management decision affirming an audit finding.148 
Very occasionally, a dispute over the grants-management rules will end 
up in court after working its way through the agency process.149 But these 
occasions are the exception, not the rule.150 
3. OMB 
Given the description above of the Uniform Grant Guidance and 
Compliance Supplement, it might seem that OMB’s central role in grants 
management is the promulgation of those documents (and their predecessor 
circulars).151 This task is carried out by personnel in OMB’s Office of Federal 
Financial Management.152 
But other parts of OMB play a role, too. For example, OMB’s Resource 
Management Offices (RMOs) are the key budget and policy shops coordinating 
the entire executive establishment.153 Those RMOs that oversee the work of 
agencies that are heavily involved in grantmaking may, through the process of 
developing those agencies’ budgets and legislative proposals, participate in 
designing the way individual grant funding is structured.154 
Still other parts of OMB participate in different strategic initiatives that 
bear on grants.155 In recent years, OMB has spearheaded the evidence-based 
movement in federal policymaking, which includes encouraging the use of 
 
145. Id. at § 4:27; THOMPSON GRANTS, supra note 139, § 620. 
146. THOMPSON GRANTS, supra note 139, at § 620. 
147. Compare, e.g., id. § 621 (HHS), with id. § 629 (USDA). 
148. 2 C.F.R. § 200.341 (2019); see supra notes 124-126. 
149. See, e.g., Gordon & Pasachoff, supra note 55, at 17 (describing a few court cases 
reviewing agency decisions on grants-management rules in the education-law context). 
150. A search for caselaw mentioning the OMB circulars that were consolidated into the 
Uniform Grants Guidance retrieved only twenty-nine cases in almost thirty years. See Memorandum 
from Alana Chill to Eloise Pasachoff (Oct. 29, 2015) (on file with author). 
151. ALLEN, supra note 139, § 4:20 (describing the role of OMB in federal grants). 
152. See Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for 
Federal Awards, 78 Fed. Reg. 78590, 78590 (Dec. 26, 2013); see also Notice of Availability, 84 Fed. 
Reg. 31353 (July 1, 2019) (listing OFFM as the key office for the Compliance Supplement). 
153. See Pasachoff, supra note 136, at 2199-201. 
154. For example, OMB officials in the budget offices were involved in the decisions to 
include new competitive grants under longstanding formula grants to spur evidence-based 
policymaking. See RON HASKINS & GREG MARGOLIS, SHOW ME THE EVIDENCE: OBAMA’S FIGHT FOR 
RIGOR AND RESULTS IN SOCIAL POLICY 2-12 (2015). 
155. Of note, given the importance of OIRA for regulatory programs, OIRA does not tend to 
be among these parts. See Pasachoff, supra note 136, at 2204-06 (describing comparatively smaller role 
for OIRA in reviewing budget programs, such as grants). 
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federal grants to stimulate the development and use of evidence in 
policymaking at the state and local level.156 OMB also promulgates the 
President’s Management Agenda, which has included a component on some 
aspect of grantmaking since President George W. Bush initiated the Agenda in 
2001.157 It also oversaw large-scale public reporting of grant funding during the 
time period of stimulus spending after the 2011 American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act.158 
OMB also plays a convening role in grant reform across the executive 
branch. For example, it facilitated the creation of the Council on Financial 
Assistance Reform (COFAR), and the OMB controller served on that board 
until it was disbanded under the Trump administration.159 
Of note, for all of OMB’s coordinating role, there is little formal 
opportunity for engagement with grantees in various OMB units’ development 
of government-wide grants policy. For example, the Uniform Grant Guidance 
included no federalism impact statement describing interactions with state and 
local stakeholders,160 and state and local governments bemoaned their lack of 
representation on the COFAR.161 OMB’s evidence agenda for federal grants 
was also not subject to public input.162 These absences may have clear 
rationales—no federalism impact statement was formally required;163 the 
 
156. Memorandum from Sylvia M. Burwell et al., Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to the 
Heads of Dep’ts & Agencies, M-13-17, Next Steps in the Evidence and Innovation Agenda 3, 8-10 (July 
26, 2013); see also supra note 154. 
157. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRESIDENT’S 
MANAGEMENT AGENDA 25, 36 (2002) (promoting electronic applications for grants and the removal of 
application barriers for faith-based organizations) [hereinafter BUSH PMA]; Clark, supra note 13 
(describing, among other things, a focus on the cessation and recovery of improper payments). 
158. See, e.g., Paul L. Posner, Accountability Under Stress: The American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, in GOVERNING UNDER STRESS: THE IMPLEMENTATION OF OBAMA’S 
ECONOMIC STIMULUS PROGRAM 194-95 (Timothy J. Conlan et al. eds., 2017). 
159. Memorandum from Jacob J. Lew, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the 
President, to the Heads of Dep’ts & Agencies, M-12-01, Creation of the Council on Financial Assistance 
Reform (Oct. 27, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/
2012/m-12-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/42Y3-C39V]; Memorandum from Mick Mulvaney, Dir., Office of 
Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, M-17-26, Reducing Burden for Federal Agencies by 
Rescinding and Modifying OMB Memoranda (June 15, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/
whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2017/M-17-26.pdf [https://perma.cc/TX9J-T399]. 
160. See Joint Interim Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 75872, 75977 (Dec. 19, 2014) (“OMB has 
determined that this joint interim final rule does not have any Federalism implications, as required by 
Executive Order 13132.”); Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit 
Requirements for Federal Awards, 78 Fed. Reg. 78590 (Dec. 26, 2013) (not mentioning any federalism 
determination); Seifter, supra note 27, at 971-74 (discussing the 1999 Federalism Executive Order 
requiring agency consultation of state and local groups when taking regulatory action that implicates 
their interests). 
161. GAO Urges COFAR, OMB To Involve Stakeholders, FED. GRANTS MGMT. HANDBOOK, 
Mar. 2014, at 10; Ryan Holeywell, States and Localities Seek Voice in Federal Grants Overhaul, 
GOVERNING: FEDWATCH (Nov. 18, 2011, 2:30 PM), https://www.governing.com/blogs/fedwatch/
States-and-Localities-Seek-Voice-on-Federal-Grants-Council.html [https://perma.cc/23NE-N9CD]s. 
162. See Pasachoff, supra note 136, at 2280. 
163. See supra note 160 (explaining that the Uniform Requirements implicated no federalism 
issues). 
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COFAR was meant to be a convening of federal grant-making agencies;164 and 
OMB initiatives are not regulations subject to notice and comment.165 
Nonetheless, this lack of formal coordination is worth noting in this Section 
highlighting the numerous players in the landscape of federal grants. 
4. Grantees 
The Uniform Grant Guidance calls all federal grantees “Nonfederal 
Entities,” but it also recognizes that grantees are a diverse group by 
acknowledging the distinct categories into which they fall: “state, local 
government, Indian tribe, institution of higher education (IHE), or nonprofit 
organization.”166 Each of these categories could be further subdivided and 
described in a way that would paint a rich portrait of the importance of federal 
funding all across America (and, indeed, the world, for the State Department, 
HHS, and USAID make grants to public international organizations to which 
parts of the grants-management regime apply).167 For present purposes, 
however, two points of commonality among this varied group are worth noting. 
First, no matter the category of grantee, the role of a grantee is different 
when the grantee is a direct recipient of a federal grant than when it is a 
subrecipient of a federal grant, as when a state agency acts in a pass-through 
capacity. Not only may different layers of rules apply, but there may also be an 
iterative process of approval that may have consequences for the 
accomplishment of the overall purpose of the grant. Section II.B describes 
some of these consequences in more detail.168 
Second, while it is important not to overgeneralize, a similar feature 
across all kinds of grantees tends to be the same division of responsibility 
between program or policy operations on the one hand and financial or 
administrative operations on the other, which federal agencies themselves 
reflect.169 This means that those tasked with carrying out the purposes of the 
grant may not have a sense of the way the grants-management rules might be 
used to help or hinder those purposes, while those tasked with ensuring 
compliance with the grants-management rules may not have the same sense of 
 
164. See Holeywell, supra note 161. 
165. See Pasachoff, supra note 136, at 2279. 
166. 2 C.F.R. § 200.69 (2019). For ease of exposition, when I refer to state and local grantees, 
I mean all intergovernmental grantees, including tribes, and when I refer to nonprofit organizations, I 
mean all nonprofits, including institutions of higher education. I do this because nothing in my analysis 
turns on more fine-grained institutional differences. 
167. See id. § 200.101(c) (authorizing application of the Uniform Grant Guidance with the 
exception of the auditing rules to a variety of international organizations); Comments Show Confusion 
Exists About Procurement Grace Period, FED. GRANTS MGMT. HANDBOOK, Apr. 2015, at 1, 3, 11 
(describing different agencies’ application of the rules). 
168. See infra notes 270-275 and accompanying text. 
169. LLOYD & FERA, supra note 52, at 2; Communication Proves Critical in Award 
Management, Planning, FED. GRANTS MGMT. HANDBOOK, Dec. 2015, at 1, 12 (describing this divide in 
research institutions). 
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mission that their counterparts do.170 Again, Part II elucidates this 
consequence.171 
5. Auditors 
The last major players in federal grant administration are the auditors. 
Audits conducted by nonfederal auditors—the independent auditors who 
implement the Single Audit Act requirements—are the bread and butter of the 
system.172 Most auditors who conduct single audits are certified public 
accountants from private auditing firms.173 In some jurisdictions, in some 
instances, state auditors play this role.174 
As Part II explains in more depth, these nonfederal auditors have the most 
regular and direct influence over grantees, but federal auditors also have a role 
to play, albeit a more sporadic one.175 Inside agencies, as already noted, 
Inspectors General take on the auditing job.176 From the outside, the GAO 
investigates agency operations at the request of congressional committees, 
subcommittees, or individual members of Congress.177 The GAO has a long 
history of issuing reports on agency grant management, on government-wide 
grants policy, and on grantee operations.178 But, like Inspector General offices, 
the GAO has no direct authority to make anything happen. Its reports may or 
may not result in the changes it recommends. Its effect depends on its 
persuasive authority, which may vary significantly depending on the political 
and institutional context.179 
*   *   * 
 
170. LLOYD & FERA, supra note 52, at 2 (describing this potential conflict). 
171. See infra notes 261-267 and accompanying text. 
172. LLOYD & FERA, supra note 52, at 249. 
173. Id. at 3. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 4, 250. 
176. See supra notes 143-144 and accompanying text. 
177. Allen, supra note 139, § 4:17; Reports and Testimonies, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFF. (2019), https://www.gao.gov/about/what-gao-does/reports-testimonies [https://perma.cc/U7FK-
NKC3]. 
178. Some early reports in this area include, for example, U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
GGD-78-111, FEDERAL COST PRINCIPLES ARE OFTEN NOT APPLIED IN GRANTS AND CONTRACTS WITH 
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (1979); and MAZE OF INCONSISTENCY, supra note 41. More recent 
reports include, for example, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-491, GRANTS 
WORKFORCE: ACTIONS NEEDED TO ENSURE STAFF HAVE SKILLS TO OVERSEE AND ADMINISTER 
FEDERAL GRANTS (2018); and U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 17-159, SINGLE AUDITS: 
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN SELECTED AGENCIES’ OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL AWARDS (2017). 
179. See, e.g., Eric Katz, The White House Is Not Complying with Inquiries From 
Government’s Top Watchdog, GOV’T EXEC. (May 30, 2018), 
https://www.govexec.com/oversight/2018/05/white-house-not-complying-inquiries-governments-top-
watchdog/148602 [https://perma.cc/WB2S-AUG2] (describing current political environment); Anne 
Joseph O’Connell, Auditing Politics or Political Auditing? 6 (UC Berkeley Pub. Law, Research Paper 
No. 964656, 2007) (summarizing empirical research findings “consistent with the GAO’s image of itself 
as a neutral watchdog agency, but one facing particular political constraints”). 
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In short, a key feature of federal grantmaking as a form of policymaking 
is that numerous kinds of grants-management rules are filtered through 
numerous kinds of institutions on the way to effectuating policy. The next Part 
assesses what happens during the process of this filtering. 
II. The Interaction of Grants-Management Rules and Grant Institutions: 
Unintended Consequences and Unwarranted Assumptions 
There are many advantages of the grants-management regime, advantages 
that help explain its evolution and growth. Given the importance of federal 
grantmaking to American policymaking, as well as the sheer number of dollars 
at stake, it is important to have a mechanism to ensure that those dollars are 
being spent as they should be. When Congress sends billions of dollars to state 
and local education agencies intending that the money be spent in the 
classroom, someone ought to see to it that swimming pools aren’t built instead. 
Likewise, someone ought to ensure that universities don’t abuse their research 
dollars on inflated entertainment expenses for administrators on pricey yachts; 
that grant recipients have the organizational and administrative capacity to 
administer federal (and their own) dollars; and that grantees don’t use 
jurisdictional variation as an excuse for not managing their grants as they have 
committed to do. 
In many ways, the grants-management regime rises to these challenges 
well. Statute-specific rules permit attention to the distinct needs of individual 
grant programs, while the unified, trans-substantive rules—as opposed to 
agency-by-agency rules—are an efficient way of accommodating the reality 
that many grantees receive federal funds from multiple federal agencies. This 
system promotes sensible coordination rather than complete standardization 
across the executive branch, while also respecting federalism values, such as by 
devolving oversight to locally hired auditors and permitting state overlays 
throughout. 
Additionally, the grants-management rules provide some political 
protection for programs that might otherwise be jeopardized by disagreement 
over the substantive policy’s wastefulness. These rules might allow legislators 
to compromise on that policy, knowing that the rules limit the potential for 
grantee abuse. 
At the same time, an examination of the interaction of these rules with the 
institutions that bring them to life reveals both unintended consequences and 
unwarranted assumptions. This Part identifies and assesses four such issues. 
One unintended consequence, discussed in Section II.A, is that the system 
distorts agencies’ enforcement capacity, expanding oversight of grantees’ 
financial compliance while permitting oversight of grantees’ substantive work 
to remain lax. A second unintended consequence, discussed in Section II.B, is 
that as a result of such agency priorities, the system skews grantees’ incentives 
to privilege financial and administrative compliance over programmatic 
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outcomes, with further consequences for how policy works on the ground. In 
other words, there’s a problem if grantees spend so much time showing that 
they are not spending money on swimming pools that they are not using their 
classroom dollars effectively. 
While it is difficult to precisely measure the scale of the problem 
discussed in these two sections,180 it is clear that the dynamics discussed there 
are far from isolated or occasional. An annual nationwide survey of grants 
managers across sectors routinely reports that they spend more time on 
compliance with the grants-management rules than they do on any other task, 
including developing program policy and monitoring programmatic 
outcomes.181 OMB’s assessment is that grant managers spend 40% of their time 
on compliance instead of working on results.182 Sector-specific studies 
consistently show that grantees perceive compliance obligations as 
significantly weakening their ability to focus on the substance of their grant 
programs.183 Because the drivers that cause grantees to prioritize compliance 
are not sector-specific, the unintended consequences discussed in these first 
two sections reflect a widespread problem. 
In addition to these unintended consequences, the system reflects two 
unwarranted assumptions. The grants-management system relies on the 
integrity of the audit process—the twin principles that that auditors have the 
capacity to conduct audits as the system expects and that the system itself is 
clear. The long history of problems in auditing and the complexity of the 
grants-management system suggests that this reliance is not well-founded, as 
Section II.C illustrates. Put another way, if different auditors would reach 
different conclusions on the same facts about whether a university-funded 
lunch on a boat reflects the yacht problem, and if university administrators find 
it too costly and difficult to challenge auditors and their funders and therefore 
forbid marine biologists from week-long research projects at sea, the system is 
not working as it should. 
 
180. Charles S. Clark, Agencies in the Dark about Performance of Their Grants, Survey 
Shows, GOV’T EXEC. (Feb. 26, 2019), https://www.govexec.com/management/2019/02/agencies-dark-
about-performance-their-grants-survey-shows/155150 [https://perma.cc/9Z29-XMMX] (quoting an 
official saying that “no one has a good picture of the administrative burden”). 
181. See id.; see also Study: Funding Uncertainty Remains Key Grants Management Concern, 
FED. GRANTS MGMT. HANDBOOK, supra note 13. 
182. See Results-Oriented Accountability for Grants, PERFORMANCE.GOV, 
https://www.performance.gov/CAP/grants [https://perma.cc/83FH-AXDU] (“The Federal government 
uses grants to invest approximately $700 billion each year in mission-critical needs for American 
taxpayers, but managers report spending 40% of their time using antiquated processes to monitor 
compliance instead of analyzing data to improve results.”). 
183. Melissa Junge & Sheara Krvaric, The Compliance Culture in Education, EDUC. WEEK: 
RICK HESS STRAIGHT UP (Oct. 24, 2011, 7:48 AM), 
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/rick_hess_straight_up/2011/10/the_compliance_culture_in_education.h
tml  [https://perma.cc/L3DG-QP49] (explaining “how federal compliance rules can shape the way states 
and school districts think about using money for education” and describing “some of the specific federal 
rules we see as barriers to effective programs”); see also NAT’L ACADEMIES OF SCI., ENGINEERING & 
MED., supra note 33, at 1 (describing a similar challenge in the context of federal funding for scientific 
research). 
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Finally, the grants-management system tends to be portrayed as a series of 
technocratic, good-government decisions. But, as Section II.D shows, this 
assumption is not entirely true. If politics is “who gets what, when, how,”184 
rules governing the allocation of and accounting for hundreds of billions of 
federal dollars are necessarily embedded in a political system of often-disputed 
policy goals. Any serious effort to assess the operation of the grants-
management system must acknowledge this reality. 
Two caveats apply. First, this Part is meant to illustrate general dynamics 
rather than make claims that apply to every grant relationship in every instance. 
Not every point made below holds true at all times. However, it is possible—
and valuable—to make these general observations in the spirit of system-wide 
assessment. 
Second, to illustrate these unintended consequences and unwarranted 
assumptions is not ultimately to condemn the system. The old adage about the 
baby and the bathwater applies; a problem is only a problem if its solution is 
not worse. Before considering what is to be done—the subject of Part III—it is 
important to understand what is actually happening. 
A. How and Why Agencies Prioritize Administrative Enforcement Over 
Substantive Oversight 
One feature of the grants-management regime that is low in salience but 
high in importance is that it encourages agencies to prioritize administrative 
enforcement over substantive oversight. This emphasis in agency enforcement 
activity seems to be a consequence rather than a goal of regime design, 
however, and is not sufficiently apparent to generate much debate as a matter 
of public policy. 
Start by considering the breadth and generality of the substantive goals of 
the typical grant statute.185 It is difficult for agencies to monitor progress 
toward such goals because many of these goals depend on factors that are 
beyond the grantee’s direct control.186 That difficulty increases where there are 
disagreements about how to measure or observe compliance with general goals 
that involve tradeoffs with other goals.187 It is also resource-intensive to 
monitor progress toward these goals in all grant sites around the country.188 
 
184. See HAROLD LASSWELL, POLITICS: WHO GETS WHAT, WHEN, HOW (1936). 
185. See, e.g., supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text. 
186. See generally, e.g., Pasachoff, supra note 1 (distinguishing between grantees’ compliance 
with terms under their own control and terms depending on external factors). 
187. See, e.g., MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: THE DILEMMAS OF THE 
INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICE 147 (2010) (describing the challenge of “conflicting or ambiguous 
goals” in public institutions); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO 
AND WHY THEY DO IT 117 (2000) (noting that there is no objective way to evaluate tradeoffs between 
vague goals). 
188. See, e.g., Audit Calls for HUD to Better Assist Grantee Risk, SINGLE AUDIT INFO. SERV., 
Sept. 2017, at 3 (describing challenges for HUD’s Office of Community and Planning Development in 
overseeing state recipients of Community Development Block Grant Funds); FTA To Issue Guidance on 
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The reality of limited budgets and the specificity of appropriations language 
mean that agencies have a fixed amount of money to spend on program 
oversight, so agency program staff can only supervise the substantive terms of 
their grants to a limited extent.189 Even agency Inspector General staff, who are 
more focused on grant enforcement in general and fiscal compliance in 
particular through their auditing function, do not have the capacity to review 
every grantee every year.190 In previous work, I have called this dynamic the 
“capacity and motivation” rationale for why agencies do not tend to withhold 
programmatic funds from noncompliant grantees.191 
In that same work, I also identified three other dynamics that contribute to 
agencies’ reluctance to withhold programmatic funds for substantive 
noncompliance. One of these dynamics is the longstanding belief that 
withholding funds from grantees would hurt needy beneficiaries. If grantees are 
failing to accomplish the substantive goals of their statute, this rationale goes, 
threatening to take their funds away would be counterproductive.192 Another 
such dynamic is rooted in solicitude for federalism. Agencies can be reluctant 
to withhold substantive program funds from noncompliant state- and local-
government grantees out of a sense that to do so would wrongly discount their 
sovereignty and autonomy, constitute coercion, and reject valuable program 
variation and diversity.193 Still another dynamic reflects political pressure. That 
is, state- and local-government grantees can enlist their congressional 
delegations to oppose agency efforts to withhold funds using tools like 
appropriations to cabin agency action, while the White House, seeking to shore 
up votes in areas across the country, can be sensitive to state and local 
complaints about withholding efforts.194   
In my work identifying these dynamics, I challenged their underlying 
rationales as normatively and practically insufficient, suggesting that agencies 
 
At-Risk Grantee Oversight, SINGLE AUDIT INFO. SERV., July 2016, at 4 (describing challenges for 
Federal Transit Administration of reviewing actions of 2,000 urban and rural transit operators receiving 
transit grants). 
189. See, e.g., Evaluating Risk Criteria Aids Monitoring Efforts, FED. GRANTS MGMT. 
HANDBOOK, June 2014, at 3 (“Many federal grantor agencies and nonfederal passthrough entities are 
finding that limited resources are hindering effective monitoring efforts.”). In fact, Inspector General 
audits of agencies’ own monitoring work routinely criticize agencies for insufficient grantee oversight. 
See, e.g., DOL Seeks Better Program Data, SINGLE AUDIT INFO. SERV., May 2017, at 2 (summarizing 
monitoring weakness in a Department of Labor office, including zero monitoring for some grantees over 
the life of their grant, and program officers canceling scheduled monitoring visits due to budgetary 
limitations); Increased Monitoring Planned for Rural Ed Program, SINGLE AUDIT INFO. SERV., Nov. 
2016, at 2 (describing Inspector General Report critiquing an office in the Department of Education for 
conducting only 18 rubber-stamping “desk monitoring reports” of 16 grantees out of 4,300 grantees over 
a three-year period). 
190. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF THE INSPECTORS GEN. ON INTEGRITY & EFFICIENCY, CRITICAL 
ISSUES INVOLVING MULTIPLE INSPECTORS GENERAL 24 (2017) (“OIGs do not always have the 
resources to provide effective oversight for the more than 30,000 single audits filed annually.”). 
191. Pasachoff, supra note 1, at 304-09. 
192. Id. at 285-93. 
193. Id. at 293-303. 
194. Id. at 312-17. 
10. PASACHOFF ARTICLE. PUBLICATION (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2020  3:21 PM 
Federal Grant Rules and Realities 
603 
 
reconceptualize their role in promoting programmatic outcomes through 
sensible (rather than blunderbuss) enforcement actions—but the descriptive 
reality is a powerful one.195 That is, these reasons accurately describe why 
agencies are often reluctant to engage in enforcement actions for failures to 
meet the grant’s programmatic goals. 
These explanations for agencies’ low focus on substantive enforcement of 
grants point to agencies’ internal conceptualization of their role. Another 
contributing explanation is the result of an external force: the history of private 
enforcement of grant statutes through lawsuits by program beneficiaries. In the 
1960s and 1970s, as Congress developed new federal grant programs and 
dramatically expanded the role of federal funding in American policy, 
Congress incorporated private enforcement regimes into some of those statutes, 
allowing beneficiaries to sue state and local agencies for violating their rights 
or providing insufficient levels or quality of service.196 Courts also played a 
role during this era in permitting robust private enforcement regimes, including 
by requiring due-process hearings before benefits could be taken away197 and 
by finding implied private rights of action where none existed in the statute’s 
explicit language.198 Because private parties were helping to ensure that federal 
grantees were delivering on programs’ policy goals, there was little need for 
Congress to develop robust substantive enforcement regimes for the federal 
agencies granting the funds in the first place, especially in light of the 
countervailing effort to encourage state and local governments to take up these 
voluntary grant programs in the first place. Accordingly, most grant offices are 
designed to give funds away, rather than to take funds away from noncompliant 
grantees; grant program managers, rather than grant enforcement attorneys, are 
the norm.199 Where Congress did include agency enforcement offices for grant 
programs, largely through Offices of Civil Rights, private lawsuits against 
those offices helped pressure the offices to do a thorough and timely job.200 
By the 1980s, when courts began to cut back on the doctrine that had up 
until then made private enforcement a forceful option,201 the political 
environment had shifted to the right. Congress, therefore, did not compensate 
for judicial retrenchment by invigorating federal agencies’ own capacity to 
engage in substantive enforcement of federal grants.202 Similarly, when the 
 
195. See generally id. at 283-316. 
196. See, e.g., Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 615(b)-(e), 
89 Stat. 773, 788-89 (1975) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (2018)). 
197. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
198. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 
(1964). 
199. See Pasachoff, supra note 1, at 304, 326. 
200. See, e.g., Women’s Equity Action League v. Cavazos, 879 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1989); 
Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
201. See infra notes 241-248. 
202. TIMOTHY CONLAN, FROM NEW FEDERALISM TO DEVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM 141-69 (1998). 
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Supreme Court decided that agency decisions not to take enforcement actions 
were unreviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act,203 Congress 
accepted this decision without placing any countervailing pressures on agencies 
to enforce the substance of their grant statutes. 
These developments left a vacuum for substantive enforcement of grants. 
Instead, the 1980s saw the rise and entrenchment of grants-management rules. 
For example, Congress passed the Single Audit Act in 1984, codifying what 
had been less formal OMB requirements of grantees for auditing.204 In 1988, 
OMB finalized what became known as the “common rule,” a unified set of 
administrative requirements that applied to all federal grants and that was 
subsequently adopted by all federal grant-making agencies.205 And throughout 
the decade, both Congress and OMB tightened various restrictions on activities 
for which grantees could spend federal dollars.206 
Against this institutional and historical backdrop, the reasons for 
agencies’ current focus on administrative enforcement as opposed to 
substantive oversight become clear. As a consequence, the single audit has 
come to play an outsize role in agencies’ grant-enforcement efforts. In contrast 
to the limited agency capacity for substantive monitoring and low tolerance for 
substantive enforcement, the single audit provides a regular source of 
oversight.207 In effect, the task of investigating compliance with the fiscal 
compliance rules is outsourced to nonfederal, front-line auditors.208 Moreover, 
agencies do not bear the cost of this work because grantees directly pay the cost 
of the single audit.209 The primary role for agencies under the fiscal compliance 
 
203. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); accord Women’s Equity Action League v. 
Cavazos, 906 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
204. Single Audit Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-502, 93 Stat. 2327 (codified in scattered 
sections of 31 U.S.C.). 
205. Final Rule, 53 Fed. Reg. 8034 (Mar. 11, 1988). 
206. See, e.g., Nora Gordon & Sarah Reber, The Quest for a Targeted and Effective Title I: 
Challenges in Designing and Implementing Fiscal Compliance Rules, in THE ELEMENTARY AND 
SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT AT FIFTY AND BEYOND, 1 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 129, 131 
(2015) (describing increased statutory restrictions on education spending); see also infra notes 333–341 
(discussing the Reagan administration’s changes to spending permissibility). 
207. See, e.g., Leita Hart-Fanta, Why Are Single Audits Challenging for External Auditors?, 
SINGLE AUDIT INFO. SERV., Oct. 2015, at 4 (calling the single audit “the primary mechanism used by 
agencies to ensure accountability for federal awards”); Leita Hart-Fanta, A Renewed Emphasis on 
Abuse, SINGLE AUDIT INFO. SERV., Aug. 2014, at 4 [hereinafter Hart-Fanta, Why Are Single Audits 
Challenging?] (“If you have been in the government environment for a while, you realize that federal, 
state and local granting agencies don’t have the resources to come and check on every grant in detail. 
The single audit is often the only assurance they receive that their money is being used properly. So if 
auditors don’t tell them that something wasteful is going on, they will never know it, and the questioned 
behavior will continue.”). 
208. Cf. Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell, & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, 
Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1834 (2015) (describing the attraction for 
legislators of such off-budget actions and unorthodox delegations). 
209. 2 C.F.R. § 200.425(a) (2019); Hart-Fanta, Why Are Single Audits Challenging?, supra 
note 207, at 4 (explaining that auditors “are working on behalf of the federal government, not the 
nonprofit organization who is only writing a check covered by their federal award”). 
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rules is simply to approve the auditors’ findings.210 It is therefore cheaper for 
agencies to engage in enforcement of the fiscal compliance rules than in 
oversight of the substantive terms of their grants. 
It is not only the increased capacity that results from outsourcing 
enforcement to auditors that makes fiscal enforcement cheaper than substantive 
enforcement; the political and social context in which fiscal enforcement 
occurs makes it cheaper than substantive enforcement as well. As political 
scientists David Konisky and Manuel Teodoro theorize, a government 
“regulator will penalize violations when the cost of tolerating the violation is 
greater than the cost of penalizing the violator.”211 This calculus plays out 
differently for fiscal violations than it does for substantive ones. 
Konisky and Teodoro explain that the “cost of tolerating a violation is the 
social cost of a regulatory policy failure.”212 The social cost of tolerating a 
fiscal violation is higher than the social cost of tolerating substantive 
noncompliance. If agencies tolerate grantees’ fiscal noncompliance, it is easy 
for the public and for lawmakers to be outraged at the agencies’ ineptitude or 
even corruption.213 In contrast, if agencies tolerate grantees’ substantive 
noncompliance, agencies are less likely to be blamed because they appear 
encouraging or patient with difficult tasks, especially where the noncompliance 
is based on the grantees’ failure to achieve outcomes that are outside the 
grantees’ own control or on grantees’ sympathetic-sounding capacity 
limitations.214 This is a basic premise of agencies’ reluctance to withhold grant 
funds from noncompliant grantees.215 
As Konisky and Teodoro further explain, the “cost of penalizing a 
violation is a function of the cost of imposing the penalty and the risk that the 
penalty will be overturned if and when the violator appeals the penalty through 
legislative or judicial channels.”216 Each of these cost categories is lower for 
fiscal violations than for substantive noncompliance. As explained above, the 
cost of imposing the penalty is lower for fiscal violations because that task is 
outsourced to auditors, who are paid directly by grantees.217 In contrast, the 
cost of imposing a penalty for substantive noncompliance is borne entirely by 
the agency. 
 
210. 2 C.F.R. §§ 200.66, 200.521 (2019). 
211. David M. Konisky & Manuel P. Teodoro, When Governments Regulate Governments, 60 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 559, 563 (2016). 
212. Id. 
213. See, e.g., Erica L. Green & Erin Fox, Federal Audit Finds City Schools Misspent 
Stimulus, Title I Funds, BALT. SUN, May 23, 2013 (describing bipartisan disapprobation of grantee 
violation of fiscal rules); McGuire, supra note 45 (discussing congressional reactions to universities 
using grant funds improperly). 
214. See Pasachoff, supra note 1, at 275, 319, 321. 
215. See id. at 272-73. 
216. Konisky & Teodoro, supra note 211, at 563. 
217. See supra note 209. 
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Similarly, the risk that the penalty will be overturned by either Congress 
or the courts is lower for fiscal violations than for substantive noncompliance. 
It can be hard for grantees to garner sympathy from legislators for a perceived 
injustice associated with the improper use of federal funds or insufficient 
paperwork documenting their use. Likewise, given the expense associated with 
challenging audit findings and the incentives to stay in funders’ good graces,218 
grantees rarely challenge audit findings even within agency procedures, much 
less in court. In contrast, grantees are more likely to find legislators receptive to 
arguments that agency efforts to withhold funds for substantive noncompliance 
are unjust, whether because loss of grant funds will hurt needy grant 
beneficiaries or because stringent federal enforcement impinges on federalism 
values.219 
The differing priorities of the political parties also makes fiscal 
compliance more heavily enforced over time. Fiscal compliance lends itself to 
bipartisan agreement more than substantive compliance does.220 Fiscal 
compliance sounds in good government; after all, who could be opposed to 
preventing waste, fraud, and abuse of taxpayer funds? Substantive compliance, 
on the other hand, depends on a belief that government money can solve policy 
problems if used right, as well as a belief in the capacity and legitimacy of the 
administrative state to compel compliance with its policy goals, both of which 
are beliefs more associated with the left than the right in American politics. 
Fiscal compliance is thus likely to be a consistent feature of both Republican 
and Democratic administrations, while substantive compliance, especially on 
the social policy grants that make up the vast bulk of the federal grant universe, 
is more likely to be a feature of only Democratic administrations. 
For all these reasons, then, agencies’ enforcement work is skewed toward 
administrative compliance over substantive oversight. 
David Super’s case study of the “quality control” (QC) system in the 
food-stamp program illustrates the dynamic described in this Section nicely. 
Passed in 1964, the Food Stamp Act directs federal funding to state grantees, 
who then administer the entitlement.221 The Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) was given oversight authority, “but with limited resources the 
Department had little capacity to identify any but the most egregious state 
administrative deficiencies.”222 In 1977, Congress “sought to improve USDA’s 
oversight capacity by requiring states to conduct QC reviews of their eligibility 
decisions.”223 In the early 1980s, as entitlement programs became central to 
political debate, the food-stamp program was charged with being rife with 
 
218. See infra notes 317-320 and accompanying text. 
219. See Pasachoff, supra note 1, at 284-85. 
220. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 13. 
221. See David A. Super, Are Rights Efficient? Challenging the Managerial Critique of 
Individual Rights, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1105 (2005). 
222. Id. at 1105. 
223. Id. 
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“waste, fraud, and abuse,” and the QC program provided a ready means of 
responding.224 Because “few members of Congress wanted to be seen as 
defending ‘high error rates,’” Congress put in place financial penalties for 
states with high error rates in awarding food stamps.225 “Although payment 
accuracy was but one of several objectives set out for the Food and Nutrition 
Service (FNS)” in USDA’s statutorily required strategic plan, “it was the only 
one that FNS had a ready means of quantifying at the state level,” and “[e]rror 
reduction permeated almost all aspects of FNS’s relations with states.”226 Thus, 
the combination of quantifiable manageability, agency capacity, and political 
support led to the agency’s prioritizing the administrative QC rules over the 
broader programmatic goals of “providing food stamps to eligible applicants,” 
“supporting working poor families,” and so on, which do not have a “remotely 
comparable measurement-and-incentive system.”227 
This dynamic should not be surprising, especially as to the question of 
measurability.228 In criminal enforcement, prosecutors often focus on violations 
that are easier to prove.229 In civil or administrative cases, the clarity and 
verifiability of requirements are key to their enforcement.230 The dynamic of 
measurability is also an important part of both public administration and 
corporate management writ large. What gets measured gets managed, the 
classic refrain goes, so it is important to choose the right things to measure.231 
Of course, people can then disagree about what those “right” things are.232 
What is particularly unusual about this dynamic in the context of grant 
enforcement is that responsibility bifurcates in two dimensions, both along 
intergovernmental lines (because investigation into compliance is devolved 
from the federal government to state and local grantees, as well as to nonprofit 
organizations operating under localized auditing oversight)233 and across the 
public-private divide (because of the prominence of private certified public 
 
224. Id. at 1103. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. at 1108. 
227. Id. at 1110. 
228. Cf. WILSON, supra note 187, at 161 (“Work that produces measurable outcomes tends to 
drive out work that produces unmeasurable outcomes.”). 
229. See, e.g., Memorandum from the Office of the Att’y Gen. to All Fed. Prosecutors, 
Department Charging and Sentencing Policy (May 10, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/965896/download [https://perma.cc/QNB6-QNNG] (instructing prosecutors to “charge and 
pursue the most serious, readily provable offense” (emphasis added)). 
230. David L. Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, A Holistic View of Agency Enforcement, 93 
N.C. L. REV. 1, 5, 13-21 (2014) (identifying “clarity, norm achievability, [and] compliance verifiability” 
as important components of “effective regulation both generally and in the specific context of regulatory 
enforcement and compliance”). 
231. See generally, e.g., JOHN DOERR, MEASURING WHAT MATTERS (2018). 
232. See, e.g., Simon Caulkin, The Rule Is Simple: Be Careful What You Measure, GUARDIAN 
(Feb. 9, 2008), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2008/feb/10/businesscomment1 
[https://perma.cc/4BXJ-HBCA]. 
233. Cf. Miriam Seifter, Further from the People? The Puzzle of State Administration, 93 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 107, 128-46 (2018) (describing challenges in oversight of state-level executive branch 
operations). 
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accountant (CPA) firms in conducting single audits).234 As a result, much of the 
work of federal grant enforcement is done off-budget and less publicly, making 
it difficult for congressional overseers and the public to observe—and therefore 
debate the priorities reflected by—this balance of oversight in federal grants.  
This critical feature underlying the administration of billions of dollars in 
annual federal spending thus goes largely unremarked. 
B. How and Why Grantees Prioritize Administrative Compliance over 
Programmatic Outcomes 
Given agencies’ apparent prioritization of administrative compliance over 
programmatic outcomes, it is no surprise that grantees adjust their priorities 
accordingly. To illustrate the point, imagine a hypothetical civil-rights audit. 
What if every federal grantee each year had to submit the entirety of its policies 
and practices to a team of on-site auditors to review whether it was in 
compliance with every single civil-rights statute and accompanying regulations 
and guidance, with the auditors additionally conducting interviews of all 
relevant parties? What if after that review, the team of civil-rights auditors 
wrote a comprehensive analysis making specific findings of noncompliance 
and demanding a revision of every policy and practice that needed fixing, as 
well as repayment of funds from programs found to have been in 
noncompliance, with the promise of returning the subsequent year to make sure 
the grantee had made the needed changes? Surely such a system would increase 
grantees’ focus on civil-rights compliance. 
That is what happens with the grants-management rules. Grantees know 
that federal agencies’ oversight over their progress toward meeting the 
substantive goals of grant statutes is unlikely to result in a loss of grant funds 
because agencies have historically been hesitant to withhold funds for most 
kinds of programmatic noncompliance.235 In contrast, grantees know that they 
are subject to annual audits that will focus on the grants-management rules. 
They also know that audit findings may result in a variety of negative 
consequences, including a requirement to repay money the grantees have 
already spent, a loss of access to future funds, the imposition of “specific 
conditions” on their grant that make it more burdensome to operate,236 or 
simply bad publicity that may have ripple effects beyond the federal grant 
itself.237 It is therefore financially riskier to miss compliance with the grants-
 
234. Cf. PAUL C. LIGHT, THE GOVERNMENT-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX: THE TRUE SIZE OF THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 1984-2018, at xv (2019) (discussing the need “to monitor and police the 
movement of functions across the divide between government and industry”); JON D. MICHAELS, 
CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 131 (2017) (“State 
power passed through private conduits becomes much harder for the rest of civil society to monitor.”). 
235. See supra notes 185-195 and accompanying text. 
236. See 2 C.F.R. §§ 207, 338 (2019) (outlining the formal consequences of noncompliance). 
237. See, e.g., Deborah M. Rosen, Why It Benefits a Grantee to Carry out a Proposal as 
Written, FED. GRANTS MGMT. HANDBOOK, Jan. 2014, at 4, 5 (“The long-term impact of noncompliance 
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management rules than with the substantive outcome-oriented goals of a grant 
statute.238 
The grants-management rules are also easier for grantees to focus on than 
accomplishing the outcome-oriented substantive goals of grant statutes, in part 
because of factors beyond grantees’ direct control, and in part because of 
disagreements about what satisfactory progress toward the goals looks like or 
whether it is observable in the relevant timeframe.239 In contrast, as input-
oriented requirements, the grants-management rules are more within grantees’ 
control and are therefore easier for grantees to comply with. As political 
scientist James Q. Wilson explained in his landmark study of bureaucracies, 
“[i]t is very difficult” for managers of bureaucracies “to find ways to change 
things when it is easier for political superiors to observe whether you are 
obeying constraints than whether you are achieving goals.”240 The constraints 
of the grants-management rules are more readily observable than the 
accomplishment of outcome-oriented grant goals. 
To be clear, input-oriented rules are not as a class worse than outcome-
oriented goals. Some kinds of input-oriented rules are quite sensible—policies 
designed to prevent grantee self-dealing, say—although reasonable people can, 
of course, disagree about whether particular rules themselves develop sensible 
requirements. But the system’s focus on the grants-management rules, coupled 
with the comparative attractiveness of those rules because they are within 
grantees’ own control, creates incentives for grantees to shift attention to 
compliance with the grants-management rules. 
In an earlier era, private lawsuits by grant beneficiaries played something 
of a counterweight to grantees’ focus on the grants-management rules (as 
described above in terms of implications for federal agency enforcement).241 
Over time, however, a series of judicial decisions limited avenues for 
beneficiaries or public interest organizations to sue state and local agencies for 
noncompliance with the substantive requirements of grant statutes. For 
example, implied private rights of actions were curtailed;242 lawsuits could no 
longer be brought under § 1983 to enforce federal spending statutes;243 
 
can remain with an organization for years and result in negative publicity for the institution and the 
inability to attract future funding.”). 
238. Cf. WILSON, supra note 187, at 129 (“The greater the costs of noncompliance, the more 
important the constraint.”); Konisky & Teodoro, supra note 211, at 562 (“[T]he cost of violation is a 
function of the risk of being penalized, the direct costs of a penalty (e.g., fines or procedural costs) 
imposed by the regulator, and any indirect costs that follow from violations.”).  
239. See supra notes 186-187 and accompanying text. 
240. WILSON, supra note 187, at 128. 
241. See supra notes 196-203 and accompanying text. 
242. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 
442 U.S. 560 (1979); Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 
183, 195-200. 
243. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997); 
see also Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983, and Medicaid 
Entitlements, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 413 (2008) (describing judicial hostility to § 1983 actions in the 
Medicaid context). 
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circumstances in which a prevailing plaintiff could obtain attorneys’ or expert-
witness fees were truncated;244 the ability to bring class-action lawsuits was 
restricted.245 
In some substantive areas of law, the Supreme Court also cut back on the 
substance of what the law had previously been seen to require. For example, as 
the Supreme Court moved from requiring school districts “to eliminate from 
the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed discrimination” and “to achieve 
the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation”246 to showing that “the 
vestiges of past discrimination have been eliminated to the extent 
practicable,”247 school districts that had previously attended to integration 
efforts turned their attention elsewhere, with little fear of a private lawsuit to 
stop them.248 
Congress also played a role in limiting the circumstances in which private 
lawsuits could pressure state and local grantees on the substance of their 
actions. For example, as part of welfare reform in the mid-1990s, Congress 
restricted legal-services organizations receiving federal funding from bringing 
class-action lawsuits, challenging the constitutionality of welfare laws, or 
obtaining attorneys’ fees under fee-shifting statutes.249 Congress has also cut 
funding for the Legal Services Corporation, which funds legal-aid 
organizations around the country and plays an important role in holding state 
and local governments accountable to their low-income citizens.250 While 
Congress has consistently funded Legal Services even when presidents propose 
to zero it out—as has President Trump and President Reagan before him—
appropriations for Legal Services remain less than they were before its pre-
welfare-reform high, in real dollars.251 Even where private enforcement 
 
244. See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006); Buckhannon Bd. & 
Care Home v. West Virginia, 532 U.S. 598 (2001); see also Karlan, supra note 242, at 205-08. 
245. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011); see also J. Maria Glover, 
Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052 (2015); Mark C. Weber, 
IDEA Class Actions After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 45 UNIV. TOLEDO L. REV. 471 (2014). 
246. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15, 26 (1967). 
247. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Schs. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249-50 (1991). 
248. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public 
Education: The Courts’ Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597 (2003). These decisions about what the 
Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause required also shaped the requirements of what Federal Spending 
Clause laws require because of other Supreme Court holdings that make the Equal Protection Clause 
coextensive with Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibits race discrimination by any 
entity receiving federal funding. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 286-87 
(1978) (Powell, J., concurring). 
249. See Super, supra note 221, at 1094. 
250. See, e.g., Alan Houseman & Linda E. Perle, Securing Equal Justice for All: A Brief 
History of Civil Legal Assistance in the United States 7, 62, CLASP (May 2018), 
https://www.clasp.org/sites/default/files/publications/2018/05/2018_securingequaljustice.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8FYL-KYS5]. 
251. See, e.g., Congressional Appropriations, LEGAL SERVICES CORP., 
https://www.lsc.gov/about-lsc/who-we-are/congressional-oversight/congressional-appropriations 
[https://perma.cc/CG7B-3Z9A]; Tim Ryan, Trump Budget Seeks to Cut Off Legal Aid Group, 
COURTHOUSE NEWS (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/trump-budget-seeks-to-cut-off-
legal-aid-group [https://perma.cc/9DZC-WPTP]. 
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regimes under federal law remain robust, there remain wide geographical 
variations in the availability of lawyers to bring claims.252 
The elimination of consistent pressure from the threat of private lawsuits 
along all these dimensions is another important component of why the grants-
management rules have taken on an outsize role for grantee focus. 
David Super’s case study of the effect of the quality-control system in the 
food-stamp program again illustrates the point, even in a program where the 
programmatic goals are connected to an actual individual entitlement that can 
be privately enforced. As he explains, FNS’s focus on QC at the expense of 
other programmatic goals drove state administrators of the funding program to 
shift their attention toward payment accuracy, “evaluat[ing] substantive policy 
proposals based on their likely effect on error rates.”253 The QC system 
“[s]kewed [i]ncentives in the [f]ood [s]tamp [p]rogram” because state program 
administrators understood that the likelihood of facing consequences for failing 
to meet other program goals was slim, either from private litigation or from 
FNS’s substantive oversight.254 To the contrary, even in an era in which 
antipoverty policy was “overwhelming[ly] pro-work,” state food-stamp 
administrators developed certification requirements “that systematically 
disadvantaged low-wage working families” (and that “dramatically increased 
states’ workloads”) because of the “powerful impact” the QC error rates had on 
states’ substantive policymaking, given the significant financial consequences 
of administrative enforcement.255 Administrative rules like quality-control 
systems, he concludes, “can be much more powerful than is generally 
recognized”256 in shaping program administrators’ actions on the ground. 
Admittedly, this description of grantees’ incentives to focus on 
administrative compliance at the expense of programmatic outcomes paints 
with a broad brush. There are grantees who do pay a lot of attention to 
programmatic outcomes and goals, whether as a result of individual actors’ 
decisions, grant agreements, or otherwise. Moreover, to say that grantees have 
an incentive to prioritize administrative compliance over programmatic 
outcomes is not to say that compliance with the grants-management rules is 
perfect—far from it. Audits routinely result in findings that grantees must 
address.257 However, getting hit with consequences from audit findings, or 
 
252. See Pasachoff, supra note 1, at 308. 
253. See Super, supra note 221, at 1108-09. 
254. Id. at 1109-10. 
255. Id. at 1110-13. 
256. Id. at 1099. 
257. See, e.g., Weaknesses Often Found in Internal Controls, Subrecipient Monitoring, 
SINGLE AUDIT INFO. SERV., June 2017, at 1 [hereinafter Weaknesses Often Found] (describing the most 
common audit findings). 
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knowing other grantees who do so, then deepens the incentive to focus on 
compliance.258 
One variation of note may stem from whether the grantee’s auditor comes 
from the private or the public sector. Private-sector auditors are sometimes 
reluctant to report compliance issues because they want to be rehired to do the 
single audit again next year.259 In contrast, in states where the state auditor’s 
office oversees the single-audit process, there tends to be more stringent 
oversight of the grant rules. Compliance with the grants-management rules may 
be less pressing under review by private sector auditors than state auditors, 
then. Either way, however, the general principle that what gets measured gets 
managed applies.260 
There are a number of downstream consequences of grantees’ fear of 
expensive audit findings. One of these consequences is that sometimes grantees 
make implementation decisions based on compliance with the administrative 
rules that work against the programmatic goals of the grant statute.261 For 
example, consider the “time and effort” cost principle, which requires grantees 
to be able to justify the use of grant funds to pay the salaries of each employee 
on the basis of the work that each employee actually did under the grant in 
question.262 This is a recordkeeping activity of vast proportions, and its 
violation routinely results in repayment requirements.263 Because it can be 
easier to prove that an employee worked under a particular grant if 100% of 
that employee’s time was spent on the grant, grantees sometimes design their 
programming in a way that silos their work efforts rather than using different 
sources of funding to create more effective comprehensive programs.264 The 
substantive goal of the grant is subsumed by attention to the fiscal compliance 
rules. 
 
258. Leita Hart-Fanta, How the COSO Model Is Like a Fishing Net, SINGLE AUDIT INFO. 
SERV., Apr. 2015, at 4, 5 (noting that many organizations pay close attention to internal controls only 
after audit findings). 
259. See, e.g., Leita Hart-Fanta, A Renewed Emphasis on Abuse, SINGLE AUDIT INFO. SERV., 
Aug. 2014, at 4 (describing different incentives for government and private auditors). 
260. See supra note 231. 
261. See, e.g., Calif. Agency Needs Better Jobs Data Oversight, SINGLE AUDIT INFO. SERV., 
Jan. 2014 (noting that the state agency’s focus on meeting federal compliance requirements may cause it 
to miss opportunities to do better work); Melissa Junge & Sheara Krvaric, How the Supplement-Not-
Supplant Requirement Can Work Against the Policy Goals of Title I, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (Mar. 
2012), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/-how-the-supplementnotsupplant-requirement-
can-work-against-the-policy-goals-of-title-i_111823556546.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2CE-7NCK]. 
262. 2 C.F.R. § 200.430(i) (2019). 
263. Guidance Sets Administrative Costs Provision, FED. GRANTS MGMT. HANDBOOK, Oct. 
2014, at 8 (discussing the difficulties of deciding how to charge personnel time to a grant and explaining 
that wrong decisions could lead to repayment requirement). 
264. See, e.g., Melissa Junge & Sheara Krvaric, “Time and Effort” Takes Too Much Time and 
Effort, EDUC. WEEK: RICK HESS STRAIGHT UP (Oct. 26, 2011, 8:10 AM), 
http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/rick_hess_straight_up/2011/10/time_and_effort_takes_too_much_time_
and_effort.html [https://perma.cc/5CHP-TLMR] (describing how “school districts (typically with the 
backing of their state) feel compelled to design their programs to minimize the risk of time and effort 
noncompliance,” making “poor educational spending decisions” that are easier to account for). 
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A similar dynamic can exist with administrative rules from substantive 
grant statutes, not simply the Uniform Grant Guidance. For example, because 
auditors focus their attention on aspects of grantees’ work that are easily 
auditable,265 grantees may pay more attention to limiting program eligibility 
rather than conducting program outreach or improving program quality. That 
is, grantees may focus on ensuring that they serve only clients who are eligible 
for their services,266 rather than on ensuring that the program is reaching 
unserved people who are eligible, or on how good the program’s services are to 
begin with.267 This is not to say that eligibility is unimportant,268 but rather that 
if a grant statute has multiple goals—such as ensuring that no one who is 
ineligible is served, making sure that all eligible people are served, and making 
sure that the service is of high quality—to focus heavily on only one of these 
goals in the audit is to stack the deck in a way the statute itself did not 
specify.269 
Grantees may also be less likely to propose innovative uses of funds out 
of a concern that auditors will be skeptical about whether such uses are 
permissible.270 For local governments that are subgrantees of a state agency, 
the possibility of funds repayment has further consequences, in that it can limit 
the state agency’s willingness to approve innovative uses of grant funds out of 
concern that those uses will ultimately be disallowed.271 
A delay in getting grant funds out the door is another consequence of a 
focus on compliance with the grants-management rules. Because the federal 
grants-management rules require the development of state and local rules and 
processes, there are often many layers of approval and multiple systems that 
need to be coordinated before money that has been appropriated and allocated 
 
265. GAO, Advisory Council Amend Draft Yellow Book; Plan Summer Release, SINGLE 
AUDIT INFO. SERV., May 2018, at 1, 3 (explaining that the GAO deleted a proposed requirement that 
government auditors report “waste or abuse” by grantees because of the difficulty for auditors of 
objectively measuring such activity). 
266. See, e.g., FNS To Assess Methods to Reduce School Meal Program Payment Errors, 
SINGLE AUDIT INFO. SERV., July 2015 (describing an Inspector General report finding that USDA’s 
Food and Nutrition Service needs to better oversee grantees’ verification of eligibility for the school-
lunch program). 
267. See, e.g., Super, supra note 221, at 1110 (observing that a particular administrative 
compliance rule’s “dominance in ruling state administration [of the food stamp grant program] is 
underscored by the fact that no other aspect of the state’s performance in administering the food stamp 
program is subject to a remotely comparable measurement-and-incentive system”). 
268. See, e.g., Leita Hart-Fanta, Auditors Should Identify a Compelling Effect, SINGLE AUDIT 
INFO. SERV., June 2014 (explaining that eligible beneficiaries lose when someone ineligible takes their 
place). 
269. Cf. Super, supra note 221, at 1109-10 (noting that in the food stamp program, “improper 
awards of eligibility count as errors and improper denials do not,” and that “no sanctions attach to cases 
with high rates of improper denials and terminations”). 
270. See, e.g., Junge & Krvaric, supra note 183 (“It can take an extraordinary leader . . . to 
spend federal money in an entirely new way because it is always possible [that] change could trigger 
additional scrutiny and raise audit risks.”). 
271. See, e.g., Gordon & Pasachoff, supra note 55, at 12-13 (describing such consequences for 
local school districts). 
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can actually be spent.272 Sometimes state or local laws or procedures even need 
to be changed before the federal grant money can be awarded.273 Even when 
federal grant money is in grantees’ coffers, grantees can delay spending money 
because they are not sure whether particular uses are permissible and seek 
guidance from funder agencies to confirm.274 Because relying on an agency 
official’s verbal approval is not sufficient to avoid an audit finding, cautious 
grantees tend to wait for formal agency guidance, which can take time to 
promulgate.275 
Another consequence is that would-be grantees sometimes decline to 
participate in discretionary federal programs due to difficulty meeting 
administrative requirements. This is not the more familiar story of rejecting 
federal money because of ideological disagreements;276 instead, these may be 
programs that the federal government wants to incentivize and that states and 
localities themselves want to take up.277 Requirements that federal funds must 
be matched at a certain rate278 or must be spent only on certain parts of a 
 
272. Joe Fiorill, GAO Calls Antiterrorism Grant Delays “Natural,” GOV’T EXEC., May 14, 
2004 (describing “natural delays that should have been expected in the complex process of distributing 
dramatically increased funding through multiple governmental levels while maintaining procedures to 
ensure proper standards of accountability at each level”); Michael Martinez, Auditor Blasts California’s 
Emergency Management Work, GOV’T EXEC. (Sept. 14, 2006), 
https://www.govexec.com/defense/2006/09/auditor-blasts-californias-emergency-management-
work/22706 [https://perma.cc/T7X9-3M7Y] (describing a delay in spending a billion dollars of 
emergency-management funds to California because of intergovernmental requirements). 
273. Jeff Stein & Arelis R. Hernàndez, Despite New Law, Trump Administration Has Not 
Given Puerto Rico Emergency Food Stamp Aid, WASH. POST (June 24, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/06/24/despite-new-law-trump-administration-has-not-
given-puerto-rico-emergency-food-stamp-aid [https://perma.cc/D5DL-PDZG] (describing delay in 
awarding food stamp funds because “the island must first propose a plan for how the aid will be spent 
and make ‘required system changes’ to its food stamps program”); Pamela M. Prah, States Could Lose 
Millions in Federal Job Money, GOVERNING (Jan. 30, 2014, 2:20 PM), 
https://www.governing.com/news/headlines/states-could-lose-millions-in-federal-job-money.html 
[https://perma.cc/X4EC-K4R2] (describing the need for state legislatures to change certain employment 
laws or lose their share of a $100 million in new federal funding). 
274. See, e.g., ED to Provide Info on Allowable Expenditures, FED. GRANTS MGMT. 
HANDBOOK, Dec. 2018, at 5 (describing how state grantees for vocational-education programs left more 
than $100 million in federal funding unspent because of a lack of clarity about allowable expenditures 
and a delay in agency guidance). 
275. See, e.g., LEIGH M. MANASEVIT & BRETTE KAPLAN, THE DO’S AND DON’TS OF 
EDUCATION COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 5-4 fig.5-2 (2011) (cautioning against such reliance). 
276. See, e.g., SEAN NICHOLSON-CROTTY, GOVERNORS, GRANTS, AND ELECTIONS: FISCAL 
FEDERALISM IN THE AMERICAN STATES 1-3 (2015) (“[A] quick examination of Medicaid expansion 
suggests that state actors sometimes leave massive sums of federal grant money on the table for reasons 
that appear to be openly partisan.”). 
277. See, e.g., id. at 4-8 (developing the argument that governors have many reasons to secure 
federal grants); David Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2577 (2005) 
(describing spending programs in which “the federal government leverages its fiscal resources for 
particular types of activity that it believes are national priorities”). 
278. J.B. Wogan, Why Some States Leave Federal Child Care Grants on the Table, 
GOVERNING (May 9, 2017, 5:00 PM), https://www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/gov-
unspent-child-care-federal-funding-states.html [https://perma.cc/97FX-N58Q]. 
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program but not others (say, expansion or initiation projects and not 
maintenance, operation, or repair projects)279 can discourage participation. 
Ironically, sometimes grantees make these choices based on an incorrect 
or out-of-date understanding of what the grants-management rules actually 
require.280 In part this is because the rules are complicated and layered in many 
different documents that are difficult for nonlawyer, nonaccountant grantees to 
understand.281 It is also because many “rules” are standards rather than rules, 
and different auditors may have different interpretations about what is 
permissible.282 Grantees, when making decisions, sometimes rely on hearsay 
from other grantees or on prior experience in trying to gain approval of a 
spending choice.283 Such reliance may lead grantees astray: the rules may have 
changed,284 their own grant may permit more than they think it does,285 or a 
prior disapproval may have been based on a factual circumstance that is not 
currently present.286 
These consequences of grantees’ choices made as a result of the grants-
management rules (or their imperfect understanding of the rules) may have 
broader consequences for Congress’s and grantor agencies’ subsequent policy 
choices. The grants-management rules are less salient to agency policymakers, 
because grant-oversight teams are often siloed from program-office staff, and 
to Congress, where legislators and staffers with substantive oversight may 
know little about the OMB rules not within their obvious remit.287 
Policymakers observing grantees’ difficulty in achieving substantive 
programmatic goals may end up changing the policy out of a sense that it is not 
working, when in fact the substantive policy may not really be fully 
implemented because grantees are focused on administrative compliance at the 
expense of programmatic choices.288 
 
279. Richard Weir, T Loses out on $10M After Fed Funds Lapse, BOS. HERALD (Nov. 18, 
2018), https://www.bostonherald.com/2015/04/10/t-loses-out-on-10m-after-fed-funds-lapse 
[https://perma.cc/9LYU-DZLG]; Chris Kardish, States Want Flexibility for Health Exchange Grants, 
GOVERNING (July 2014), https://www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/gov-health-
exchange-grant-flexibility.html [https://perma.cc/NC4F-E8U5]. 
280. Andrew Feldman & Thaddeus Ferber, It’s Time to Bust Some Myths About How States 
Can Use Federal Funds, GOV’T EXEC. (July 5, 2017), 
https://www.govexec.com/management/2017/07/its-time-bust-some-myths-about-how-states-can-use-
federal-funds/139167 [https://perma.cc/V656-TXN9] (“Federal programs, it turns out, often provide 
more flexibility than states and localities realize.”). 
281. See, e.g., Gordon & Pasachoff, supra note 55, at 10-11. 
282. See, e.g., id. at 10. 
283. See, e.g., id. at 13. 
284. See, e.g., Weaknesses Often Found, supra note 257, at 6 (explaining grantees’ lack of 
awareness in rule changes under the Uniform Grant Guidance). 
285. See, e.g., Feldman & Ferber, supra note 280. 
286. See, e.g., id. 
287. See supra note 133 and accompanying text; see also CRS, FEDERAL GRANTS, supra note 
2, at 38-39 (outlining “congressional issues” for federal grants with no mention of compliance rules). 
288. See, e.g., Junge & Krvaric, supra note 65, at 1. 
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Alternatively, policymakers may decide to change the substantive policy 
but miss the fact that the grants-management rules will frustrate the 
effectiveness of the policy change because the substantive policy change 
ignores the incentives set up by the grants-management rules.289 Or 
policymakers may end up deciding to cut funding for a program or eliminate it 
entirely on the assumption that it isn’t working, when the issue was not with 
the program itself but with the impact of the grant rules.290 Funding is 
particularly relevant to this issue because grantees pay for the single audit 
themselves out of their general grant funding.291 Funders who wonder why 
grantees are not accomplishing the goal of the statute may not be aware that the 
full appropriated amount is not being spent on program implementation. In 
addition, funders may not always be fully aware of the extent of administrative 
compliance requirements. 
Under any of these scenarios, policymakers may end up making choices 
they would not otherwise make but for the way the grant rules operate within 
grantees’ compliance universe and for policymakers’ lack of attention to those 
rules. The grants-management rules thus have important consequences for the 
ultimate accomplishment and specification of the goal of the statute. 
C. Systemic Assumptions About the Integrity of the Audit Process 
The centrality of the auditor’s role in grant oversight indicates systemic 
assumptions about the integrity of the audit process and the determinacy of the 
task entrusted to auditors. Yet a long history of issues surrounding single audits 
suggests that these assumptions are not fully warranted. 
Numerous studies over many decades have consistently found a troubling 
degree of low-quality audits. For example, a high-level presidential 
commission in 2007 found that more than one third of audits of the largest 
federal grantees could not be fully trusted.292 Even after a decade of concerted 
effort to redress the problems uncovered in that report, a more recent study by 
the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants found “concerning 
levels of non-conformity with the Uniform Guidance” in audits, noting that 
 
289. See, e.g., Melissa Junge & Sheara Krvaric, Managing the Law in Education: Strategies 
for Education Leaders and the Organizations that Support Them 1-2, AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (2014), 
https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED555550 [https://perma.cc/6RGF-FN7P] (describing policy change even 
though the original policy was never actually implemented because of low-salience, high-impact 
compliance rules). 
290. Cf. Sarah Harney, Dock Shock, GOVERNING (June 2005), 
https://www.governing.com/topics/politics/Dock-Shock.html [https://perma.cc/B2N8-6LD6] (noting 
that only twenty-one percent of all funds awarded under a homeland security program had actually been 
spent because of grantee difficulty, which might make the federal government scrutinize grant proposals 
even more). 
291. See supra note 209. 
292. PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON INTEGRITY & EFFICIENCY, REPORT ON NATIONAL SINGLE 
AUDITING SAMPLING PROJECT 10 (2007), 
https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/NatSamProjRptFINAL2.pdf [https://perma.cc/S25M-
2B52]. 
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55% of the sample of single audits reviewed were found to be “materially 
nonconforming” in that regard.293 Auditors may report grantee compliance 
problems where none exist, or fail to report compliance problems that do 
exist.294 They may fail to document their work properly, making it difficult for 
agencies to review in any meaningful way.295 They may draft corrective action 
plans for grantees instead of leaving it to grantees to take ownership of their 
own plans to come into compliance.296 
For all of these reasons, the Uniform Grant Guidance required—for the 
first time—a regular federal study of single audit quality to take place every six 
years, starting with the data from the 2018 single audit universe.297 In a classic 
move of a pre-emptive industry self-governance effort, the American Institute 
of CPAs launched its own “Enhancing Audit Quality” initiative in 2014.298 
Yet concerns about audit quality remain. One reason for poor audit quality 
is that single audits are complex undertakings that require skills and training far 
beyond what is normally expected of CPAs.299 Experienced CPA firms better 
understand what is involved in a single audit and bid for the work at a 
commensurate rate, but less experienced CPA firms may underbid in an effort 
to win the contract and then may do lower quality work in order to make 
money on the deal.300 
It is also common for junior audit staffers to do much of the frontline 
auditing work.301 The more experience auditors and their institutions have in 
 
293. Enhancing Audit Quality 6, 12-13, AICPA (2017), 
https://www.aicpa.org/content/dam/aicpa/interestareas/peerreview/downloadabledocuments/eaq-hlt-
rpt.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZN68-2XJP]. 
294. See id. at 6. 
295. See id. at 10. 




297. 2 C.F.R. § 200.513(a)(3)(ii) (2019). 
298. See Enhancing Audit Quality, AICPA (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.aicpa.org/eaq.html 
[https://perma.cc/JFN8-6R2K]. 
299. See, e.g., Elizabeth K. Keating & Peter Frumpkin, Reengineering Nonprofit Financial 
Accountability: Toward a More Reliable Foundation for Regulation, 63 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 3, 8 (2003) 
(describing “additional training” needed to conduct a Single Audit in order to “assess the operational 
activities of the organization as well as the accounting system”); Elizabeth K. Keating et al., The Single 
Audit Act: How Compliant are Nonprofit Organizations?, 17 J. PUB. BUDGETING, ACCT. & FIN. MGMT. 
285, 286 (2005) (calling the Single Audit “a highly rigorous form of nonprofit oversight” that “demands 
skills beyond those necessary for a standard CPA audit” because of the scope of its coverage). 
300. See, e.g., Leita Hart-Fanta, Who Audits the Auditor?, SINGLE AUDIT INFO. SERV., Oct. 
2014, at 4 (describing this problem). 
301. See, e.g., Keating et al., supra note 299, at 303 (describing this phenomenon); Ken 
Tysiac, 11 Tips for Success with Single Audits, J. ACCOUNTANCY (Nov. 1, 2016), 
https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2016/nov/single-audits.html [https://perma.cc/X46K-
23F3] (“Junior audit staffers in the field are the first line of defense in finding noncompliance, so they 
need to understand what they’re looking for instead of performing procedures without thinking about 
their purpose.”). 
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conducting single audits, the fewer mistakes are made.302 However, small 
auditing firms that each does only a limited number of single audits collectively 
have a large share of the single-audit market overall, as compared to the biggest 
auditing firms, which make the fewest errors.303 The problems associated with 
poor single-audit quality thus likely fall most heavily on smaller, less 
sophisticated grantees who work with private, rather than state, auditors. 
But even as to larger, more sophisticated grantees, difficulties with the 
single-audit process remain. This fact is related to another reason for poor audit 
quality: the legal requirements reflected in the Uniform Grant Guidance and the 
Compliance Supplement are complex, and they can be difficult for auditors to 
understand. Consider this description of the 240 pages of the Compliance 
Supplement relevant to grants overseen by the Department of Education: 
 
[T]he Compliance Supplement is hardly straightforward. For example, it 
summarizes the rules with reference to the statute, the regulations, and guidance, 
but often doesn’t explain the particular source of law for a given obligation, let 
alone whether the obligation is a true requirement or merely advisory. 
Moreover, it provides several lengthy lists of potentially relevant Department of 
Education guidance documents but doesn’t explain which ones are relevant to 
which point, nor does it weave the relevant documents’ insights into the 
summary of what each fiscal compliance rule requires. It contains many cross-
references without explaining exactly what should be examined in the cross-
referenced sources of law. And it does not always adequately explain statutory 
changes to the rules that meaningfully affect compliance obligations.304 
This description is not unique to the Department of Education’s 
chapter.305 Given that the Department of Education is one of the five biggest 
grant-making agencies, however, that its chapter is so complex is itself cause 
for concern.306 
 
302. See Top Factors Driving Single Audit Quality, AICPA (2017), 
https://www.aicpa.org/interestareas/peerreview/downloadabledocuments/singleauditqualityfactorsinfogr
aphicpdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/88G8-6XKJ]. 
303. See, e.g., Keating et al., supra note 299, at 305. 
304. Gordon & Pasachoff, supra note 55, at 11. 
305. See, e.g., Jerry Ashworth, OMB Releases 2015 Compliance Supplement, Despite Title 
Complexities, FUNDING ATTRACTIONS (Jul. 15, 2015), 
http://fundingattractions.blogs.thompson.com/2015/07/15/omb-releases-2015-compliance-supplement-
despite-title-complexities [https://perma.cc/UN8T-W6Q9] (describing the 2015 version as generally 
involving “complex” changes that “can be confusing, even for those that have been involved with grants 
and audits for many years”); GAQC Alert No. 360, AICPA (May 18, 2018), 
https://www.aicpa.org/interestareas/governmentalauditquality/newsandpublications/gaqcalert/2018gaqca
rchivedalerts/gaqcalertno360.html [https://perma.cc/5P3X-S7TE] (describing need for “immediate 
attention” and staff training “to help ensure single audit quality” in light of the particular complexity of 
the 2018 version); GAQC Alert No. 387, AICPA (Sept. 20, 2019), 
https://www.aicpa.org/interestareas/governmentalauditquality/newsandpublications/gaqcalert/2019gaqca
rchivedalerts/gaqcalertno387.html [https://perma.cc/3NY4-75YM] (noting that the “2019 Supplement 
contains many more changes than usual,” and that it will be a “very challenging 2019 single audit 
season”).  
306. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
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Furthermore, there may be confusion over whether the Compliance 
Supplement is a retrospective document instructing auditors on the 
permissibility of past conduct or a prospective document instructing auditors 
and grantees on the permissibility of future conduct. This ambiguity emerges 
when the Compliance Supplement fails to give notice of an impending change 
in a law that it summarizes. Take, for example, the “supplement, not supplant” 
rule of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, the requirement that state 
and local grantees use federal funds to increase total spending on education, 
rather than to replace their own spending on education.307 The 2015 
reauthorization of this Act transformed what it means to comply with this rule, 
but gave a two-year grace period for compliance.308 This grace period 
essentially left it until audits taking place in the 2018 fiscal year to follow the 
new rule. Yet the 2016 and 2017 Compliance Supplements made no mention of 
the transformation, and even the 2018 Compliance Supplement buried it as an 
afterthought.309 
This inattention to the statutory change gives neither auditors nor grantees 
any indication that change is afoot. If history is any guide, it will take a long 
time for auditors to understand that the rules have changed, and a long time for 
grantees to change their spending practices to take advantage of their newfound 
flexibility.310 
The problems with the Compliance Supplement’s complexity are 
compounded when the annual update is full of errors, as recently happened. In 
September 2019, OMB had to release a revised version of the entire 1,600-page 
document after the auditing community identified numerous errors in the 
supposedly final version released in June 2019.311 Since many single audits had 
already been completed in the intervening months, this update caused 
consternation in the field, confusion about the process going forward, and 
concerns about version control for the rest of the year’s audits.312 Assumptions 
about the integrity of the audit process are weakened by the document’s 
difficulty in conveying to the field the actual legal requirements. 
Even when the Compliance Supplement does convey accurate legal 
requirements, however, those legal requirements are often ambiguous enough 
that it is not straightforward to apply them to the facts presented by grantees’ 
operations. Again, to take the “supplement, not supplant” example, different 
auditors can have a different interpretation of whether a particular instance of 
 
307. 20 U.S.C. § 6321(b)(5)(a) (2018). 
308. Id.; Decision Guide for Implementing ESSA: State Considerations for Effective Grant 
Programs 21, COUNCIL OF CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFICERS (Nov. 2016), 
https://ccsso.org/sites/default/files/2017-10/CCSSODecisionGuideForESSAImplementation.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VR73-H2Z6] (describing this change). 
309. Gordon & Pasachoff, supra note 55, at 11 n.21. 
310. See supra notes 283-286 and accompanying text. 
311. See GAQC Alert No. 387, supra note 305. 
312. Id. 
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spending violates or satisfies the rule.313 The Department of Education even 
indicated in informal guidance in place for a decade that “any determination 
about supplanting is very case specific and it is difficult to provide general 
guidelines without examining the details of a situation.”314 
But the difficulty in applying the Compliance Supplement and cost 
principles goes far beyond this one example. Recall, for example, the case-
specific determinations of whether grantees should classify a particular cost as 
direct or indirect, or whether grantees may use federal funds to ask for a 
particular kind of professional advice.315 Auditors additionally have a lot of 
discretion in how much emphasis they place on any individual compliance 
requirement, and their choices are contestable.316 
It would be easier to trust the integrity of the single-audit process if 
grantees were able to meaningfully push back against auditors whose 
interpretations strike grantees as incorrect or improperly hamstringing their 
ability to make good policy choices with their federal dollars. But it can be 
difficult for grantees to protest the auditor’s determinations. While it is possible 
to challenge the auditor’s decisions, doing so is costly in administrative time, 
so the incentive to push back increases with the significance of the expected 
financial implications of the audit finding, as well as the capacity of the grantee 
to do so. 
Capacity is a major concern here, for pushing back against an auditor’s 
findings also requires expertise in the complex rules around federal grants. 
Paying for a lawyer’s advice or assistance, even if permitted under the 
“professional service” cost principle,317 takes money away from the substantive 
activities the grant is supposed to facilitate. Challenging management decisions 
that sustain auditors’ findings is even more costly, since there is a flat ban on 
using grant funding to do so.318 Further, management decisions are not made 
public, so there is a barrier to obtaining information that might be helpful to 
make the case that similar spending was allowed in other contexts.319 While 
more sophisticated, better-resourced grantees are in a stronger position to 
challenge the auditor’s decision and a management decision sustaining it, there 
 
313. Kerstin Carlson Le Floch et al., Study of Title I Schoolwide and Targeted Assistance 
Programs: Final Report 61-62 (2018), https://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/title-i/schoolwide-
program/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/47VW-7H95] (describing auditor disagreements about the 
permissibility of the same spending decision). 
314. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., TITLE I FISCAL ISSUES: MAINTENANCE OF EFFORT 
COMPARABILITY SUPPLEMENT, NOT SUPPLANT CARRYOVER CONSOLIDATING FUNDS IN SCHOOLWIDE 
PROGRAMS GRANTBACK REQUIREMENTS 38 (2008), 
https://www2.ed.gov/programs/titleiparta/fiscalguid.doc [https://perma.cc/MZJ6-Q4UZ]. 
315. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. 
316. OMB Webinar Helps Clarify Internal Control Concerns, SINGLE AUDIT INFO. SERV., 
Nov. 2014, at 8 (discussing debates around new time-and-effort rules and whether auditors will accept 
different grantee proposals). 
317. See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
318. 2 C.F.R. § 200.435 (2019). 
319. Gordon & Pasachoff, supra note 55, at 9, 13-14. 
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are nonetheless strong incentives for all grantees to want to keep in the good 
graces of their funders for reputational reasons. And collaborative, rather than 
combative, relationships with both auditors and funders can pay dividends.320 
A final difficulty with the integrity of the audit process relates to audit 
oversight by funders, whether the state agencies that often act as pass-through 
entities to local and nonprofit grantees or the federal agencies from which the 
grants originate. The problem here is that audit oversight is inconsistent. 
Sometimes agencies rubberstamp auditor reports.321 Sometimes agencies fail to 
follow up on the extent to which grantees are implementing their corrective 
action plans.322 Sometimes agencies fail to check for timely submission of 
single audits or fail themselves to issue timely management decisions,323 or 
check only for timely submissions that in reality are without much substance.324 
Agency oversight of the audit process can thus appear random rather than 
rational to grantees. 
The primacy of the single audit in the grant-oversight process indicates 
that the system depends on it to ensure accountability over federal funds. The 
actual operation of the single-audit process, however, indicates that the 
capacity of the audit process to meaningfully do so is questionable. 
D. Systemic Assumptions About the Technocratic Role of Grants-Management 
Rules 
OMB discusses the grants-management rules in technocratic terms. So too 
does Congress. The auditing and grants-management industries do as well. 
Assumptions about the technocratic nature of the grants-management rules run 
deep. 
But these rules are not entirely technocratic. While the mine run of grants-
management rules may simply promote fiscal and managerial rectitude, other 
rules reflect and permit policy and political priorities. This is true whether the 
rules are developed by Congress, by OMB, or by individual agencies. 
Treating the grants-management system as consisting only of 
technocratic, good-government interventions is problematic for a number of 
 
320. Grantees Should Make Adjustments To Endure the Shutdown, FED. GRANTS MGMT. 
HANDBOOK, Feb. 2019, at 6 (advocating that grantees “strive to maintain a positive, effective 
relationship with their auditor, because [needed] advice may not be forthcoming if the relationship is an 
adversarial one”); THOMPSON FEDERAL GRANTS MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK, supra note 139, § 611 
(“Before questioning an awarding agency’s decision, a recipient must consider not only what the final 
legal outcome of a dispute may be, but also what effect the mere raising of a dispute will have on 
subsequent requests for federal assistance and day-to-day working relationships with agency officials.”). 
321. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 17-159, SINGLE AUDITS: IMPROVEMENTS 
NEEDED IN SELECTED AGENCIES’ OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL AWARDS 15 (2017). 
322. Id. 
323. Id. 
324. See, e.g., FWS Aims to Develop Uniform Performance Report, FED. GRANTS MGMT. 
HANDBOOK NEWSLETTER, Apr. 2018, at 7 (describing the Department of Interior Office of Fish and 
Wildlife Service’s oversight of timely filed but incomplete reports). 
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reasons. Doing so can obscure the true values that underlie decision-making, 
making it hard for the public to assess what is going on and therefore to hold 
policymakers accountable for their actions.325 Portraying grants-management 
rules as technocratic also helps skew decision-making toward the prevention of 
waste, fraud, and abuse and away from expansive program benefits or goals, 
because it is politically easier to join a good-government platform than to battle 
forces claiming the mantle of good government while actually seeking to gut a 
program.326 Finally, describing the grants-management system as purely 
technocratic complicates efforts to improve the system, as it is easy for some 
procedural reforms to be politically co-opted and thus not serve as reforms at 
all.327 Understanding the potential for the nontechnocratic nature of the grants-
management rules helps make sense of both the regime’s operation and the 
possibilities for reform. 
There are three distinct kinds of politically inflected or policy-laden rules. 
The first category of politically inflected grants-management rules 
consists of those that explicitly present as furthering a substantive policy 
priority. For example, the Obama administration’s OMB introduced a series of 
cost principles collectively called “Encouraging Nonfederal Entities to Have 
Family-Friendly Policies” in order to fulfill the administration’s goal of 
increasing women in science, technology, engineering, and math careers.328 
These cost principles permit grant dollars to be spent on certain kinds of 
childcare costs.329 
Similarly, the Obama administration’s OMB included a broader directive 
in the Uniform Grant Guidance that agencies ensure that “[f]ederal funding is 
expended and associated programs are implemented in full accordance with 
U.S. statutory and public policy requirements: including, but not limited to, 
those protecting public welfare, the environment, and prohibiting 
discrimination.”330 These three policy priorities are surely reflected in positive 
law, but they are a selection of legal requirements that were particularly prized 
 
325. Cf. HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 35, at 247 (describing how “opacity” and the mantle 
of “political neutrality” of administrative burdens “allow policy choices to be made without widespread 
consultation, understanding of the consequences, and in some cases with a weak relationship between 
stated aims and actual intent”). 
326. Cf. id. at 248 (“Misleading statements about the motives behind administrative burdens 
are damaging because they undermine support for policies and programs.”). 
327. In the famous words of the late Representative John Dingell (D-MI), in hearings on 
amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act, “I’ll let you write the substance . . . you let me write 
the procedure, and I’ll screw you every time.” Regulatory Reform Act: Hearing on H.R. 2327 Before the 
Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Regulations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th 
Cong. 312 (1983) (statement of Rep. Dingell). 
328. Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for 
Federal Awards, 78 Fed. Reg. 78590, 785593, 78602 (Dec. 26, 2013). 
329. One such provision permits grantees holding conferences to spend federal dollars on “the 
costs of identifying, but not providing, locally available dependent-care resources.” 2 C.F.R. § 200.432 
(2019). Another provision allows a grantee’s employees to spend federal dollars on temporary 
dependent-care that “directly results from [the employee’s] travel to conferences.” Id. § 200.474(c). 
330. Id. § 200.300(a). 
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by this administration over others. The practical import of this policy directive 
for grant recipients is underscored by the subsequent additions promulgated by 
first the Obama and then the Trump HHS. The Obama HHS amended this 
provision in its incorporation of the Uniform Grant Guidance to forbid all HHS 
grants recipients from discriminating on the basis of gender identity or sexual 
orientation, while the Trump HHS has taken steps to rescind that 
requirement.331 For its part, the Trump administration’s OMB has proposed 
adding “free speech” and “religious liberty” to the Uniform Grant Guidance’s 
list of policy priorities for funding programs.332 
These explicitly policy-laden rules are good examples of the way grants-
management rules can reflect values, not simply technocracy. This first 
category is the least troublesome of the politically inflected grants-management 
rules. Because their policy rationales are explicit, they are easy to see and to 
debate on the merits. 
The second category are those grants-management rules that seem 
politically motivated despite their neutral, technocratic phrasing. The cost 
principle banning the use of federal funds for lobbying falls under this 
category.333 The Reagan administration’s OMB finalized this rule over the 
vociferous objection of left-leaning public-interest groups.334 Although OMB 
attempted to portray the need for the restriction in neutral, good-government 
terms,335 it undercut this effort by highlighting what it called the “abuse” of 
federal funds in lobbying only by organizations working on such liberal causes 
as women’s educational equity, family planning, urban mass transportation, 
and disability rights.336 Moreover, the restriction was widely understood to be 
of a piece with the Reagan administration’s broader efforts to “‘defund the 
left’—bankrupt the social action, civil rights, and other liberal groups that 
depend so heavily on federal funds.”337 
Similarly, the Reagan administration tightened requirements that family-
planning organizations completely segregate federal funds from the grantees’ 
 
331. Compare Health and Human Services Grants Regulation, 81 Fed. Reg. 89393, 89395 
(Dec. 12, 2016), with Office of the Assistant Secretary for Financial Resources; Health and Human 
Services Grants Regulation 84 Fed. Reg. 63831, 63832-83 (Nov. 19, 2019) (notice of proposed 
rulemaking). 
332. Guidance for Grants and Agreements, 85 Fed. Reg. 3766, 3768 (proposed Jan. 22, 2020). 
333. 2 C.F.R. § 200.450 (2019). 
334. See Cost Principles for Nonprofit Organizations—“Lobbying” Revision, 49 Fed. Reg. 
18260 (Apr. 27, 1984). The lobbying rule received over 93,000 comments that pitted liberal 
organizations like the National Education Association and the American Friends Service Committee 
against conservative organizations like the American Legislative Exchange Council and Taxpayers for 
Less Government. Id. at 18261, 18265, 18267. 
335. Id. at 18263 (describing related congressional efforts as protecting the integrity of federal 
funds); id. at 18265 (arguing that “the intent behind the revision is nondiscriminatory, and its effects are 
politically neutral”). 
336. Id. at 18264, 18267, 19271. 
337. CONLAN, supra note 202, at 150-51 (describing a variety of methods many contemporary 
observers saw as falling into this broader effort). 
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own funds used for abortion services338 and increased audits of family-planning 
organizations in the years before the Single Audit Act kicked in.339 The facial 
justification was program integrity,340 but the underlying interest was in 
weakening those organizations. As President Reagan wrote to Senator Orrin 
Hatch about those efforts, “I regret that we do not have the votes to defeat the 
family planning program . . . perhaps we can remedy some of the problems in 
the . . . program administratively.”341 
Into this category also fall statute-specific administrative-compliance rules 
presented as efforts to rein in “waste, fraud, and abuse” but which are actually 
designed to cut spending on disfavored programs or populations, as illustrated 
by the food-stamp quality-control program.342 More generally, as David Super 
observes, heightening requirements for administrative compliance can be a 
tactic to diminish a substantive policy. That is, policymakers wishing to curtail 
a legal entitlement can either change the substance of the entitlement or they 
can impose administrative burdens to weaken it. Instead of explicitly “denying 
public assistance to families in which children are not immunized,” for 
example, “policymakers could consider reducing Medicaid’s per capita 
reimbursements of managed-care plans where more than a minimal share of 
child beneficiaries have not received their shots.”343 
This second category of grants-management rules is troublesome because 
the underlying purpose of the administrative-compliance rule is obscured. It is 
easier for the public to understand visible cuts to a program than it is to 
understand the long-term implications of administrative rules that will have the 
same effect. Using administrative rules to achieve substantive ends while 
pretending not to thus reduces political accountability by distracting and 
obfuscating. In addition, using administrative-compliance rules in this way puts 
advocates for program beneficiaries at a political disadvantage. Arguing against 
the administrative-compliance rules can make advocates seem like they don’t 
care about program integrity or wasting federal dollars, so there are 
 
338. Statutory Prohibition on Use of Appropriated Funds in Programs Where Abortion Is a 
Method of Family Planning; Standard of Compliance for Family Planning Services Projects, 53 Fed. 
Reg. 2922, 2923-24, 2938 (Feb. 2, 1988). 
339. See COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE U.S., GAO/HRD-82-106, RESTRICTIONS ON ABORTION 
AND LOBBYING ACTIVITIES IN FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS NEED CLARIFICATION (1982), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/hrd-82-106.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BX6-W6QZ]. 
340. Robert Pear, Planned Parenthood Groups Investigated on Use of U.S. Funds, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 6, 1981), https://www.nytimes.com/1981/12/06/us/planned-parenthood-groups-
investigated-on-use-of-us-funds.html [https://perma.cc/P394-XL9A] (noting that the Inspector General’s 
office explained that “the audits had been undertaken in a routine manner, to insure the proper use of 
Federal money”). 
341. NAT’L ORG. FOR WOMEN, REAGAN ADMINISTRATION ACTION ON REPRODUCTIVE 
RIGHTS 2, (1983), http://digitalcollections.library.cmu.edu/awweb/awarchive?type=file&item=417547 
[https://perma.cc/2LB5-YZ8M]. 
342. See Super, supra note 221, at 1114; see also id. at 1099 n.218 (discussing similar efforts 
by the Reagan administration on Social Security disability benefits and welfare). 
343. Id. at 1099; see also HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 35, at 33 (“[P]oliticians will 
sometimes deliberately construct administrative burdens—as a complement or alternative to traditional 
forms of policymaking—to achieve their policy goals.”). 
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disincentives to oppose these rules. But if the program’s goals don’t change as 
administrative rules are layered, those goals will eventually be hollowed out. 
The grants-management rules thus help make policymaking into a one-way 
ratchet. 
The third category of politically inflected grants-management rules are 
those that both seem neutrally motivated and are written in neutral technocratic 
language but have the potential for political use. The Obama administration’s 
focus on performance measurement in the Uniform Grant Guidance falls into 
this category. It introduced a new administrative requirement that agencies 
include “performance goals” in the form of “outcomes intended to be achieved 
by the program” in each grant award.344 It also developed a way for grantees to 
escape the cost principles almost entirely through a new kind of grantmaking—
”fixed amount awards”—that provides an initial set dollar figure in the 
expectation that the grantee will hit specific metrics or reach certain results 
before receiving another installment of funds.345 The Trump administration has 
furthered this focus, both as part of the President’s Management Agenda, 
which includes as a goal “Results-Oriented Accountability for Grants,”346 and 
as part of the proposed revisions to the Uniform Grant Guidance, which 
suggest a number of “changes to emphasize the importance of focusing on 
performance to achieve program results throughout the Federal award 
lifecycle.”347 
While focusing on grantee performance, results, and outcomes sounds like 
a neutral, good-government proposition, such a focus provides opportunities 
for political decision-making.348 Consider, as an illustration, the George W. 
Bush administration’s program-evaluation system, under which OMB assessed 
how well different federal grants and other forms of policy interventions were 
accomplishing their intended aims.349 A number of scholarly assessments 
documented ways in which this neutral-sounding evaluation system ended up 
justifying cuts to programs the administration disfavored while providing 
support for its political priorities.350 
 
344. 2 C.F.R. § 200.210(d) (2019). 
345. Id. §§ 200.45, 200.201(b); Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and 
Audit Requirements for Federal Awards, 78 Fed. Reg. 78590, 78590 (Dec. 26, 2013). Fixed amount 
awards “rely more on performance than compliance requirements to ensure accountability.” Id. at 
78596. 
346. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRESIDENT’S 
MANAGEMENT AGENDA 36 (2018) (discussing the goal of focusing on results instead of compliance for 
federal grants). 
347. Guidance for Grants and Agreements, 85 Fed. Reg. 3766, 3768 (proposed Jan. 22, 2020). 
348. See, e.g., Eloise Pasachoff, Two Cheers for Evidence: Law, Research, and Values in 
Education Policymaking and Beyond, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1933, 1966-71 (2017); Kristen Underhill, 
Broken Experimentation, Sham “Evidence-Based” Policy, 37 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 
2020) (on file with author). 
349. BUSH PMA, supra note 157, at 27-30. 
350. See, e.g., BERYL RADIN, CHALLENGING THE PERFORMANCE MOVEMENT: 
ACCOUNTABILITY, COMPLEXITY, AND DEMOCRATIC VALUES 163-80 (2006); Irene Rubin, Budgeting 
During the Bush Administration, 20 PUB. BUDGETING & FIN. 1, 9-10 (2009). 
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To measure performance and results is to make decisions about what to 
measure,351 how to measure,352 within what time frame to measure,353 and what 
results the measurement should support.354 It is to rely on data that might be 
manipulated or poor quality.355 The stakes are especially high when 
performance and results are connected to the potential for budget cuts or budget 
increases.356 The move to permit grantees who receive fixed awards to ignore 
the Uniform Grant Guidance’s cost principles as long as they meet certain 
metrics provides further opportunity to reward political favorites.357 This is 
especially the case because the decisions to give fixed-award grants is made 
privately with no opportunity for input or redress.358 
But it is not simply the performance-oriented grants-management rules 
that raise this potential for politicized decision-making. Savvy political players 
can use the grants-management rules overall to achieve politically desirable 
outcomes under the cover of neutral application of the rules. For example, after 
Congress passed a supplemental appropriations bill for hurricane relief in 
Puerto Rico even after President Trump had urged it not to, the Trump 
administration was able to delay getting food-stamp funds to Puerto Rico—
with whose political officials he had a longstanding feud359—on the ground 
 
351. J.B. Wogan, Obama Tries to End the Cycle of Broken Poverty Promises, GOVERNING 
(July 2015), https://www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/gov-promise-zones-obama-
poverty.html [https://perma.cc/UDY2-3MRP] (describing the debate about how to measure success in 
antipoverty programs). 
352. Robert Brodsky, States Report Saving 640,000 Jobs Through Recovery Act, GOV’T EXEC. 
(Oct. 30, 2009), https://www.govexec.com/oversight/2009/10/states-report-saving-640000-jobs-through-
recovery-act/30250 [https://perma.cc/G9YS-UNPE] (describing the debate about how to measure the 
jobs saved by President Obama’s economic stimulus plan). 
353. Wogan, supra note 351 (discussing the debate about how long to wait to assess whether 
antipoverty programs are working). 
354. The Daunting Challenge, supra note 29 (describing the difficulty of measuring a 
program’s effects when a federal grant is merged with state and local sources of funding). 
355. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-551R, K-12 EDUCATION: EDUCATION 
SHOULD TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO ADDRESS INACCURACIES IN FEDERAL RESTRAINT AND 
SECLUSION DATA 9 (2019) (discussing missing and error-laden data and possibly purposeful 
underreporting of certain civil-rights violations). 
356. See, e.g., Robert Gordon & Ron Haskins, The Trump Administration’s Misleading 
Embrace of ‘Evidence,’ POLITICO (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/03/the-
trump-administrations-misleading-embrace-of-evidence-000385 [https://perma.cc/Q3V6-9U3H] 
(discussing the OMB director’s defense of the Trump administration’s efforts to cut $53 billion in 
domestic spending because the programs in question were “just not showing any results” and “lacked 
demonstrable evidence”). 
357. See, e.g., JOHN HUDAK, PRESIDENTIAL PORK: WHITE HOUSE INFLUENCE OVER THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL GRANTS (2014) (discussing opportunities for presidents to use grant funding 
to reward favored constituencies); Christopher R. Berry et al., The President and the Distribution of 
Federal Spending, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 783, 783 (2010) (same); see also NICHOLSON-CROTTY, 
supra note 276, at 81 (discussing a similar phenomenon at the state level). 
358. Unlike GAO’s bid protest process for would-be contractors who do not receive a federal 
contract, see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-510SP, BID PROTESTS AT GAO: A 
DESCRIPTIVE GUIDE (2018), there is no parallel process for would-be grantees who do not receive a 
federal grant. 
359. See, e.g., Annie Karni & Partiricia Mazzei, Trump Lashes Out Again at Puerto Rico, 
Bewildering the Island, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/02/us/trump-
puerto-rico.html [https://perma.cc/27C8-WW65]. 
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that the island needed to implement new financial-management procedures 
before it could receive the federal dollars.360 
Similarly, the day after California filed a lawsuit to invalidate President 
Trump’s declaration of an emergency and stop his repurposing of federal funds 
to build a wall at the border, the Trump administration moved to cancel a high-
speed rail grant to California of almost a billion dollars, asserting the state’s 
noncompliance with a series of grant rules.361 The President linked these two 
events, the lawsuit and the federally funded train project, in a succession of 
tweets.362 
This third category of politically inflected grants-management rules is not 
itself troublesome, but its use can be dangerous. Even if the rules themselves 
sound in good government, and even if some individual decisions under the 
rules can be factually and legally justified, the grants-management regime can 
be used in ways that shade into partisan politicization. And because some 
statute-specific grants-management rules are based on politically contested 
substantive policy judgments—such as the quality-control requirements in the 
food-stamps program, funds separation in family-planning grants, and so 
on363—the grants-management regime writ large must be seen as part of a 
larger set of political realities rather than solely as a technocratic intervention. 
Observers should thus be wary of taking at face value all claims about 
operational justifications for these rules. 
III. To Abandon or Reform? 
Reactions to the discussion in Part II may vary depending on one’s priors. 
One set of responses may present itself to those who believe the administrative 
state is too big and that too much federal money threatens federalism values. 
While this is not a view I share, it is an important perspective and demands 
consideration. Accordingly, Section III.A considers possible responses from 
this perspective, including abandoning the whole grants-management regime 
or, even more broadly, the ecosystem of federal grants entirely. This Section 
makes the case that each possible method for abandoning is normatively 
fraught and politically and structurally implausible. 
A very different set of responses may occur to those who believe, as I do, 
in the importance of the federal government and in the value of 
intergovernmental programs. Section III.B thus turns to an entirely different set 
of suggestions. How should the system be reformed, rather than abandoned? 
 
360. Stein & Hernàndez, supra note 273. 
361. Brandon Conradis, California Sues Trump over Cancellation of High-Speed Rail Funds, 
HILL (May 21, 2019), https://thehill.com/regulation/444837-california-sues-trump-over-cancellation-of-
high-speed-rail-funds [https://perma.cc/MN6V-EU3H]. 
362. Id. 
363. See supra notes 338-342 and accompanying text. 
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As this Section explains, there is no one-size-fits-all solution. In a system 
governing hundreds of billions of dollars given by dozens of federal agencies to 
fifty different states and tens of thousands of local governments and nonprofit 
organizations, as authorized by a vast number of statutes with varying 
substantive policy priorities passed by different Congresses and overseen by 
many different congressional committees, with different political constraints 
and opportunities available at different times, there are bound to be widely 
different views “about the appropriate trade-offs between discretion and 
constraint.”364 Certainly, the past forty years of effort to improve the grants-
management regime suggest that there is no easy answer. 
At the same time, the absence of easy answers does not mean that there 
are no answers. This Section, therefore, identifies potential reforms that 
respond to the incentive problems identified above: agencies’ prioritization of 
administrative enforcement, grantees’ concomitant prioritization of 
administrative compliance, and concerns about audit integrity. It considers 
strategies to increase programmatic enforcement, to reduce administrative 
compliance burdens, and to empower grantees in the audit process. In addition 
to these reforms focused on particular outcomes, this Section also offers the 
process-based reform of reducing silos throughout grant decision-making. 
The final issue discussed in Part II—the potential for political 
manipulation of grants-management rules—provides a warning about the limits 
of technocratic reform, for it is impossible to entirely remove politics from the 
grants-management system. There is no realistic way to limit the kinds of 
politically inflected grants-management rules that raise concerns. The best 
response to those concerns is simply to be aware of them and cautious about 
taking grants-management reforms at face value. The proposed reforms are 
thus sensitive in their design to the potential for political cooptation under the 
guise of good-government reforms. 
A. Abandoning 
Laying bare the operation of the federal grants-management regime might 
add fuel to the fire of those who see the ubiquity and size of federal funding as 
a blight on the American constitutional order.365 One natural response could 
therefore be to abandon the current structure of federal grants. After all, if 
federal grants are working so poorly, why keep them around? 
Implementation of this goal could take a number of forms. It might mean 
that federal grant funds should be cut entirely, whether phased out gradually or 
zeroed out cold turkey. It might instead mean that the federal government and 
 
364. HERBERT KAUFMAN, RED TAPE: ITS ORIGINS, USES, AND ABUSES 81 (2015). 
365. See, e.g., NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 671-89 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Fiscal 
Federalism, in CATO HANDBOOK FOR POLICYMAKERS 259 (8th ed. 2017), 
https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-handbook-policymakers/2017/2/cato-
handbook-for-policymakers-8th-edition-25_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z2WV-VSAR]. 
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states should engage in a “grand swap” or “sorting out” of their respective 
roles, perhaps trading education funding (left to the states) in exchange for 
medical funding (left to the federal government).366 It might promote 
privatizing government services by engaging private entities to take on the 
projects that are now funded by grants to state and local governments.367 Or it 
could suggest a federal funding structure light on strings, such as through block 
grants.368 
I do not mean for my analysis of the pathologies of the grants-
management system to support these proposals. To do so would end up with 
worse outcomes than the problems these proposals would in theory respond 
to—an example of the proverbial throwing of the baby out with the bathwater I 
cautioned against above. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to rebut 
each argument against federal grants made by opponents, this Section briefly 
explains why each of these options to explode the current regime is dangerous 
as a normative matter, hurting state and local governments, taxpayers, citizens, 
and program beneficiaries alike. This Section also explains why each of these 
options is politically unlikely, both now and in the long-term, given political 
and institutional dynamics. Therefore, even if any one option were to be 
implemented, it is implausible that any such reform would last. 
Cutting federal grants. Opponents of federal grants often argue that such 
spending encourages poor and bloated policy choices, reduces political 
accountability, and threatens valuable innovation.369 But these claims overstate 
the reality. As I have argued elsewhere, states and localities have many 
opportunities to participate in the design of federal grant programs, and many 
grant programs reflect a great amount of jurisdictional diversity in 
implementation.370 State and local governments are well able to get their 
messages out to voters to distinguish their own choices from federally imposed 
ones,371 and in any event, the idea that states and localities are closer to the 
people and are therefore better able to reflect their desires is not borne out by 
serious scholarly attention.372 The claim that state and private spending will 
step up to replace federal grant spending373 is not realistic.  Instead, what is 
 
366. See, e.g., CRS, FEDERAL GRANTS, supra note 2, at 23-26 (describing congressional 
history of such efforts); ALICE M. RIVLIN, REVIVING THE AMERICAN DREAM: THE ECONOMY, THE 
STATES, AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 117-18 (1993) (proposing such a swap). 
367. See MICHAELS, supra note 234, at 119-41 (describing the rise of contracting out 
government services). 
368. See Carl W. Stenberg, Block Grants and Devolution: A Future Tool?, in CONLAN & 
POSNER, supra note 25, at 263-85. 
369. See, e.g., Chris Edwards, Restoring Responsible Government by Cutting Federal Aid to 
the States, CATO INST. POL’Y ANALYSIS 1 (May 20, 2019), 
https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/pa868_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/XAC2-NU6C]. 
370. Pasachoff, supra note 1, at 277, 301, 331-33. 
371. Id. at 303. 
372. See, e.g., David Schleicher, Federalism and State Democracy, 95 TEX. L. REV. 763, 767-
69 (2017); Seifter, supra note 233, at 146-48. 
373. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 369, at 22-23. 
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more likely is that poor people will lose if federal grant programs are curtailed 
or abandoned,374 while society as a whole will face negative externalities from 
the consequences of lost federal financial support.375 
As a practical matter, however, despite the negative rhetoric about the 
intrusiveness of federal grants, the likelihood of their wholesale or significant 
abandonment is small. There are incentives for federal and state policymakers 
of both political parties to keep the basic flow of federal grants in place. 
Democrats and Republicans alike in Congress and the White House have 
policy priorities that they want to spread throughout the states, even if their 
policy priorities differ.376 Democrats and Republicans alike have incentives to 
use federal funds to respond to national crises, even if they would do so in 
different ways.377 And Democrats and Republicans alike in state and local 
legislatures and executive offices seek out federal grants when their own 
coffers need that money in light of cyclical downturns, state-balanced budget 
amendments, or the federal government’s superior fiscal capacity378—not to 
mention when doing so is helpful for the politicians in question.379 For these 
reasons, if a movement to significantly reduce or cut off federal funds 
happened to be successful at any given point in time, such a policy would be 
unlikely to be stable. It is therefore not a plausible response to the problems of 
the grants-management regime. 
Swapping and sorting. As for the “grand swap” or “sorting out,” both 
parties have periodically floated this suggestion for almost forty years.380 There 
is a certain logic to this suggestion, letting each level of government specialize 
in a policy area that it might perhaps be better suited to—education to the 
states, for local diversity, and health care to the federal government, for 
superior fiscal capacity. But it is also a dangerous idea from the perspective of 
dignity, equality, and liberty values. Many civil-rights obligations prohibiting 
certain kinds of discrimination attach only through federal funding 
 
374. See, e.g., Super, supra note 277, at 2640-41 (discussing the “bleak picture of states’ fiscal 
capacities” and the resulting difficulties “in funding programs for low- and moderate-income people”). 
375. See, e.g., Nora Gordon, The Changing Federal Role in Education Finance and 
Government, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON EDUCATION FINANCE AND POLICY 318 (Helen F. Ladd & 
Margaret E. Goertz eds., 2d ed. 2015); Pasachoff, supra note 1, at 295-96. 
376. See CRS, FEDERAL GRANTS, supra note 2, at 40. 
377. See, e.g., Niv Elis, Disasters Become Big Chunk of U.S. Deficit, HILL (Oct. 14, 2018), 
https://thehill.com/policy/finance/411215-disasters-become-big-chunk-of-us-deficit 
[https://perma.cc/GKW5-B9LV] (describing this dynamic in the context of hurricane relief); Kristina 
Peterson & Andrew Duehren, GOP, Democrats Hit an Impasse Over Nature of Next Round of 
Coronavirus Aid, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/congressional-democrats-
gop-wrangle-over-coronavirus-aid-to-small-businesses-11586432954 (describing this dynamic in the 
context of coronavirus aid); Jenni Bergal, Federal Cybersecurity Bill Would Help State and Local 
Governments Ward Off Hackers, GOVERNING: STATELINE (Apr. 10, 2017, 12:10 PM), 
https://www.governing.com/topics/public-justice-safety/sl-federal-bill-cybersecurity.html 
[https://perma.cc/4FD4-M87Q] (describing this dynamic in the context of cybersecurity). 
378. See Super, supra note 277, at 2648-50 (describing such realities). 
379. See NICHOLSON-CROTTY, supra note 276, at 48-78. 
380. The proposals discussed at note 366, supra, come from both sides of the aisle. 
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obligations.381 Huge variation in state and local efforts and capacity in 
education spending and oversight have led many to conclude that more, rather 
than less, federal funding should be required.382 And having multiple, 
competing governments can be liberty-enhancing rather than liberty-burdening, 
as one can protect individuals where another is failing.383 
Beyond these normative concerns, there is also a practical reason why 
these suggestions have never taken root, making such a move an unlikely 
response to the pathologies of federal grant administration. The states don’t 
have unified interests on this point.384 With wildly different fiscal capacities, a 
sorting out would hurt many states more than it would help them.385 The states 
that might benefit from such a swap tend to be blue states with little interest in 
returning to the “layer-cake federalism” this model represents.386 There is also 
little agreement on which policy areas belong to which sphere of government, 
as recent history reveals. For example, some Republican governors sought out 
sizable education grants under the Obama administration’s stimulus spending 
Race to the Top program, while rejecting the Medicaid expansion under the 
Affordable Care Act,387 exactly the reverse of what the swapping and sorting 
argument would predict. 
Privatizing. Because privatizing governmental functions already exists on 
a large scale in America,388 increasing this trend might seem to be a more 
easily achievable result of backlash to the grants-management regime. But 
privatization is a normatively fraught endeavor. Most importantly, it makes it 
harder for civil society to monitor policymakers and policy implementers, and 
it permits aggrandizement of the federal officials who award grants to those 
organizations on the ground, who operate without the internal separation of 
powers that civil servants provide.389 Private organizations that receive federal 
funds are subject to the civil-rights laws that attach to those funds, but they are 
generally not considered state actors for constitutional purposes and so may 
 
381. See, e.g., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SECURING EQUAL 
EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 6 (2016). 
382. See generally, e.g., KIMBERLY JENKINS ROBINSON, A FEDERAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION: 
FUNDAMENTAL DECISIONS FOR OUR DEMOCRACY (2019). 
383. Pasachoff, supra note 1, at 295. 
384. Jake Grovum, How States Divide Federal Money, GOVERNING: STATELINE (Dec. 10, 
2013, 6:25 PM), https://www.governing.com/topics/finance/how-states-get-federal-money.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q3X9-B6JA] (describing “stark differences” in the distribution of federal funds in the 
states). 
385. See, e.g., NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, THE FISCAL SURVEY OF STATES, at 
vii (Spring 2019) (describing state variations in budget conditions and capacities). 
386. See, e.g., Timothy J. Conlan, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Evolution of 
American Federalism, in CONLAN & POSNER, supra note 25; Liz Farmer, The 10 States That Give More 
to the Feds Than They Get Back, GOVERNING (Jan. 11, 2019, 4 AM), https://www.governing.com/week-
in-finance/gov-taxpayers-10-states-give-more-feds-than-get-back.html [https://perma.cc/ACD2-GT7W]. 
387. Compare, e.g., NICHOLSON-CROTTY, supra note 276, at 1-3 (discussing Republican 
governors’ rejection of Medicaid expansion), with id. at 68 (describing Republican governors’ 
submission of applications to the Race to the Top competition). 
388. See supra note 367 and accompanying text. 
389. MICHAELS, supra note 234, at 126-31. 
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escape liability for constitutional violations.390 Given jurisdictional variation in 
the existence and capacity of the nonprofit sector and industry, privatizing 
grant-funded government services would likely leave swaths of Americans 
behind. 
Here, too, however, it is unlikely that confronting the problems with the 
grants-management regime would actually result in more privatization as a 
solution. While privatizing governmental services is frequently seen as an 
alternative to bureaucratic red tape,391 the grants-management regime applies to 
nongovernmental organizations receiving federal money through grants (as 
well as many kinds of contracts as well).392 Moreover, recent scandals about 
the financial mismanagement of federal funds by private corporations and 
nonprofit organizations suggest that interest in oversight of federal dollars is 
not going away any time soon.393 
Block granting. So what about a financial intergovernmental regime light 
on compliance requirements, such as through block grants? For those 
attempting to use federal grants to support particular policy goals, block grants 
are associated with two major problems. First, by definition, they make it 
harder to target particular goals or populations.394 Since money is fungible, 
grantees can use the money under the letter but not the spirit of the law, as 
when school districts in the 1960s used their new federal education dollars to 
build swimming pools rather than to improve classroom services for low-
income, newly integrated communities.395 Second, block grants can lead to 
destructive budget cuts. They are often sold as promoting efficiencies in 
grantee operations but in practice over time can lead to cuts in federal dollars 
regardless of whether efficiencies come to fruition.396 
There is also little reason to think that block granting would actually solve 
the problems of the grants-management system. The block grants that currently 
exist are less specific than many other more targeted grants, but the statutes that 
create them are hardly without their own compliance requirements.397 And 
 
390. Id. at 126. 
391. Id. at 97-98. 
392. 2 C.F.R. §§ 200.38, 200.40 (2019). 
393. See, e.g., Eric Katz, Congress, FBI Already Investigating Potential Abuse of Federal 
Funds in Puerto Rico’s Disaster Response, GOV’T EXEC. (Oct. 18, 2017), 
https://www.govexec.com/management/2017/10/congress-fbi-already-investigating-federal-spending-
fraud-puerto-ricos-disaster-response/141876 [https://perma.cc/U5HU-UKLW]; Rebecca R. Ruiz et al., 
Justice Department Investigating Migrant Shelter Provider, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/20/us/southwest-key-migrant-shelters.html [https://perma.cc/6698-
JDP7]. 
394. Stenberg, supra note 368, at 272. 
395. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
396. See, e.g., CONLAN, supra note 202, at 165; Stenberg, Block Grants and Devolution, supra 
note 368, at 270. 
397. Stenberg, supra note 368, at 272-73. 
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even block grants are, with few exceptions, subject to OMB’s Unified Grant 
Guidance.398 
In any event, transforming the system of federal grants into a series of 
block grants seems no more likely than any of the above options. Historical 
efforts to move in such a direction have routinely been unsuccessful.399 While 
past performance is no indication of future results, the difficulty that grant 
simplification has had, despite decades of attempts in periods of both divided 
and unified government, suggests that a fundamental barrier exists. 
This barrier is the central reason that any grants reform along any of the 
above lines would likely eventually revert to a system of financial oversight 
very much like the one we have today: the theme of accountability for federal 
spending is a core part of the American blueprint. It dates back to the 
Founding.400 Contemporary problems with grants mismanagement suggest that 
the issues are as important as ever.401 Legal support for financial accountability 
exists, too, both in appropriations law (which requires that “public funds may 
be used only for the purpose or purposes for which they were appropriated”402) 
and in the Constitution (which limits federal spending to that in pursuit of “the 
general welfare”403 and which requires regular publishing of the “Expenditures 
of all public Money”404 ). 
Using the problems of the grants-administration system to call for the 
destruction of federal grants themselves thus seems of doubtful utility. The best 
illustration of this point is the famous protest against President Obama’s health 
care reform efforts: “Keep your government hands off my Medicare!”405 
Medicare is, of course, a government program. The uneasy, unspoken truce that 
currently exists in America is that at some level we want the services that 
federal funding provides; we just want them to be better, even though we don’t 
fully agree about what “better” means.406 
 
398. Compare 2 C.F.R. § 200.102(d) (2019) (describing a small subset of block grants that are 
not subject to administrative requirements and cost principles yet remain subject to the auditing rules), 
with Stenberg, supra note 368, at 269 (describing a larger set of block grants than the limited exceptions 
in the Uniform Grants Guidance). 
399. See, e.g., CRS, FEDERAL GRANTS, supra note 2, at 39 (describing the growth over time of 
federal grants). 
400. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
401. See supra note 393 and accompanying text. 
402. U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-17-797-SP, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL 
APPROPRIATIONS LAW 3-10 (4th ed. 2017); see also 31 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (2018). 
403. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
404. Id. § 9, cl. 7. 
405. See, e.g., Philip Bump, Republicans Are Anti-socialism—and Less Likely to See Social 
Programs as Socialism, WASH. POST (July 26, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/26/republicans-are-anti-socialism-less-likely-see-
social-programs-socialism [https://perma.cc/4EVM-SCC5]; Matthew Continetti, Hands off My 
Medicare, WASH. EXAMINER (Aug. 17, 2009), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-
standard/hands-off-my-medicare [https://perma.cc/N6TY-VYKA]. 
406. Cf. MICHAELS, supra note 234, at 2; Paul L. Posner & Timothy J. Conlan, Conclusion: 
Managing Complex Problems in a Compound Republic, in CONLAN & POSNER, supra note 25, at 338, 
339. 
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So how might we reform the system of grants administration rather than 
exploding it, while acknowledging the lack of agreement over the meaning of 
“better”? This Section considers four options that respond to the incentive 
problems identified in Part II: increasing programmatic enforcement, 
decreasing administrative-compliance rules, reforming the audit process, and 
reducing the informational and institutional silos that exist throughout the 
system. Each option is necessarily incomplete, but they are not mutually 
exclusive. Some combination of them would improve the grants-management 
system while retaining what is valuable about federal grants. 
1. Increasing Programmatic Enforcement 
One reform option to redesign incentives is increasing programmatic 
enforcement, whether through private lawsuits or expanded public enforcement 
focusing on programmatic goals. The theory behind this reform is that if part of 
the pressure grantees face toward administrative compliance is that 
administrative rules are more heavily enforced, expanding programmatic 
enforcement would helpfully rebalance grantees’ focus toward programmatic 
outcomes, whatever the legislated content of those desired outcomes at any 
time. 
Although difficult to put in place, more programmatic enforcement would 
be beneficial. To be sure, expanded programmatic enforcement is more likely 
to shift incentives around the edges than to dramatically change dynamics, but 
some recalibration is both valuable and possible. Increasing programmatic 
enforcement is a worthwhile part of a package of reforms to shift incentives 
toward programmatic goals. 
Increasing private enforcement. Under one path, Congress could reinstate 
the private enforcement regimes that the Supreme Court spent decades cutting 
back. At the most basic level, Congress could incorporate private rights of 
action into Spending Clause statutes that make no specific provision for them. 
It could also reverse the Court’s statutory-interpretation decisions limiting 
attorneys’ and expert fees and the availability of class-action lawsuits and 
reincorporate substantive requirements that the Supreme Court otherwise cut 
back on. Even further, it could reverse its own decisions limiting certain kinds 
of Legal Services claims and provide more funding for Legal Services to hold 
state and local agencies accountable. Were individuals broadly able to bring 
lawsuits challenging the substantive provision of services under the terms of 
grant statutes and agreements, many grantees would face a pressure that would 
serve as a counterweight to the current focus on administrative compliance.407 
 
407. Cf. Super, supra note 221, at 1059 (“[E]nforceable individual rights can meaningfully 
enhance the efficiency of governmental operations in achieving the optimal balance among their 
competing values.”). 
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At the same time, it is important not to overstate the incentives created by 
private enforcement. Even where private enforcement regimes continue to 
exist, they are unevenly used, depending on geographic and economic 
disparities in access to lawyers, information asymmetries about violations, 
variations in reputational concerns about suing, and other reasons.408 Some 
incentives set up by specific administrative-compliance rules are so strong that 
the occasional private enforcement action does not do much to counter this 
pressure.409 Moreover, much ink has been spilled advocating for the return of 
private enforcement for a variety of reasons, and Congress has thus far shown 
little inclination to adopt such an effort.410 
This path, then, is not particularly likely to come to fruition any time 
soon. Even if it were, it would not fully counter the incentives set up by the 
grants-management regime. Yet increased private enforcement would do 
something to rebalance grantee focus toward programmatic goals while 
countering the focus on grants-management rules—another value of a 
reinvigorated private enforcement regime. 
Increasing programmatic public enforcement. Under a second path to 
incentivize grantees to focus on programmatic goals, agencies could heighten 
their own substantive enforcement. After all, if grantees understand that they 
will face real repercussions for undervaluing programmatic goals—rather than 
simply for administrative issues—they will likely rebalance their focus. Given 
agencies’ own incentives to prioritize administrative compliance over 
substantive enforcement, agencies’ own rebalancing would be no mean feat. 
However, as alluded to above, in previous work I have offered suggestions for 
how this turn might be accomplished.411 I both summarize and expand upon 
those suggestions below. 
The bottom line is that increased programmatic public enforcement would 
be both possible and to the good, in the right circumstances. At the same time, 
those circumstances are unlikely to be broad enough to fully counter the 
incentives set up by the grants-management regime, so increased public 
enforcement alone is an incomplete solution. 
When should programmatic enforcement be used? Most basically, the 
funding cut-off—the ultimate programmatic-enforcement tool—should be 
reconceived as a valuable tool for rehabilitation (to induce grantees’ future 
compliance) and deterrence (to signal the need for compliance to other 
grantees), rather than as a disfavored tool of incapacitation (by withholding 
money from needy beneficiaries) or retribution (by punishing sovereign states 
 
408. See Pasachoff, supra note 1, at 308-09; Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, 
and the Limits of Private Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413, 1437-45 (2011). 
409. See Super, supra note 221, at 1111-12 (describing the strength of the counter-entitlement 
in the food-stamps quality-control program as compared to the entitlement to food stamps). 
410. See, e.g., Pasachoff, supra note 408, at 1415-16 (discussing the literature and collecting 
cites). 
411. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
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exercising their own policy choices). The concerns agencies hold about 
withholding programmatic funds, as mentioned above,412 do not capture the full 
range of potential options, and clarifying those options can encourage 
rethinking about the potential for substantive enforcement. For example, as to 
the concern about hurting needy beneficiaries, withholding can be targeted 
rather than wholesale, and if beneficiaries are already being harmed by 
insufficient attention to the programmatic purposes of the statute, enforcement 
action can help improve the situation for beneficiaries overall.413 As to the 
concern about intruding on state and local prerogatives, many enforcement 
actions would seek to hold state and local governments to their own policy 
choices, rather than some standardized set of unvarying federal 
requirements.414 
The concern that agencies have insufficient capacity to engage in 
substantive enforcement is real, especially in comparison to the outsourced 
comprehensive single audit model. Nonetheless, some actions would improve 
substantive enforcement without requiring dramatic increases in capacity. A 
President, OMB officials overseeing grantmaking agencies, or senior agency 
leadership interested in grant reform could institute a number of requirements. 
For example, agency Inspector General offices could expand their focus within 
their already existing statutory jurisdictions, such as by investigating not only 
whether grantees serve ineligible beneficiaries but also whether they are 
excluding eligible beneficiaries and whether they are providing the kinds of 
quality services the statute requires. Agency officials revising their 
contributions to the Compliance Supplement could identify programmatic 
requirements for auditors to review alongside administrative ones in the single 
audit. Agency leadership could reconfigure grant program offices to separate 
training and technical assistance from enforcement work. They also could 
develop mechanisms for strategic or targeted enforcement, as opposed to 
comprehensive monitoring, such as by further investigating grantees with 
significant audit findings or those about whom beneficiaries or the public have 
complained. 
In so doing, agencies should carefully distinguish among grantee reasons 
for programmatic noncompliance in order to ensure that substantive 
enforcement actions truly serve the purposes of rehabilitation and deterrence 
rather than incapacitation or retribution. When grantees are having a difficult 
time meeting program goals despite hard work in good faith, enforcement 
actions would be counterproductive.415 Instead, agencies should provide 
additional technical support or consider whether granting targeted waivers or 
urging Congress to modify the conditions would be more appropriate.416 
 
412. See supra notes 185-194 and accompanying text. 
413. See Pasachoff, supra note 1, at 320, 328-29. 
414. See id. at 302-03. 
415. See id. at 317-20. 
416. See id. at 319-20. 
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However, when grantees are taking insufficient actions to serve programmatic 
ends or are making programmatic decisions that are difficult to justify 
substantively out of an over-expanded fear of the audit process, agency 
enforcement actions would serve a valuable counterweight.417 So, too, would 
such enforcement actions be useful when grantees are failing to fulfill 
programmatic input-oriented or output-oriented conditions that are within their 
control—more useful than when grantees are failing to achieve outcome-
oriented conditions that are more in the nature of precatory policy goals.418 
There are important limits to this potential reform in terms of increasing 
grantees’ focus on programmatic goals. One major limit is implicit in the 
previous paragraph: the types of grantee decisions and behavior for which 
programmatic enforcement might be appropriate are not likely to be pervasive 
enough for programmatic enforcement to fully balance out administrative 
enforcement. Consider some of the grantee decisions driven by a focus on the 
grants-management rules discussed earlier.419 When grantees decide to build 
their budgets in silos instead of designing comprehensive reforms, or when 
grantees decline to pursue innovative, promising uses of funds because of the 
difficulty in persuading auditors of their validity, they are not taking actions 
that programmatic enforcement would address. When grantees fail to achieve 
big policy goals, they typically need assistance, not punishment. Increased 
programmatic enforcement would serve valuable purposes in the right 
circumstances, but it is unlikely to be widespread enough to serve as a full 
counterweight to the grants-management rules. 
Another limit is political. I explained above why agencies face fewer 
political hurdles to administrative enforcement than to substantive 
enforcement; they are less likely to face blowback for efforts to protect against 
fraud, waste, and abuse than for other efforts.420 Even though those political 
constraints will not hold water all of the time—there will be times when 
political alignments make substantive enforcement possible or even likely421—
this variation makes it difficult for substantive enforcement to be as robust a 
counterweight as it might otherwise be. 
A separate political issue is the potential for politicization of the 
enforcement process. For example, an agency might attempt to engage in the 
selective enforcement of grant rules only against disfavored political actors 
while turning a blind eye to copartisans’ insufficient grant implementation.422 
 
417. See id. 
418. See id. 
419. See supra notes 261-286 and accompanying text. 
420. See supra notes 216-220 and accompanying text. 
421. See Pasachoff, supra note 1, at 315-17. 
422. Cf. Carol Davenport, Trump Administration Threatens to Cut U.S. Highway Funds from 
California, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/24/climate/trump-
california-climate-change.html [https://perma.cc/2XMS-XXPC] (describing threat to withhold highway 
funds as “the latest parry between President Trump and the liberal West Coast state that he appears to 
relish antagonizing”). In another project, I taxonomize and assess different kinds of grant politicization, 
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While courts likely provide a judicial backstop to at least some such efforts,423 
this potential suggests another reason why agencies’ increased programmatic 
enforcement will not fully shift grantees’ incentives toward substantive 
compliance. 
While troubling, these limits are not fatal. They illustrate that heightening 
agency substantive enforcement would be an incomplete response to the 
incentives set up by the grants-management system. Expanding agency 
attention to substantive enforcement would encourage at least some adjustment 
in grantees’ focus. More generally, while increasing agency substantive 
enforcement would be complex along a number of dimensions, it would not be 
impossible. 
2. Decreasing Administrative-Compliance Rules 
Another option to shift grantees’ incentives to focus on programmatic 
goals would be to reduce some of the administrative-compliance rules. One 
ongoing approach tries to reduce and streamline the reporting burden, making 
paperwork less time-consuming to accomplish, thereby leaving more time to 
focus on programmatic efforts. Another approach, which OMB has indicated it 
is considering, would be to waive some administrative-compliance rules in 
exchange for an intensive focus on programmatic goals. Both approaches hold 
promise. 
Data standardization. There is currently underway a useful effort to 
standardize and streamline data collection from funding recipients, which 
would eliminate some busy-work reporting and inconsistent requirements 
between different grants for some of the same basic pieces of information. This 
effort attempts to ensure that the inevitable need for grantees to be good 
stewards of federal funds focuses on collecting meaningful data—rather than 
unnecessary and duplicative data—and should be more fully implemented. 
In 2014, Congress passed the Digital Accountability and Transparency 
(DATA) Act, part of which directed OMB to develop a pilot program for a 
subset of funding recipients to “standardiz[e] reporting elements across the 
Federal Government,” “eliminat[e] . . . unnecessary duplication in financial 
reporting,” and “reduc[e] . . . compliance costs for recipients of Federal 
awards.”424 OMB subsequently implemented the pilot, which the GAO found 
generally successful (although the pilot was required to sunset after two years, 
 
including this one. See Eloise Pasachoff, Weaponizing Federal Funding (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author). 
423. See Pasachoff, supra note 1, at 282-83; Mila Sohoni, Crackdowns, 103 VA. L. REV. 31, 
84-85, 98-104 (2017). 
424. Pub. L. No. 113-101, § 5(b)(1), 128 Stat. 1146, 1150 (2014) (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 
6101 (2018)). 
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per the DATA Act).425 OMB has taken several steps toward implementing 
standardized and streamlined reporting of grant data elements more generally 
even in the absence of the ongoing pilot.426 While OMB has indicated its intent 
to publish guidance directing agencies to adopt standard data elements where 
they can, it has also acknowledged its delay in doing so.427 
OMB has a new reason (and a new deadline) to announce standard data 
elements, however. At the end of 2019, Congress passed, and the President 
signed into law, the Grant Reporting Efficiency and Agreements Transparency 
(GREAT) Act of 2019.428 This Act requires OMB to work with the agency that 
administers the most funding programs each year (which in practice means 
HHS429) to develop within two years standards for reporting data on financial 
management, administration, or management that are not program-specific.430 
OMB must then issue guidance to agencies on how to implement those 
standards within a year after that, and within yet another year, agencies must 
make sure that their grant reporting requirements use those data standards.431 
The GREAT Act will helpfully streamline some aspects of grant reporting 
and is a welcome addition—although its import should not be overstated, 
considering both the four-year rollout and the significant burdens associated 
with program-specific reporting,432 which the GREAT Act does not address. 
Moreover, even as to general administrative reporting, changing requirements 
at the top will only go so far. OMB’s implementation of the GREAT Act 
should therefore include a plan not only for agency implementation of data 
standardization but also for grantee training and internalization on the 
standardization. 
As discussed above, too often grantees do not understand or implement 
changes in federal grant rules, and too often grantees themselves are relying on 
 
425. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-19-299, DATA ACT: PILOT EFFECTIVELY 
TESTED APPROACHES FOR REDUCING REPORTING BURDEN FOR GRANTS, BUT NOT FOR CONTRACTS 
(2019), https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/698806.pdf [https://perma.cc/G524-MRCG]. 
426. See, e.g., Draft Federal Grants Management Data Standards for Feedback, 83 Fed. Reg. 
57751 (Nov. 16, 2018); OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, REPORT TO CONGRESS: DATA ACT PILOT 
PROJECT 56-57 (Aug. 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/
sequestration_reports/2017_data_act_section5_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WUS-HZ5B]; 
Memorandum from Mick Mulvaney, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to Heads of Dep’ts, M-18-24 
(Sept. 5, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/M-18-24.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L432-NZX3]. 
427. Results-Oriented Accountability for Grants 7, PRESIDENT’S MANAGEMENT AGENDA 
(Sept. 2019), https://www.performance.gov/CAP/action_plans/sept_2019_Results-Oriented_
Accountability_for_Grants.pdf [https://perma.cc/DQC8-Z6RZ]. 
428. Pub. L. No. 116-103, 133 Stat. 3266. As would be predicted by the claim that financial 
management rules have bipartisan appeal, the GREAT Act passed both the House and Senate 
unanimously. Actions Overview, H.R. 150, CONGRESS.GOV (Dec. 23, 2019), 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/150/actions?KWICView=false 
[https://perma.cc/6L43-QDTY]. 
429. See S. REP. NO. 116-96, at 7 (2019). 
430. GREAT Act § 4, 133 Stat. at 3268 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 6402). 
431. Id., 133 Stat. at 3269-70 (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 6403-6404). 
432. See supra Section I.A.1. 
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outdated systems that hinder their full participation in grant reforms.433 
Agencies should be required to demonstrate that they are working hard to 
communicate these changes to grantees, not simply by posting in the Federal 
Register and on their websites but also by working with membership 
organizations and grant publications from which grantees often receive 
information. It would also be helpful to require auditors to provide information 
about reporting streamlining during the process of audits. Auditors could thus 
play a helpful informative role rather than simply an evaluative one. 
Evaluations, outcomes, and waivers. A second effort to change grantees’ 
incentives to focus on programmatic outcomes more than administrative 
compliance would develop a system to waive some compliance rules in 
exchange for grantees’ heightened commitment to focus on outcomes and 
evaluate their success in doing so.434 Given the manifold concerns about the 
potential for politicization of neutral-sounding grant rules,435 this reform would 
have to be structured carefully. But with the appropriate guardrails in place, it 
is a reform with real potential to redirect grantees’ efforts toward their 
programs more than their paperwork. 
The Uniform Grant Guidance contemplates a waiver of compliance 
obligations in exchange for a commitment to focus on outcomes. A new 
provision added in 2014 permits agencies to propose to OMB “new strategies 
for Federal awards . . . to develop additional evidence relevant to addressing 
important policy challenges” alongside requests to waive any aspect of the 
Uniform Grant Guidance other than the audit rules.436 In principle, this 
provision allows agencies to propose that grantees focus on tracking progress 
toward the grants’ desired outcomes and evaluating the grantees’ goal-oriented 
strategies, in exchange for which OMB would provide an opportunity to relieve 
those grantees from some time-intensive but low-value administrative rules.  
This provision has not been taken advantage of, however, and in the proposed 
revision to the Uniform Grant Guidance, OMB takes it a step further, 
“encourag[ing] Federal awarding agencies to request exceptions in support of 
innovative program designs that apply a risk-based, data-driven framework to 
alleviate select compliance requirements and hold recipients accountable for 
good performance.”437 
 
433. See supra notes 280-286 and accompanying text. 
434. Thanks to Kathy Stack for focusing attention on, and helpful conversations about, this 
idea. See Kathy Stack, Outcome-Based Accountability Pilots (Nov. 15, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author); see also Andrew Feldman & Kathy Stack, The Missing Piece in OMB’s Push for 
High-Value Government Work, GOV’T. EXEC. (Dec. 15, 2018), 
https://www.govexec.com/management/2018/12/missing-piece-ombs-push-high-value-government/
153297 [https://perma.cc/F68E-H79E]. 
435. See supra 327-362 and accompanying text. 
436. 2 C.F.R. § 200.102(d) (2019). 
437. Guidance for Grants and Agreements, 85 Fed. Reg. 3766, 3788 (proposed Jan. 22, 2020) 
(emphasis added). 
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This proposed revision to the Uniform Grant Guidance provides a sensible 
approach to recalibrating the balance between compliance and performance, 
and it ought to be adopted. Even if it is not, agencies should still take advantage 
the currently operative language to propose waivers from compliance rules they 
perceive to be unnecessary under the circumstances. Under either path, 
agencies would identify grant programs with statutory levers permitting 
outcome-focused grant designs—for example, embedding an ongoing 
evaluation component in their funding438—and would work with grantees to 
identify what compliance obligations should be waived, a theory of change for 
why the grantees’ strategies to accomplish their program goals are promising, 
and a commitment to evaluate their work and change strategies depending on 
what the evaluations show.439  OMB would work with agencies to decide what 
compliance rules to waive—possibly different ones, to allow evaluation of 
which rules may not be necessary. Where agencies have the statutory authority 
to waive certain requirements of the particular grants they oversee, they could 
also propose waivers of those requirements in order to allow grantees to focus 
on alternative approaches toward the same goal, again with a commitment to 
evaluate their approaches.440 
By removing a slew of compliance obligations in exchange for a 
commitment to improving program results, this reform would shift the 
incentives grantees currently face, at least for the grantees operating under a 
waiver. Its focus on evaluation would also help identify what compliance 
obligations are truly low-value and could therefore be waived (or removed 
entirely) for grantees more generally. If this effort proves successful, it can be 
expanded in a way that would shift incentives to focus on programmatic 
outcomes for increasing numbers of grantees. 
At the same time, this reform has the potential for destructive 
politicization that could seriously compromise the legitimacy of the effort. 
Proponents of the reform should be alert to these dangers and attempt to 
structure the reform to cabin them. For example, one danger is that OMB or 
agencies would politicize the selection of grantees to receive the waiver, 
 
438. See, e.g., Memorandum from Sylvia Burwell, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, et al., to 
the Heads of Dept’s & Agencies, M-13-17, Next Steps in the Evidence and Innovation Agenda, at 6-8 
(July 26, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2013/m-13-
17.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z72V-MMRK] (identifying ways to embed “[h]igh-quality, low-cost 
evaluations and rapid, iterative experimentation” into funding programs), id. at 8-10 (identifying 
“innovative outcome-focused grant designs”). 
439. Cf. Colleen V. Chien, Rigorous Policy Pilots: Experimentation in the Administration of 
the Law, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2313, 2343-44 (2019). 
440. A targeted version of this authority already exists, although not for the purposes of grants 
management burden-shifting. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-17-208, PERFORMANCE 
PARTNERSHIPS: AGENCIES NEED TO BETTER IDENTIFY RESOURCE CONTRIBUTIONS TO SUSTAIN 
DISCONNECTED YOUTH PILOT PROGRAMS AND DATA TO ASSESS PILOT RESULTS (2017), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/684159.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZJ2-Y2XZ]; Memorandum from Sylvia 
Burwell, supra note 438, at 9 (discussing performance partnership examples). 
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choosing only copartisans or rewarding certain regions for political support.441 
A related danger is that even if the selection of grantees is not actually 
politicized, it will be perceived as politicized by disappointed grantees or the 
general public. To protect against these concerns, organizations from across the 
political spectrum should be involved with developing criteria against which to 
assess grantees’ capacity to participate in the pilot. As in many other 
competitive grant decisions, there should be an outside panel of judges, and 
their rankings ought to be made public. There should also be an effort to have 
regional, programmatic, and grantee-type diversity among those selected. 
Another danger is politicization on the back end, where OMB or agencies 
would use the principle of obtaining programmatic results as a pretense for 
defunding disfavored grantees or program areas—for example, by finding that 
a grantee had not produced results based on a narrow, contested definition of 
programmatic goals,442 a time frame that is too short to show results,443 or 
disagreement about how to read the evidence that the program evaluations 
produce.444 Reaching agreement ahead of time about what results the grantees 
are aiming for within the relevant time period is one way to protect against this 
concern. Another is to require grantees to demonstrate commitment to the 
process of continuous learning from program evaluations rather than reaching 
any particular outcome. 
Yet another danger is the politicization of the decision as to which 
compliance rules to waive. As public administration scholar Herbert Kaufman 
observed in his classic study of red tape, “Everybody seems to hate red tape, 
but “[o]ne person’s ‘red tape’ may be another person’s treasured safeguard.”445 
Advocates for program beneficiaries may see a compliance obligation as 
protecting beneficiaries when grantees themselves see it as overly burdensome, 
such as a requirement to spend a certain percentage of dollars or employee time 
on a particular activity or population. OMB and agencies may thus use 
selective relief from compliance obligations to transform the purpose of the 
program in a way that promotes the current administration’s policy preferences 
more than the congressional design seems originally to have contemplated. On 
the flip side, grantees and advocates for program beneficiaries alike may see a 
 
441. Cf. Timothy Cama, EPA Stops Policy of Having Press Aide Review Grants, HILL (July 8, 
2018), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/392845-epa-stops-policy-of-having-press-aide-
review-grants [https://perma.cc/VRP7-889N]; Juliet Eilperin, Interior Puts Grants Worth Hundreds of 
Millions of Dollars Through Political Review, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2018), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/interior-puts-grants-to-nonprofits-universities-through-
political-appointee-review/2018/01/08/ec7140b2-f4bc-11e7-beb6-c8d48830c54d_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/634D-48DR]; Sarah N. Lynch, Union Says Trump Appointee May Be Improperly 
Influencing Justice Department Crime Victim Grants, REUTERS (Sept. 4, 2019) 
https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-justice-grants/union-says-trump-appointee-may-be-improperly-
influencing-justice-department-crime-victim-grants-idUSL5N25H6AF [https://perma.cc/VYC8-ZBRX]. 
See generally Pasachoff, supra note 422 (discussing such concerns). 
442. Underhill, supra note 348, at 22. 
443. Pasachoff, supra note 348, at 1960. 
444. Underhill, supra note 348, at 24-27 
445. KAUFMAN, supra note 364, at 1. 
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compliance obligation as providing political cover from a hostile Congress 
seeking to cut funding for the program. If a compliance obligation, no matter 
how burdensome, signals to Congress that grantees are good stewards of 
federal funds, grantees may prefer keeping that obligation in place, even 
though OMB and agencies may see it as a low-value regulation that ought to be 
removed and be perfectly happy for Congress to cut the program eventually. To 
protect against these concerns, advocates for program beneficiaries ought to be 
provided an opportunity to comment on agency and grantee proposals for 
waivers. There also should be public debate around what to waive, to allow for 
accountability through news coverage and advocacy efforts. Done right, some 
collective, noncontroversial agreements about obligations to waive are likely. 
These dangers ought not be taken lightly. Nevertheless, once 
acknowledged and designed around, the dangers should not undercut the 
potential of this reform to shift incentives toward programmatic goals instead 
of mere compliance. 
3. Reforming the Audit Process 
A third set of reforms would address the incentive problems created by 
the audit process. The best proposals would promote audit quality; encourage 
the making of programmatic decisions by grantees and agencies rather than by 
auditors; and reduce incentives for grantees to make poor programmatic 
decisions out of an overcautious fear of audits. Several interventions would 
help. 
Compliance Supplement usability. One reason why audits have so many 
errors and why auditors are able to end up with de facto power to make 
programmatic decisions is that the Compliance Supplement is extremely 
difficult to understand, both for the lay grantee and for the junior auditors who 
largely conduct single audits.446 The Compliance Supplement purports to 
summarize all of the legal obligations on which grantees will be evaluated in 
their audit, but it does so in a decidedly non-user-friendly way. One way to 
shift the balance of power would be to revise the Compliance Supplement in 
plain English, both as a helpful reference for grantees on their compliance 
obligations and as a less inscrutable guide for auditors.447 
The Compliance Supplement touts its value as a one-stop shop for 
auditors, but it is odd to focus so heavily on the value to auditors without also 
providing a one-stop shop for the people who actually have to implement what 
the auditors are evaluating. Giving grantees an opportunity to understand their 
obligations more clearly would allow them to explain to doubting auditors why 
 
446. See supra notes 304-310. 
447. Cf. Cynthia R. Farina et al., The Problem with Words: Plain Language and Public 
Participation in Rulemaking, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1538 (2015) (suggesting that agencies’ failure to 
write rulemaking documents in plain language contributes to the power imbalance between regulated 
industries and the general public in participation in the rulemaking process). 
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certain steps that they wish to take for programmatic reasons are actually 
allowed. Clearer drafting would also help auditors understand their own 
obligations more easily; it is easier to make errors when the assigned task is 
more difficult to understand. Clearer drafting would thus help ensure inter-
auditor reliability. 
This proposal accords with plain-English recommendations elsewhere in 
the government, including the Federal Plain Language Guidelines issued under 
the Plain Writing Act of 2010448 and the Recommendation for Plain Language 
in Regulatory Writing approved by the Administrative Conference of the 
United States in 2017.449 OMB could task each agency whose programs are 
included in the Compliance Supplement to revise its chapter along the lines of 
those recommendations and then could further revise the trans-agency chapters 
for which OMB itself is responsible. OMB and each agency should invite 
grantees, members of the auditor community, and different subject-matter-
specific grant industry organizations to participate in such a revision. Their 
participation would improve accuracy and provide an understanding of 
common communication breakdowns in the field. If taking on the whole 
project at one time is too large, a pilot program involving one or two 
committed agencies which would then share best practices with other agencies 
would be a good first step. 
Safe-harbor development. Another difficulty for the audit process is the 
need for auditors to make case-specific determinations of compliance rules that 
are actually open-ended standards. As explained above, grantees sometimes 
make risk-averse but programmatically poor decisions to avoid raising any 
audit concerns. One intervention that could help is the development of “safe 
harbors” within which grantees could operate without risking an audit finding. 
One such safe harbor has been developed in a partnership between offices 
in HHS and in the USDA and two different states to address how to allocate the 
costs of software development to different federal and state grants.450  While 
the safe harbor was developed to expedite the approval process within federal 
agencies, it serves a dual function as protection in an audit for a vague and 
complex calculation. 
Similar safe harbors could be developed in similar partnerships across a 
wide range of indeterminate compliance rules, whether statute-specific (such as 
supplement-not-supplant rules) or trans-substantive (such as indirect vs. direct 
cost calculations and professional-service costs).451 Grantees could thus have 
 
448. See Federal Plain Language Guidelines, PLAINLANGUAGE.GOV (Dec. 23, 2019), 
https://www.plainlanguage.gov/guidelines [https://perma.cc/5UBS-JCZ3]. 
449. See Adoption of Recommendations, 82 Fed. Reg. 61728 (Dec. 29, 2017) (adopting 
Recommendation 2017-3 of the Administrative Conference of the United States). 
450. See Cost Allocation Methodologies (CAM) Toolkit, OFFICE OF CHILD SUPPORT 
ENFORCEMENT (Jan. 15, 2015), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/css/resource/cost-allocation-methodologies-
cam-toolkit [https://perma.cc/2PPW-PCXQ]. I thank Kathy Stack for calling this example to my 
attention. 
451. See supra notes 313-317 and accompanying text. 
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the benefit of some certainty and could make programmatic decisions without 
worrying about audit findings from those rules, while auditors and agencies 
could have the benefit of simplifying the oversight effort. 
To encourage the further development of safe harbors, OMB could invite 
proposals for collaboration from within the grantee community as part of its 
grants reform work under the President’s Management Agenda. OMB could 
also use periodic revisions to the Uniform Grants Guidance to specify 
circumstances that satisfy an otherwise open-ended standard.452 
Decisional transparency. Another reason why grantees sometimes let 
auditor determinations drive their own programmatic choices is that there is no 
generally available source of precedential decisions about the permissibility of 
different choices under the grants-management rules. If there were an online 
clearinghouse of audit reports, management decisions, Inspector General 
reports on grant programs, GAO reports on grant and program issues, and final 
agency decisions in administrative adjudications on grants, grantees would 
have somewhere to turn to assess whether an action they want to take has been 
upheld or criticized in another context. Akin to the “What Works 
Clearinghouse” model that has garnered praise for making it easier for grantees 
to find evidence-based strategies for achieving different policy goals, such a 
grant-focused clearinghouse—call it the Grants Compliance Clearinghouse—
would empower grantees with the ability to justify programmatic decisions as 
permissible. OMB could develop such a clearinghouse under its President’s 
Management Agenda work. 
The Federal Audit Clearinghouse could, but does not, play this role. Even 
though all PDF submissions of audit reports to the database have had to be text-
searchable since 2015,453 there is no way for a grantee to do a multilayer 
keyword search for a particular compliance provision, a type of action, a type 
of decision, or the like—no mechanism to conduct a Boolean search at all. Any 
lawyer who has ever done an online search in a database like Westlaw or 
Lexis—or anyone who has ever done a Google search—understands the 
benefits of a general search functionality compared to scrolling through 
individual documents looking for keywords of interest. 
Even worse, many decisions are not available online at all. For example, 
the Department of Education’s management decisions, called program 
determination letters, are available only through a Freedom of Information Act 
 
452. The proposed revisions as of this writing include a clarification that program evaluation 
costs are an allowable direct cost and an expansion of eligibility for a simplified way of calculating 
indirect costs, both sensible steps. Guidance for Grants and Agreements, 85 Fed. Reg. 3766 (proposed 
Jan. 22, 2020) (proposing revisions to 2 C.F.R. §§ 413 and 414(f)). 
453. See Federal Audit Clearinghouse, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 23, 2019), 
https://harvester.census.gov/facweb [https://perma.cc/V9ZY-2MGW]. The GREAT Act calls for data, 
including audit reports, to be “fully searchable and machine-readable.” Grant Reporting Efficiency and 
Agreements Transparency (GREAT) Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-103, § 4, 133 Stat. 3266, 3269. 
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request or through private subscription services.454 Other private subscription 
services summarize select recent agency decisions,455 while different agencies 
make some grants-related decisions available on their websites, with different 
degrees of searchability.456 A grantee struggling to figure out whether an action 
it wants to take for programmatic reasons will be found permissible under an 
audit is at a strong informational disadvantage as compared to the auditor and 
agency reviewers. 
Ensuring that all grant-related decisions be posted online would therefore 
be an important step forward.457 Such a move is in keeping with other gestures 
toward making government documents458 and data459 more available and 
transparent. A unified, searchable clearinghouse would go even farther toward 
providing information in a format that helps grantees make wise programmatic 
decisions. 
4. Reducing Silos 
A final set of reforms focuses more on process than substance, 
acknowledging the institutional and informational disconnects that help 
produce the dynamics discussed in Part II.460 This reform therefore seeks to 
create points of connection between decisions about substantive grants policy 
and decisions about grants-management rules. After all, it makes little sense to 
expect certain policy outcomes when unacknowledged constraints work against 
 
454. See, e.g., Gordon & Reber, supra note 206, at 130; TITLEIADMIN.COM (2019), 
https://www.shoplrp.com/product_p/300915.htm [https://perma.cc/72AL-X7VH]; cf. Margaret B. 
Kwoka, FOIA Inc., 65 DUKE L.J. 1361 (2016). 
455. See, e.g., Thompson Grants Compliance Expert, THOMPSON GRANTS (2019), 
https://grants.thompson.com/compliance-expert [https://perma.cc/NW28-WE4F]. 
456. The Department of Education’s Office of Hearings and Appeals lists decisions by docket 
number, with no subject-matter search feature. See Office of Hearings and Appeals, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., 
https://oha.ed.gov/oha-judges-decisions [https://perma.cc/W3CK-YE4J]. In contrast, the HHS 
Departmental Appeals Board website allows multiple stages of search. See Board Decisions, U.S. DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (2019), https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/dab/decisions/board-
decisions/index.html [https://perma.cc/T6WR-JCB3]. GAO reports evaluating different programs are 
generally available online, but it is very difficult to search within the GAO website for specific 
information on particular programs and provisions. See Reports and Testimonies, U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (2019), https://www.gao.gov/reports-testimonies/by-topic 
[https://perma.cc/79ZT-HBVY]. 
457. Cf. Metzger & Stack, supra note 22, at 1303-04. 
458. Adoption of Recommendations, 84 Fed. Reg. 38927, 38931-33 (Aug. 8, 2019) (adopting 
Recommendation 2019-3, Public Availability of Agency Guidance Documents); Adoption of 
Recommendations, 84 Fed Reg. 2139, 2142-43 (Feb. 6, 2019) (adopting, among others, 
Recommendation 2018-5, Public Availability of Adjudication Rules); 84 Fed. Reg. at 2143-45 (also 
adopting Recommendation 2018-6, Improving Access to Regulations.gov’s Rulemaking Dockets); 
Adoption of Recommendations, 82 Fed. Reg. 31039, 31039-40 (July 5, 2017) (adopting 
Recommendation 2017-1, Adjudication Materials on Agency Websites). 
459. See, e.g., Hyon Kim, Data.gov at Ten and the Open Government Act, DATA.GOV (May 
31, 2019), https://www.data.gov/meta/data-gov-at-ten-and-the-open-government-data-act 
[https://perma.cc/3Q39-29GE]. 
460. Cf. FARBER & O’CONNELL, supra note 30, at 9 (“[R]eformers should consider focusing 
on process values instead of on outcomes, if outcomes are highly uncertain and contingent on complex 
institutional factors.”). 
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the achievement of those outcomes.461 It is only by sharing information that 
decisionmakers can make informed, and perhaps different, decisions—whether 
expecting different outcomes, expecting the same outcomes but on a longer 
timeframe, providing appropriate resources to temper the constraints, or 
changing the constraints. Reducing the effects of structural and informational 
silos—within and across agencies, OMB, Congress, and state and local 
jurisdictions, as illustrated above462—is the goal of this last reform. 
There are several different mechanisms through which one could reduce 
silos: top-down, bottom-up, or outside-in. A top-down approach would have 
OMB re-create an expanded version of the Council on Financial Assistance 
Reform (COFAR).463 In this expanded version, the COFAR would include state 
and local grantee representation, agency grant program officers, and OMB 
budget staff members, not simply agency and OMB financial officers, and it 
would address grant issues beyond the grants-management rules. A parallel 
top-down effort could take place in Congress through the creation of a study 
group or caucus to work on grants-administration issues beyond narrow 
committee jurisdictional lines, meeting periodically with the expanded 
COFAR. 
Under a bottom-up approach, states and localities breaking down silos in 
their own grants work would invite others to join them, develop working 
groups, and then share information and requests across program, finance, and 
budget divides in Congress, OMB, and agencies.464 An outside-in approach 
would see nonpartisan groups or a bipartisan coalition with an interest in 
improved grants management develop a project to regularly bring together 
these sets of players across federal, state, and local divides to develop 
reforms.465 
Any of these options would be to the good, encouraging the relevant 
players to reach across silos to seek out and share information. In turn, such 
information-sharing could help decisionmakers make better decisions. 
 
461. See supra notes 261-291 and accompanying text (describing this situation as a result of 
the grants-management regime). 
462. See supra notes 133-179 & 287 and accompanying text. 
463. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
464. Models for this kind of work exist at different scales. See, e.g., Innovation Exchange 
Session, PRESIDENT’S MGMT. AGENDA (Oct. 24, 2019), https://www.performance.gov/CAP/innovation-
sessions/10-24-reducing-administrative-burden-a-states-perspective.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8S9-UFHU] 
 (Illinois); Allegheny County Data Warehouse, ALLEGHENY COUNTY ANALYTICS  (2019), 
https://www.alleghenycountyanalytics.us/index.php/dhs-data-warehouse [https://perma.cc/MJ79-MFBJ] 
 (Allegheny County, Pennsylvania); Home, FED, DEMONSTRATION PARTNERSHIPS (2019), 
http://thefdp.org/default [https://perma.cc/8WT9-ULQQ] (consortium of 10 government agencies and 
154 university and industry partners that receive federal research grants). 
465. Models for this kind of work exist, too. For example, the National Academy of Public 
Administration and Grant Thornton host a quarterly Grants Management Symposium. The Center for 
American Progress and the American Enterprise Institute previously cosponsored a project on fiscal 
compliance rules in education. See Junge & Kravaric, supra note 261 (a publication resulting from that 
project). 
09. PASACHOFF ARTICLE. FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2020  3:21 PM 
Yale Journal on Regulation  Vol. 37:573, 2020 
648 
 
For example, recall that policymakers may modify or cut a program in the 
belief that the substantive policy design is flawed, when actually it is the 
operation of grants-management rules that are the issue, so the change imposed 
will be no more successful than the initial version.466 Relatedly, in this era of 
results-oriented grantmaking, consider how program evaluations depend on 
knowing how federal funds are being used. Congress and agencies alike want 
to know whether federal funding is having the desired effect. But the 
complexity of program operation—where a federal grant may go to a state 
agency, then to a county, then to several local government agencies and 
nonprofits, where it is combined with other federal, government, and 
foundation grants, with a broadly defined outcome as a goal, when grantees are 
focused on grants-management rules as much as or more than program goals—
may not be obvious to officials designing an evaluation of a federal program.467 
Involving grantees in designing evaluations and bringing together policy and 
management experts could help make evaluations more realistic and give 
meaning to already existing data. 
As another example, consider a disconnect that resulted from raising the 
threshold for single audits from $500,000 to $750,000, as the 2014 creation of 
the Uniform Grant Guidance did. In practice, this change increased the burden 
on “pass-through entities” such as state agencies, which had previously relied 
on reviewing their subgrantees’ single audits for monitoring.468 The Uniform 
Grant Guidance also heightened the requirements for oversight conducted by 
pass-through entities more generally.469 Yet there was no discussion in the 
congressional budget process whether an increase in appropriations or a change 
in its allocation would be helpful to state agencies during this transition as they 
needed to expand their capacity. And in fact, state agencies struggled with the 
transition, jeopardizing their own federal funding as a result.470 
To be sure, these examples of better decision-making resulting from 
reducing silos all assume that better management of federal grants is a shared 
goal. For those who want to shrink the federal government, oppose 
intergovernmental programs, or wish to reduce the social welfare state, poor 
management of such programs may well be desirable to create the proof needed 
 
466. See supra notes 287-291 and accompanying text. 
467. See Beryl A. Radin, Performance Management and Intergovernmental Relations, in 
CONLAN & POSNER, supra note 25, at 245-49 (discussing federal evaluation programs that are 
insensitive to block grant flexibility); Posner, supra note 29 (describing a version of this situation). 
468. New Audit Threshold May Create Oversight Burden for Pass-Throughs, SINGLE AUDIT 
INFO. SERV., June 2014, at 1. 
469. Uniform Grant Guidance Expands the Role of Pass-through Entities, FED. GRANTS 
MGMT. HANDBOOK, July 2014, at 1. 
470. See, e.g., Better Oversight Sought for Pa. Homeless Programs, SINGLE AUDIT INFO. 
SERV., Mar. 2016, at 6-7 (discussing deficiencies in Pennsylvania’s monitoring of grantees and 
subgrantees and risk of being required to return funds to HUD); Tenn. Agency to Address Monitoring 
Weaknesses, SINGLE AUDIT INFO. SERV., Jan. 2017, at 5-6 (discussing deficiencies in Tennessee’s 
monitoring of economic and community development subgrantees). 
10. PASACHOFF ARTICLE. PUBLICATION (DO NOT DELETE) 5/31/2020  3:21 PM 
Federal Grant Rules and Realities 
649 
 
to rein them in. This is a barrier to cross-silo collaboration. Other such barriers 
exist as well, including a general lack of trust connected to partisan rancor.471 
These are difficult problems that implicate far more than the complexities 
of federal grants administration. Nonetheless, while collaboration across silos 
will not always be feasible, it surely sometimes will be. One can acknowledge 
the existence of these barriers without assuming they will always be fatal to the 
possibility of collaboration. 
Conclusion 
The grants-management regime plays a critical but underrecognized role 
in driving the implementation of some of the nation’s most important policies. 
This Article shows how and why the regime can unintentionally frustrate the 
accomplishment of those policies’ goals. By disaggregating the variety of legal 
rules and the institutional relationships in which the rules are embedded, this 
Article reveals the pathologies stemming from the incentives created by the 
rules and those relationships. This Article also shows how those incentives 
might be redesigned, not with an easy, one-time, one-size-fits-all fix, but rather 
with a cautious, real-world approach to the role of federal grants in our political 
system—one that acknowledges the complex problems of intergovernmental 
internal administration and ongoing institutional and political realities. For the 
story of the pathologies of the grants-management rules is not one of inevitable 
government failure. It is instead a story of the potential to improve the capacity 
of the intergovernmental administrative state to better implement policies in  
service of the American public.  
 
 
471. See, e.g., HERD & MOYNIHAN, supra note 35, at 12, 241-51 (discussing the political 
complexities of negotiating administrative burdens); Paul L. Posner, The Bleak Outlook for Our 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Future, GOVERNING (Oct. 23, 
2013https://www.governing.com/columns/mgmt-insights/col-bleak-outlook-fiscal-future-state-local-
federal-intergovernmental-forum.html [https://perma.cc/C8Z3-MGMV]. 
